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INTRODUCTION
Some areas of the law are neatly organized and packaged. For
example, federal tax laws can generally be found in the United States
Tax Code. Commercial law has the Uniform Commercial Code at its
foundation. The Uniform Probate Code has codified estate laws in
many states. However, labor and employment laws have been
adopted in a hodge-podge fashion. Courts, attorneys, employers and
employees must have a vast store of knowledge and expertise when
analyzing issues concerning the workplace. American labor and em-
ployment law can be found in the United States Constitution, state
constitutions, federal statutes and regulations, state statutes and reg-
ulations, local ordinances and regulations, and common law princi-
ples. A simple listing of statutes implicating federal labor and
employment law illustrates the breadth and depth of federal legisla-
tion in this important area of national policy. 1
1. The Reconstruction Era Civil Rights Acts, including the Civil Rights Act of
1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981; and the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985; the
Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d); the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-209;
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634; the Civil
Rights Restoration Act of 1987, 20 U.S.C. 1687 et seq.; the Congressional Accountability
Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq.; the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d & e et
seq.; the Civil Rights Act of 1991; the Glass Ceiling Act of 1991; the Civil Rights Attor-
neys' Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988; the Employee Polygraph Protection
Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2009; the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115;
the Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C. § 276a; the Walsh-Healey Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ 35-45; the
Service Contract Labor Standards Act of 1965, 41 U.S.C. §§ 351-358; the Portal-to-Por-
tal Pay Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 251-262; the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 623-630; the Federal Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1801; the Wagner-Peyser Act, 29 U.S.C. § 49; the Federal Unemploy-
ment Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3311; the Job Training Partnership Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1501-1781; the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 U.S.C. § 1324B; the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k); the Whistleblower Protec-
tion Act of 1989, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1211-1222, 3352; the Railway Labor Act of 1945, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-163, 181-188; the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654; the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq.; the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 706(8), 791, 793-794a; the Vietnam Era Veterans Readjust-
ment Assistance Act, 38 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2014; the National Labor Relations Act and
Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197; the Labor-Management Re-
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Given the daunting backdrop of federal legislation impacting the
labor and employment arena, the task of understanding how all of the
federal legislation-not to mention the state and local legislation-in-
terrelates may be an impossible task even for legal experts. One vital
area of federal employment legislation involves protecting the rights
of individuals with disabilities. The Americans with Disabilities Act
of 19902 ("ADA") was a long-awaited piece of federal legislation which
seeks "to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities."3
The ADA also seeks "to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable
standards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabili-
ties," and "to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role
in enforcing the standards established in this Act on behalf of individ-
uals with disabilities."4 To fully understand the ADA and to ensure
its purposes are fulfilled, other federal employment statutes must not
diminish the ADA's goals. This article discusses how the ADA inter-
acts with other critical federal employment statutes.5
porting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531; the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678; the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29
U.S.C. §§ 201-219; the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-
1451; the Immigration and Naturalization Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1105; the Privacy Act
of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 522a; Title IX of Education Amendments to the Higher Education
Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688; the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C.
§§ 7101-7135; the Job Training Partnership Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1781; the Federal
Employee's Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-9193; the Social Security Act of 1935,
42 U.S.C. §§ 423 et seq.; the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33
U.S.C. §§ 901-950; and the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12213.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2)-(3).
5. Because this article addresses the critical interactions between the ADA and
other federal employment statutes, it will not discuss the majority of the laws men-
tioned above or any state or local laws. Thus, this article will not discuss how the ADA
interacts with state workers' compensation statutes, although courts, attorneys, em-
ployers and individuals with disabilities must understand how these laws interact.
Notwithstanding this paper's omission of such a discussion, the reader may wish to
review some of the vast and expansive literature on this subject. See, e.g., Scott A. Carl-
son, The ADA and the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act: Can Two "Rights" Make a
"Wrong"?, 19 S. ILL. U. L. J. 567 (1995); Barbara L. Kramer, Hayes and Mobley: Bridg-
ing the Definition of Disability under the Ohio Workers' Compensation Act and the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 45 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 733 (1997); Ranko Shiraki
Oliver, The Impact of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 on Workers'
Compensation Law, 16 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 327 (1994); Gregory G. Pinski and
Angela L. Rud, The Employer's "Bermuda Triangle:" An Analysis of the Intersection Be-
tween Workers' Compensation, ADA, and FMLA, 76 N. D. L. REV. 69 (2000); Alison
Steiner, The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and Workers' Compensation: The
Employee's Perspective, 62 Miss. L. J. 631 (1993); EEOC Notice #915.002, EEOC En-
forcement Guidance: Workers' Compensation and the ADA.
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Specifically, this article focuses on how the ADA affects and is af-
fected by other federal laws. Part I discusses the ADA's interrelation-
ship to the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993. Part II discusses
the ADA's interaction with the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970. Part III discusses the applicability of the hostile work environ-
ment theory under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. of 1964 to the
ADA. Part IV discusses the ADA's relationship to the Social Security
Act of 1935. Finally, Part V discusses the ADA's interaction with the
National Labor Relations Act and national labor policy. Given the dis-
abling complexity of the vast amount of federal employment legisla-
tion, especially the laws impacting our national disability policy, every
citizen must critically ask whether our Nation enjoys a single, clear,
effective, compassionate policy toward individuals with disabilities.
I. SO CLOSE, YET SO FAR AWAY: THE ADA'S INTERACTION
WITH THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT OF 1993
A. INTRODUCTION
The ADA can often interact with the Family and Medical Leave
Act of 19936 ("FMLA"). 7 However, it is important to remember the
FMLA is a leave-oriented act,8 while the ADA is a work-oriented act. 9
Although the FMLA focuses on leave and the ADA focuses on work,
understanding the interaction between these two employment stat-
utes can be difficult. One author has noted sixty-three percent of re-
spondents to a Society for Human Resource Management survey
6. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654.
7. See, e.g., Gregory G. Pinski & Angela L. Rud, The Employer's "Bermuda Trian-
gle:" An Analysis of the Intersection Between Workers' Compensation, ADA, and FMLA,
76 N. D. L. REV. 69 (2000); James A. Passamano, Employee Leave Under the Americans
with Disabilities Act and the Family Medical Leave Act, 38 S. TEx. L. REv. 861 (1997);
Lisa J. Gitnik, Note: Will the Interaction of the Family and Medical Leave Act and the
Americans with Disabilities Act Leave Employees with an "Undue Hardship?," 74 WASH.
U. L. Q. 283 (1996); David W. Wilhelmus & Mary Tiede Wilhelmus, The Interaction of
the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Family Medical Leave Act, and the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act and Their Impact on Libraries, 88 LAw LIBR. J. 231 (1996).
8. See 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(2) (stating one of the FMLA's purposes is "to entitle
employees to take reasonable leave for medical reasons, for the birth or adoption of a
child, and for the care of a child, spouse, or parent who has a serious health condition");
29 C.F.R. § 825.101(a) (stating the "FMLA is intended to allow employees to balance
their work and family life by taking reasonable unpaid leave for medical reasons, for the
birth or adoption of a child, and for the care of a child, spouse, or parent who has a
serious health condition").
9. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (stating a qualified individual with a disability "is "an
individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can per-
form the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or
desires"); § 12112(a) (prohibiting discrimination "against a qualified individual with a
disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application proce-
dures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job
training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment").
[Vol. 38
DISABLING COMPLEXITY
"reported frequent or occasional uncertainty about coordinating leave
under the ADA, the FMLA, and short-term and long-term disability
programs."10 The same author noted fifty-eight percent of those re-
sponding to the same survey "reported uncertainty about whether an
employee who requested FMLA leave was also covered by the ADA."1
Indeed, the interaction between the FMLA, the ADA, and state work-
ers' compensation laws has been referred to as the Bermuda Trian-
gle. 12 An employee can have rights under both the ADA and the
FMLA, under the ADA and not the FMLA, under the FMLA and not
the ADA, or no rights under either the ADA or the FMLA. Therefore,
one must understand how the ADA and the FMLA interact.
When the ADA and the FMLA interact, both statutes must be in-
terpreted and applied such that neither is adversely impacted by the
other. The ADA specifically states that it does not "invalidate or limit
the remedies, rights, and procedures of any Federal law... that pro-
vides greater or equal protection for the rights of individuals with dis-
abilities than are afforded by this Act."1 3 Likewise, the FMLA
specifically mandates that it does not "modify or affect any Federal...
law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of ... disability."14 Al-
though the ADA and the FMLA may be implicated at the same time,
both statutes stand on their own and must be individually analyzed
under their varying standards. 15 The most critical distinction be-
10. See, e.g., Lawrence P. Postol, Sailing the Employment Law Bermuda Triangle,
18 LAB. LAw. 165, 166 (2002) (citing Disabilities: SHRM Survey Finds Uncertainty
about ADA/FMLA Interaction, 57 DAILY LABOR REPORT (BNA) A-7 (Mar. 23, 1999)).
11. Id.
12. See, e.g., id.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(b).
14. 29 U.S.C. § 2651(a); see also § 2651(b) ("[n]othing in this Act or any amendment
made by this Act shall be construed to supersede any provision of any State or local law
that provides greater family or medical leave rights than the rights established under
this Act or any amendment made by this Act."); 29 C.F.R. § 825.702(a). Section
825.702(a) provides, in pertinent part:
Nothing in [the] FMLA modifies or affects any Federal or State law prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of race, religion, color, national origin, sex, age, or
disability (e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act). [The] FMLA's legislative history explains that
[the] FMLA is "not intended to modify or affect the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
as amended, the regulations concerning employment which have been promul-
gated pursuant to that statute, or the [ADA], or the regulations issued under
[the ADA]. Thus, the leave provisions of the [FMLA] are wholly distinct from
the reasonable accommodation obligations of employers covered under the
[ADA] ....
Id.
15. Before addressing the interaction, or overlap, between the ADA and the FMLA,
one must understand who is covered under each statute. Neither the ADA nor the
FMLA applies to all employers and all employees. Similarly, an employer who is sub-
ject to the ADA may not be subject to the FMLA. The ADA defines employer as "a
person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees for
each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding
2005]
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tween the ADA and the FMLA involves the standard under which em-
ployees gain protection under both employment statutes. For that
reason, this section will focus only on those varying standards of cov-
erage under the ADA and the FMLA.
B. THE ADA AND THE FMLA
The ADA prohibits discrimination against qualified individuals
with disabilities. 16 Specifically, the ADA states that "[n]o covered en-
tity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability
because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application
procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, em-
ployee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and
privileges of employment." 17 A qualified individual with a disability is
"an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable ac-
calendar year, and any agent of such person." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A). However, the
ADA excludes from its definition of employer "(i) the United States, a corporation wholly
owned by the government of the United States, or an Indian tribe; or (ii) a bona fide
private membership club (other than a labor organization) that is exempt from taxation
under section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986." § 12115(5)(B).
The FMLA defines employer as "any person engaged in commerce or in any indus-
try or activity affecting commerce who employs 50 or more employees for each working
day during each of 20 or more calendar workweeks in the current or preceding calendar
year." 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(i); see also § 2611(4)(A)(ii)-(iv) (stating that an employer
includes "any person who acts, directly or indirectly, in the interest of an employer to
any of the employees of such employer[,l any successor in interest of an employer[,] any
'public agency' [as defined in the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, and] the General
Accounting Office and the Library of Congress."); 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.104-.109.
The ADA broadly defines an employee as "an individual employed by an employer,"
including United States citizens employed in foreign countries. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(4).
The FMLA has a more limited definition of employee: "[tihe term 'eligible employee'
means an employee who has been employed (i) for at least 12 months by the employer
with respect to whom leave is requested under [29 U.S.C. § 2612]; and (ii) for at least
1,250 hours of service with such employer during the previous 12-month period." 29
U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A). The FMLA excludes from its definition of employee "any Federal
officer or employee covered under [5 U.S.C. § 6381, or] any employee of an employer
who is employed at a worksite at which such employer employs less than 50 employees
if the total number of employees employed by that employer within 75 miles of that
worksite is less than 50." 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(B); 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.110, 111. Another
critical difference between the ADA and the FMLA involves Eleventh Amendment Im-
munity. Title I of the ADA and the FMLA have not been treated the same when it
comes to the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit. Compare Bd. of Tr. of
Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 n.9 (2001) (holding "Congress did not validly
abrogate the States' sovereign immunity from suit by private individuals for money
damages under [Title I of the ADA]"), with Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S.
721, 725 (2003) (holding Congress validly abrogated the States' sovereign immunity
from suit by private individuals for money damages under the FMLA). But see Tennes-
see v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 1994 (2004) (holding Title II of the ADA, "as it applies to
the class of cases implicating the fundamental right of access to the courts," validly
abrogated States' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); see also § 12112(b) (construing the term "discriminate").
878 [Vol. 38
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commodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment
position that such individual holds or desires.
18
The FMLA, on the other hand, provides qualified employees with
up to twelve workweeks of leave per year.1 9 Specifically, a qualified
employee can receive her federally mandated leave for the birth of a
child, placement of an adopted or foster child with the employee, to
care for certain relatives with serious health conditions, or when a se-
rious health condition prevents the employee from performing her
job.20 Employers are prohibited from discriminating against or inter-
fering with employees who seek to exercise their FMLA rights.
21
It is essential to understand how the ADA and the FMLA inter-
act. The most critical distinction between the ADA and the FMLA lies
in what health conditions are covered. The ADA only protects quali-
fied individuals with disabilities. 2 2 Therefore, an individual must
have a qualifying disability to benefit from the ADAs protection. 23
The FMLA, on the other hand, does not cover individuals with disabil-
ities. Instead, the FMLA uses a distinct term for coverage-"serious
health condition." 24 While the Supreme Court has actively inter-
preted the term "disability" under the ADA, the Court has not ad-
dressed the FMLA's use of the term "serious health condition."2 5
C. THE ADA's Focus ON DIsABILITY
The ADA's most important definition is what constitutes a disa-
bility. The ADA defines disability as "(A) a physical or mental impair-
ment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities
of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being
18. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1).
20. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1).
21. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)-(b).
22. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (defining disability).
24. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(11). Because of the apparent similarities between the terms
"disability" and "serious health condition," this article will focus on the FMLA's defini-
tion of "serious health condition," and will not discuss the FMLA's other applicable
terms, e.g., birth, adoption, serious health condition of certain family members. Id.
25. The ADA specifically charged the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) with issuing regulations implementing Title I dealing with employment. 42
U.S.C. § 12116. Interestingly enough, the term disability is defined in a generally appli-
cable provision of the ADA, outside of Title I. § 12102. Thus, the Supreme Court has
recognized that "no agency has been delegated authority to interpret the term 'disabil-
ity.'" Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 479 (1999) (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102(2)); see also Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 194 (2002).
Notwithstanding the lack of Congressional authority, the EEOC has issued regulations
defining disability. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)-(k). The FMLA, on the other hand, charged
the Secretary of Labor with issuing regulations implementing the FMLA, which in-
cludes the definition of serious health condition. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2611(11), 2654. The La-
bor Secretary has complied with this congressional charge. 29 C.F.R. § 825.114.
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regarded as having such an impairment."26 In a trio of cases issued
on the same day in 1999, the Supreme Court limited the ADA's reach
by narrowly interpreting the term disability.2 7 The Supreme Court
again limited the scope of the term disability in 2002.28
In Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,29 twin sisters with severe my-
opia were precluded from interviewing for commercial airline pilot po-
sitions because their uncorrected vision was worse than 20/100.30
With corrective lenses, each sister had at least 20/20 vision and could
"function identically to individuals without a similar impairment."3 1
The twins sued for disability discrimination under the ADA, which ul-
timately led to the Supreme Court deciding the effect mitigating mea-
sures have on an individual's disability. Specifically, the Court asked
whether an individual's disability should be determined by taking into
account corrective measures. 32 The Court recognized the EEOC had
already issued interpretive guidance that an ADA disability determi-
nation is made "without regard to mitigating measures."33 The Court
determined "that the approach adopted by the [EEOC's] guidelines-
that persons are to be evaluated in their hypothetical uncorrected
state-is an impermissible interpretation of the ADA."34 The Court
held "the determination of whether an individual is disabled should be
made with reference to measures that mitigate the individual's
impairment."3 5
In addition to holding eligibility for ADA protection depends on
measures that mitigate an impairment, the Supreme Court, in Sutton,
also addressed circumstances when an employer regards an individual
as having a disability under the ADA.3 6 The ADA protects an individ-
ual who is "regarded as having a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such in-
dividual."37 The Supreme Court recognized two ways in which an in-
26. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
27. See Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999); Murphy v. United
Parcel Serv., 527 U.S. 516 (1999); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
28. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
29. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
30. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475-76.
31. Id. at 475.
32. Id. at 481.
33. Id. at 480 (quoting 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(j) (1998)).
34. Id. at 482.
35. Id. at 475; see also Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. at 565-66 (holding mitigating mea-
sures include "measures undertaken with artificial aids, like medications and devices,
and measures undertaken, whether consciously or not, with the body's own systems");
Murphy, 527 U.S. at 521 (holding employee's hypertension was not an ADA-qualifying
disability when controlled by medication).
36. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489-94; see 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C).
37. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(2)(B), 12102(2)(C).
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dividual may be regarded as having a disability. 38 First, an
individual is regarded as having a disability when "a covered entity
mistakenly believes that a person has a physical impairment that sub-
stantially limits one or more .major life activities."3 9 Second, an indi-
vidual is regarded as having a disability when "a covered entity
mistakenly believes that an actual, nonlimiting impairment substan-
tially limits one or more major life activities."40 The analysis must
focus on whether a covered entity "entertain[s] misperceptions about
the individual-it must believe either that one has a substantially
limiting impairment that one does not have or that one has a substan-
tially limiting impairment when, in fact, the impairment is not so
limiting."4 1
The Court specifically recognized an employer can legally "prefer
some physical attributes over others."42 However, the Court noted an
employer violates "the ADA when it makes an employment decision
based on a physical or mental impairment, real or imagined, that is
regarded as substantially limiting a major life activity."4 3 Thus, the
Court made clear that "an employer is free to decide that physical
characteristics or medical conditions that do not rise to the level of an
impairment-such as one's height, build, or singing voice-are prefer-
able to others, just as it is free to decide that some limiting, but not
substantially limiting, impairments make individuals less than ide-
ally suited for a job."4 4
When deciding whether an impairment substantially limits a ma-
jor life activity, the Court stated that "'substantially' suggests 'consid-
erable' or 'specified to a large degree.'"4 5 The Court also noted the
EEOC's regulations interpret "substantially limits" as "'[ulnable to
perform' or '[s]ignficantly restricted."' 4 6 The Court again took up the
task of defining "substantially limits" three years later in Toyota Mo-
tor Manufacturing, Ky., Inc. v. Williams.4 7
38. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (Congressional finding that "individuals
with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority who have been faced with restric-
tions and limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and rele-
gated to a position of political powerlessness in our society, based on characteristics that
are beyond the control of such individuals and resulting from stereotypic assumptions
not truly indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to participate in, and
contribute to, society").
42. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 490.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 490-91.
45. Id. at 491 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 2280 (1976)).
46. Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i), (ii) (1998)).
47. 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
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In Toyota, an employee sued her employer for failing to provide a
reasonable accommodation under the ADA for the employee's carpal
tunnel syndrome and related impairments.A4 The employee asserted
her physical impairments substantially limited her in the major life
activity of performing manual tasks.4 9 Thus, the Supreme Court was
faced with determining "the proper standard for assessing whether an
individual is substantially limited in performing manual tasks."50
The Court asked "what a plaintiff must demonstrate to establish a
substantial limitation in the specific major life activity of performing
manual tasks."5 1
Following Sutton's lead, the Court in Toyota determined "substan-
tially ... suggests 'considerable' or 'to a large degree."' 5 2 The Court
determined Congress's use of the term "substantial" "clearly precludes
impairments that interfere in only a minor way with the performance
of manual tasks from qualifying as disabilities."5 3 The Court then in-
terpreted the term "major" to mean "important."54 With these defini-
tions in hand, the Court defined the term "major life activities" as
"those activities that are of central importance to daily life."5 5 Thus,
the Court held that, when performing manual tasks is the major life
activity in question, the "manual tasks .. .must be central to daily
life." 56 To qualify as a major life activity, the Court stated that tasks
can be viewed independently or collectively. 5 7 However, the Court an-
nounced that the ADA's definition of disability must "be interpreted
strictly to create a demanding standard."58
After examining the ADA's language defining disability, the
Court held "that to be substantially limited in performing manual
tasks, an individual must have an impairment that prevents or se-
verely restricts the individual from doing activities that are of central
importance to most people's daily lives."5 9 The Court announced that
household chores, bathing, and brushing one's teeth are examples of
48. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 187.
49. Id. at 190. Although not relevant to this discussion, the employee also con-
tended her impairments limited her ability to engage in the major life activities of
housework, gardening, playing with her children, lifting, and working. Id.
50. Id. at 192.
51. Id. at 196.
52. Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEw INT'L DICTIoNARY 2280 (1976)); see also Sut-
ton, 527 U.S. at 491 (quoting same definition for the term substantially).
53. Id. at 197 (citing Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. at 565).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 198.
57. Id. at 197.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 198.
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manual tasks that are of central importance to people's daily lives. 60
The Court also stated the impact of the impairment must be perma-
nent or long-term.6 1
The Supreme Court also commanded lower courts to interpret the
ADA's terms "strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as
disabled," and mandated that courts determine the existence of an
ADA-qualifying disability in "a case-by-case manner."6 2 In making a
case-by-case assessment of a person's claim to have an ADA-qualifying
disability, the Court made clear "[uit is insufficient for individuals at-
tempting to prove disability status under this test to merely submit
evidence of a medical diagnosis of an impairment."63 The Court noted
an individualized assessment of the effect an impairment has on an
individual's major life activity "is particularly necessary when the im-
pairment is one whose symptoms vary widely from person to
person."64
Given the Supreme Court's pronouncement that the standard to
qualify as disabled under the ADA is a demanding one,6 5 it should
come as no surprise that many individuals asserting ADA claims are
unsuccessful because they are unable to prove they have an ADA-
qualifying disability. 6 6
60. Id. at 202.
61. Id. at 198 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)(ii)-(iii) (2001)).
62. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (defining disability "with respect to an
individual")).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 199.
65. Id. at 197.
66. See, e.g., McGeshick v. Principi, 357 F.3d 1146, 1148-51 (10th Cir. 2004) (hold-
ing individual's Meniere's disease, tinnitus and vertigo are not ADA-qualifying disabili-
ties); Ristrom v. Asbestos Workers Local 34 Joint Apprenticeship Comm., 370 F.3d 763,
769-72 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding individual's attention deficit disorder and depression are
not ADA-qualifying disabilities); Brunke v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 344 F.3d 819,
821-22 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding individual's epilepsy not an ADA-qualifying disability);
Doebele v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 342 F.3d 1117, 1130 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding indi-
vidual's bipolar disorder, Attention Deficit Disorder and hypothyroidism not ADA-quali-
fying disabilities); Liljedahl v. Ryder Student Transp. Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 836, 841
(8th Cir. 2003) (holding individual's cancer and lung cancer not qualifying disabilities
under ADA-analogous state statute); Waldrip v. Gen. Elec. Co., 325 F.3d 652, 655-57
(5th Cir. 2003) (holding individual's chronic pancreatitis not an ADA-qualifying disabil-
ity); Whitlock v. Mac-Gray, Inc., 345 F.3d 44, 46 (1st Cir. 2003) (holding individual's
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder not an ADA-qualifying disability); Wood v.
Crown Redi-Mix, Inc., 339 F.3d 682, 686 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding individual's back im-
pairment not an ADA-qualifying disability); Mahon v. Crowell, 295 F.3d 585, 591-92
(6th Cir. 2002) (same); Orr v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 297 F.3d 720, 724 (8th Cir. 2002)
(holding individual's diabetes not an ADA-qualifying disability).
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D. THE FMLA's Focus ON SERIOUS HEALTH CONDITION
Although the Supreme Court has interpreted the ADA's use of the
term "disability," the Court has not interpreted the FMLA's use of the
term "serious health condition." Because the Court has not inter-
preted the FMLA's critical term, it has also not restricted the meaning
of that term. Unlike the ADA's demanding standard to qualify as hav-
ing a disability,6 7 the FMLA's standard cannot be considered demand-
ing. Thus, many individuals claiming to have FMLA-qualifying
serious health conditions are successful in obtaining leave, unlike
many individuals attempting to meet the demanding standard to have
an ADA-qualifying disability.68 The FMLA has a relatively straight-
forward definition of what constitutes a serious health condition: "an
illness, injury, impairment, or physical or mental condition that in-
volves (A) inpatient care in a hospital, hospice, or residential medical
care facility; or (B) continuing treatment by a health care provider."69
Thus, it is quite obvious the FMLA broadly defines what constitutes a
serious health condition, requiring an illness, injury, impairment or
condition simply to involve inpatient care or continuing treatment by
a health care provider. Complying with Congress's mandate to imple-
ment the FMLA, the Secretary of Labor issued an extensive regulation
further developing the term "serious health condition." 70 Indeed, the
Secretary of Labor has issued a lengthy answer to the question of
"[w]hat is a 'serious health condition' entitling an employee to FMLA
leave?" 7 1 Although one must still work through the definition of seri-
ous health condition to determine whether an employee is entitled to
FMLA benefits, the standard is not demanding.
The EEOC has issued a fact sheet to provide technical assistance
on common questions about the interaction between the ADA and the
FMLA. When asked whether the ADA's definition of disability is the
67. See Toyota, 534 U.S. at 197.
68. See Miller v. AT&T, 250 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 2001) (influenza can be an FMLA-
qualifying serious health condition); Hodgens v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 144 F.3d 151 (1st
Cir. 1998) (atrial fibrillation); Brock v. United Grinding Tech., Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d
1089 (S.D. Ohio 2003) (depression); Niimi-Montalbo v. White, 243 F. Supp. 2d 1109 (D.
Haw. 2003) (back injury); Swanson v. Senior Res. Connection, 254 F. Supp. 2d 945 (S.D.
Ohio 2003) (depression); Corcino v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, 200 F. Supp. 2d 507
(D.V.I. 2002) (pharyngitis); Peter v. Lincoln Technical Inst., 255 F. Supp. 2d 417 (E.D.
Pa. 2002) (sleep apnea). But see Frazier v. IBP, Inc., 200 F.3d 1190 (8th Cir. 2000)
(holding an employee's shoulder injury not an FMLA-qualifying serious health condi-
tion); Haefling v. UPS, Inc., 169 F.3d 494 (7th Cir. 1999) (neck injury); Joslin v.
Rockwell Intl Corp., 8 F. Supp. 2d 1158 (N.D. Iowa 1998) (adverse reaction to allergy
shot); Roberts v. Human Dev. Ass'n, 4 F. Supp. 2d 154 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (post-meno-
pausal vaginal bleeding).
69. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(11).
70. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.114-.115.
71. 29 C.F.R. § 825.114. The Secretary's expanded definition of the FMLA's term
"serious health condition" is not complicated, but deserves a careful study.
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same as the FMLA's definition of serious health condition, the EEOC
stated "[a n FMLA 'serious health condition' is not necessarily an ADA
'disability."' 72 The EEOC opined, however, that some serious health
conditions under the FMLA, such as most cancers and serious strokes,
may qualify as disabilities under the ADA. 73 On the other hand, the
EEOC stated other serious health conditions under the FMLA, such
as pregnancy, a broken leg or a hernia, may not be ADA-qualifying
disabilities, because such conditions may not substantially limit a ma-
jor life activity.74
The EEOC also addressed how the ADA's three-pronged defini-
tion of disability interacts with the FMLA's definition of serious
health condition. The EEOC noted that, although an individual may
have a record of a serious health condition, that circumstance alone
would not necessarily require a finding that the individual has a re-
cord of an ADA-qualifying disability. The reasoning is simple-under
the ADA, an individual has a record of a disability only when the indi-
vidual has a record of an impairment that substantially limits a major
life activity, not whether an individual has a record of a serious health
condition. v5
Finally, the EEOC addressed the ADA's regarded as disabled
prong of the disability definition. The EEOC duly noted that, just be-
cause an individual has an FMLA-qualifying serious health condition,
that does not mean the employer regards the individual as having an
ADA-qualifying disability.7 6 As discussed above, the Supreme Court
has stated an individual is regarded as having a disability when "a
covered entity mistakenly believes that a person has a physical im-
pairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities," or
when "a covered entity mistakenly believes that an actual, nonlimit-
ing impairment substantially limits one or more major life activi-
ties."7 7 It is important to recognize the FMLA only grants rights
when an employee has an FMLA-qualifying serious health condition,
so being regarded as having an FMLA-qualifying serious health condi-
tion provides no benefits under the FMLA.
While the ADA grants protection to an individual who has a disa-
bility, or even a record of a disability or is regarded as having a disa-
bility, the FMLA only grants protection to an individual who actually
72. See EEOC Guidance, Facts About the Family and Medical Leave Act, the Amer-
icans with Disabilities Act, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Q. 9 at 3 (No-
vember 1995), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/fmlaada.html.
73. Id.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. Id.
77. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489.
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has a serious health condition (or who has a family member with a
serious health condition). The FMLA does not provide protection for
an individual who is perceived to have a serious health condition. Not
surprisingly, the FMLA also does not consider mitigating measures
when determining whether an individual has a serious health condi-
tion, as does the ADA when determining whether an individual has a
disability.
Because the ADA and the FMLA seemingly overlap, as both in-
volve impairments of some sort, it is common for plaintiffs to allege
ADA and FMLA violations in the same lawsuit.78 Notwithstanding
any desire to blend an ADA claim with an FMLA claim, one must al-
ways separately analyze eligibility for protection under either statute,
as each statute establishes different standards and effectuates differ-
ent national employment policies. 79 By keeping the statutes analyti-
cally separate, courts can decide a plaintiff has rights under one
statute and not the other.
E. JUDICIAL INTERACTION BETWEEN THE ADA AND THE FMLA
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has
confronted the interaction between the ADA and the FMLA, illumi-
nating how the two employment laws diverge on a single set of facts
and underscoring why a separate analytical framework must be ap-
plied to the ADA and the FMLA. In Spangler v. Federal Home Loan
Bank of Des Moines,80 Theresa Spangler, a bank employee, was diag-
nosed with dysthymia, a form of depression.8 ' In 1993, Spangler took
six weeks of leave to treat her depression.8 2 In 1997, Spangler took
78. See, e.g., Bones v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 366 F.3d 869 (10th Cir. 2004); Brenne-
man v. MedCentral Health Sys., 366 F.3d 412 (6th Cir. 2004); Buie v. Quad/Graphics,
Inc., 366 F.3d 496 (7th Cir. 2004); Rinehimer v. Cemcolift, Inc., 292 F.3d 375 (3d Cir.
2002).
79. Although not implicated by the current discussion of the potential interaction
between the ADA and the FMLA given the similar standards enunciated by both stat-
utes, it is worth noting a First Circuit Court of Appeals decision striking down a Depart-
ment of Labor regulation co-opting an EEOC regulation peripherally discusses the
interaction between the ADA and the FMLA. In Navarro v. Pfizer Corp., 261 F.3d 90,
92 (1st Cir. 2001), the First Circuit recognized the Secretary of Labor, when implement-
ing the FMLA, adopted certain definitions the EEOC had issued in implementing the
ADA. The First Circuit, while recognizing "the comparative jurisprudence of the ADA
and the FMLA," rejected the Labor regulations adopting the EEOC's durational re-
quirements as it applies to the ADA, determining the FMLA does not require such a
demanding showing as does the ADA. Id. at 104-05 (stating "we think it highly unlikely
that, with so much less at stake under the FMLA, Congress would have required FMLA
litigants to make the same durational showing as ADA litigants").
80. 278 F.3d 847 (8th Cir. 2002).
81. Spangler v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Des Moines, 278 F.3d 847, 848 (8th Cir.
2002).
82. Spangler, 278 F.3d at 848.
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more leave to undergo treatment.8 3 At that time, Spangler notified
her supervisor she took the leave to treat her depression, and later
told other supervisors about her depression.8 4 Between 1993 and
1997, Spangler was frequently absent or tardy from work, missing be-
tween twelve and thirty days per year.8 5 Spangler's excessive tardi-
ness and absenteeism came to a head in 1997, and her performance
appraisal specifically noted this problem.8 6 In January 1998, Span-
gler's string of absences prompted a warning and six-month probation,
with specific notice that she could not miss more than two workdays or
she would face discharge.8 7 Spangler missed two days of work during
the probationary period, and in the two months after her probation
ended, Spangler racked up four more unexcused absences.8 8 Spangler
was again placed on probation in late August 1998.89 On September
15, Spangler missed work due to transportation trouble. 90 On Sep-
tember 16, Spangler called the bank and left a message informing her
supervisor she would miss work because of "depression again."9 1
When Spangler missed work the next day, her supervisor discharged
her.92
Spangler sued her employer, alleging her discharge violated the
ADA and the FMLA.93 The district court granted summary judgment
to Spangler's employer on both claims.9 4 Analytically separating the
ADA and the FMLA claims, the Eighth Circuit first addressed Span-
gler's ADA claim.9 5 The court began its analysis by stating its oft-
repeated principle that regular attendance is an essential job func-
tion.9 6 After determining Spangler was unable to perform her essen-
tial job functions and thus not entitled to ADA protection, the court
affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the bank
on the ADA claim.9 7
After disposing of Spangler's ADA claim, the court focused on
Spangler's FMLA claim.9 8 The court immediately recognized that
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 849.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 849-50.
92. Id. at 850.
93. Id. at 848.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 850.
96. Id. (citing Pickens v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 264 F.3d 773, 777 (8th Cir. 2001)).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 851-53.
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"[the rights Congress created under the FMLA are fundamentally dif-
ferent than those granted under the ADA."9 9 While noting the ADA
provides no protection to an employee who is unable to perform her
job's essential functions, the court contrasted that with the FMLA's
design to protect an employee who is unable to perform her job's func-
tions from losing her job while taking FMLA-qualifying leave.10 0 The
court recognized the FMLA's leave period provides an employee with
the opportunity to treat a condition while unable to perform her
job.1 1 Thus, the court announced that Spangler's FMLA claim was
not automatically barred just because Spangler's ADA claim was de-
feated by her inability to perform the essential functions of her job. 102
Because the bank knew about Spangler's depression, her previous
leaves of absence to treat her depression, and that she said she needed
time off for depression, the court held a fact issue remained on
Spangler's FMLA claim such that summary judgment was
inappropriate.. 0 3
A federal district court decision also contains a good discussion of
the interaction between the ADA and the FMLA. In Swanson v. Se-
nior Resource Connection,'0 4 Benita Swanson missed numerous
workdays, which resulted in her supervisor counseling her to improve
her attendance.' 0 5 A little over a year after her counseling, Swanson
experienced "fatigue, stress, weight loss, lack of motivation and sleep-
ing disruptions, all of which had an impact on her work."10 6 At that
time, Swanson received a written reprimand for her excessive absen-
teeism and tardiness.10 7 Three months later, Swanson's supervisor
issued another written reprimand for being tardy or absent twenty-six
times, informing Swanson she would be discharged for the next infrac-
tion.' 0 8 The day after receiving the written reprimand, Swanson was
diagnosed with depression. 10 9 Swanson's doctor opined that the "de-
pression substantially limited [Swanson] 's ability to sleep and work,
but that with treatment, [Swanson's] difficulties could be allevi-
ated."1 10 Swanson's doctor then directed her to take two weeks of
leave from work."'l The day after being diagnosed with depression,
99. Id. at 851.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 853.
104. 254 F. Supp. 2d 945 (S.D. Ohio 2003).
105. Swanson v. Senior Res. Connection, 254 F. Supp. 2d 945, 948 (S.D. Ohio 2003).
106. Swanson, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 948.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
[Vol. 38
DISABLING COMPLEXITY
Swanson went to work and requested two weeks of leave as directed
by her doctor. 1 12 Swanson's employer granted her two weeks of
FMLA leave. 113 Swanson received a letter four days later informing
her she had been discharged. 114 Swanson sued her employer for vio-
lating the FMLA and the ADA 115
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio
first discussed the viability of Swanson's FMLA claim, determining
Swanson had established a submissible case of FMLA discrimina-
tion. 116 The court next determined Swanson's request for FMLA leave
was also a requested accommodation for her disability. 1 17 Once the
court determined factual issues existed on the FMLA leave issue, the
court then decided that it logically followed "that a genuine issue of
material fact also exists when the question is rephrased in the disabil-
ity discrimination context to ask whether Swanson's employer failed
to accommodate a reasonable request for accommodation."' 1 8 The
court's discussion of how the FMLA implicates the ADA is most perti-
nent to the discussion here because it provides an instructive example
of how the FMLA implicates the ADA.x19
The court furnished a helpful discussion of the interaction be-
tween the ADA and the FMLA. The court "clarified that Swanson's
disability discrimination claim is not at odds with her FMLA
claim." 120 Although Swanson's employer attempted "to play Swan-
son's evidence relating to her respective claims off on each other," the
court was not impressed. 12 1 The court recognized an employee alleg-
ing disability discrimination must show her ability to perform her
job's essential functions with or without reasonable accommoda-
tion. 122 The court then recognized that "[h onoring an employee's two-
week FMLA leave request, where her physician has recommended the
leave for the beneficial effect it might have on the employee's long-
term ability to function properly at work, can be a reasonable accom-
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 947.
116. Id. at 950-58.
117. Id. at 961.
118. Id.
119. Although Swanson's disability claim fell under Ohio law, rather than the ADA,
the case still is insightful because Ohio disability law tracks the ADA. See id. at 958-59.
The discussion will specifically focus on the court's handling of Swanson's claim that her
employer violated disability law by failing to accommodate her disability through leave,
which implicated the FMLA.
120. Swanson, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 961.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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modation itself (not to mention a duty imposed by Congress)." 123 The
court noted, "[a]lthough Swanson must demonstrate for purposes of
her FMLA claim that she needed two week's leave because she could
not, during that time, perform the functions of her job, there is no rea-
son why she cannot also demonstrate that she would have been able to
perform the essential functions of her job upon her return from
same."12 4 Because the record allowed an inference that Swanson
could perform the essential functions of her job if she had been given
two weeks leave, the court held Swanson's disability discrimination
claim for failure to accommodate was for the jury once her employer
"cut short her leave under the FMLA."12 5
Although the ADA and the FMLA use different language-disa-
bility versus serious health condition-for eligibility for coverage, and
serve different purposes-pro-work versus pro-leave-the ADA and
the FMLA significantly interact. Because the ADA and the FMLA are
routinely implicated by a single set of circumstances, the initial focus
must critically ask whether an individual has an ADA-qualifying disa-
bility and/or an FMLA-qualifying serious health condition. Once that
critical determination is made, a substantive discussion of what rights
the individual enjoys is merited.
The bottom line is an individual's eligibility for ADA protection
must be analyzed separately according to the ADA's standards with-
out interference or seepage from the FMLA. Of course, the opposite is
equally true. Because both the ADA and the FMLA represent differ-
ent federal employment policies, they must stand on their own and
should be analyzed under their unique analytical frameworks to vindi-
cate their underlying purposes. Blending the ADA and the FMLA for
ease will not result in either statute reaching its full potential.
F. CONCLUSION
Because both the ADA and the FMLA involve physical or mental
impairments, the two statutes are often implicated by a single set of
circumstances. However, neither the ADA nor the FMLA benefit from
a combined analytical framework to determine eligibility for protec-
tion under either statute. The ADA, a statute designed to open the job
market for individuals with disabilities, focuses on whether an indi-
vidual has a disability. The FMLA, designed to allow individuals with
certain physical conditions to take unpaid leave without fear of dis-
charge, focuses on whether an individual has a serious health condi-
tion. The only proper way to determine eligibility under the ADA and
123. Id.
124. Id. at 961-62.
125. Id. at 962.
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the FMLA is to faithfully follow the statutory and regulatory defini-
tions for both the ADA and the FMLA, and to recognize the statutes
use different language and serve different purposes. By adhering to
this command, federal employment policy can be applied consistently
and fairly to further Congressional intent.
II. WORKPLACE SAFETY MEETS WORKERS WITH
DISABILITIES: THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF
1970 AND THE ADA
A. INTRODUCTION
The ADA's interaction with the Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970 ("OSHA") may also pose complex issues for courts, employ-
ers, employees and attorneys. Whenever an individual with a disabil-
ity poses a threat to the health and safety of herself or others in the
workplace, both the ADA and OSHA must be considered. For the
most part, when the threat of harm is substantial and real, the ADA's
anti-discrimination protections for individuals with disabilities must
yield to workplace safety. However, the ADA does not yield lightly.
Only a critical and unflinching application of workplace safety con-
cerns will trump the ADA's prohibition against discrimination based
on disabilities.
B. OSHA CONFRONTS THE ADA
1. OSHA Mandates Workplace Safety
By enacting a comprehensive statute such as OSHA, Congress an-
nounced a national policy guaranteeing workplace safety. 12 6 When
studying workplace safety, Congress found "that personal injuries and
illnesses arising out of work situations impose a substantial burden
upon, and are a hindrance to, interstate commerce in terms of lost
production, wage loss, medical expenses, and disability compensation
payments." 12 7 Congress declared a national policy "to assure so far as
possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and health-
ful working conditions and to preserve our human resources." 128 To
meet this policy, Congress sought to encourage "employers and em-
ployees in their efforts to reduce the number of occupational safety
and health hazards at their places of employment, and to stimulate
employers and employees to institute new and to perfect existing pro-
126. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678.
127. 29 U.S.C. § 651(a).
128. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b).
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grams for providing safe and healthful working conditions." 12 9 Addi-
tionally, Congress sought to provide "medical criteria which will
assure insofar as practicable that no employee will suffer diminished
health, functional capacity, or life expectancy as a result of his work
experience" 130
OSHA's General Duty Clause requires every employer to "furnish
to each of his employees employment and a place of employment
which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely
to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees."' 3 ' Employ-
ees do not escape OSHA's requirements either, as they are also re-
quired to follow OSHA's mandate: "Each employee shall comply with
occupational safety and health standards and all rules, regulations,
and orders issued pursuant to this chapter which are applicable to his
own actions and conduct."1 3 2
Employers violate OSHA at their own peril; penalties can be
steep. 13 3 For example, an employer who willfully violates OSHA is
subject to a civil penalty between $5,000 and $70,000 per violation.' 3 4
A willful violation causing an employee's death subjects an employer
to a $10,000 fine and six months imprisonment.13 5 Finally, an em-
ployer who knowingly makes false statements or representations
about its OSHA compliance is subject to a $10,000 fine and six months
imprisonment.' 3 6 A serious violation exists "if there is a substantial
probability that death or serious physical harm could result from a
condition which exists ... unless the employer did not, and could not
with the exercise of reasonable diligence, know of the presence of the
violation."i137
If an individual, because of her disability, poses a threat to the
health and safety of others in the workplace, does an employer violate
OSHA by allowing the individual to work? If an employer refuses to
allow an individual with a disability to work because of the threat to
others in the workplace, does the employer violate the ADA? This ver-
itable Hobson's choice 138 places an employer in the unenviable posi-
tion of potentially violating one federal labor law in order to comply
129. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(1).
130. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(7).
131. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1).
132. 29 U.S.C. § 654(b).
133. See 29 U.S.C. § 666.
134. 29 U.S.C. § 666(a); see also §§ 666(b) (civil penalty for serious violation), 666(c)
(civil penalty for violation that is not serious), and 666(d) (civil penalty for failure to
correct a violation).
135. 29 U.S.C. § 666(e).
136. 29 U.S.C. § 666(g).
137. 29 U.S.C. § 666(k).
138. A Hobson's choice involves "the necessity of accepting one of two or more
equally objectionable things." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1076 (1993).
[Vol. 38
DISABLING COMPLEXITY
with another. Fortunately, the two statutes can be reconciled to pro-
mote workplace safety without unduly infringing on the right to work
of individuals with disabilities.
2. EEOC's Conflict Provision
Conflicts in the law are inevitable. Though confronted with an
apparent conflict between OSHA and the ADA, the conflict resolution
principles contained in the ADA's implementing regulations serve as a
guide to navigating the apparent conflict. Congress specifically au-
thorized the EEOC to interpret the ADA, 139 and the EEOC has com-
plied with this Congressional charge by issuing an exhaustive set of
regulations. 140 Realizing the ADA may conflict with other federal
laws, the EEOC promulgated 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(e), which specifi-
cally provides a defense to an ADA discrimination charge whenever "a
challenged action is required or necessitated by another Federal law
or regulation, or that another Federal law or regulation prohibits an
action (including the provision of a particular reasonable accommoda-
tion) that would otherwise be required."14 1 When an individual with a
disability poses a threat to the health or safety of others in the work-
place, can an employer rely on section 1630.15(e) if the employer ref-
uses to allow the individual to work? Unfortunately, courts have
rarely confronted the interaction between section 1630.15(e) and
OSHA's General Duty Clause.
3. Isolated Cases involving the ADA's Conflict with OSIIA
Although interpretive caselaw does not provide much assistance
in solving the apparent conflict between the ADA and OSHA, two
courts have discussed the interaction between the two federal work-
place statutes. In EEOC v. Murray, Inc.,142 Raymond Waits, an insu-
lin-dependent diabetic, worked as a forklift operator for his employer,
Murray, Inc. 143 After Waits had worked for Murray for about twenty-
four years, Murray implemented a medical screening program for
forklift operators, which automatically excluded an employee from op-
erating a forklift if the employee had been diagnosed with insulin-de-
pendent diabetes. 14 4 Once Waits disclosed he was an insulin-
dependent diabetic, Murray removed Waits from his forklift position
139. 42 U.S.C. § 12116.
140. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.
141. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(e).
142. 175 F. Supp. 2d 1053 (M.D. Tenn. 2001).
143. EEOC v. Murray, Inc., 175 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1055 (M.D. Tenn. 2001).
144. Murray, 175 F. Supp. 2d at 1055-56 (noting the medical screening program also
excluded individuals with other impairments such as hearing problems, epilepsy and
heart problems).
20051
CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW
and eventually discharged him. 145 Murray did not consider-and
would not accept-any further medical information or examinations to
determine the effect the diabetes had on Waits's ability to safely oper-
ate a forklift. 146 The EEOC sued Murray for violating the ADA by
discharging Waits because of his diabetes. 14 7
Murray asserted OSHA's General Duty Clause as a defense to dis-
ability discrimination. 148 Murray contended that, because employees
with insulin-dependent diabetes created a hazard likely to kill or seri-
ously harm other employees, OSHA required Murray to eradicate this
recognized hazard. 14 9 The EEOC disagreed, arguing OSHA did not
require excluding all individuals with certain impairments from oper-
ating forklifts. 15 0 The EEOC recognized some individuals with disa-
bilities could be excluded from the workplace. 15 1 For example, the
EEOC acknowledged Murray could preclude from the workplace a dia-
betic with frequent blackouts due to uncontrolled blood sugar because
of that individual's specific risk to workplace safety. 152 However, the
EEOC contended the ADA prevents an employer from simply relying
on generalizations when fulfilling OSHA's requirements. 1 53 Thus, the
EEOC argued the ADA required Murray to conduct individualized as-
sessments of specific risks to determine who posed a threat by operat-
ing a forklift.' 54
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Ten-
nessee agreed with the EEOC's "well-taken" argument. 15 5 The court
held a per se exclusion of all individuals with certain medical condi-
tions could only be authorized when an employer shows "the condition
necessarily results in a specific limitation that would preclude all indi-
viduals with the condition from being able to operate a forklift
safely."15 6 According to the court, if an employer cannot make such a
showing, OSHA's General Duty Clause does not require the employer
"to exclude these individuals from operating forklifts and fails as a
defense to a claim of disability discrimination."15 7 Rejecting Murray's
145. Id. at 1056.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1066 (asserting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(e) (EEOC's conflict provision) and 29
U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (OSHA's General Duty Clause)).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1066-67.
157. Id. at 1067.
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asserted OSHA defense, the court denied Murray's motion for sum-
mary judgment. 158
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Texas has also addressed OSHA's interaction with the ADA, but in
backhanded terms. In Rayha v. United Parcel Service, Inc.,1 59 Ed-
ward Rayha had worked for United Parcel Service ("UPS") for ten
years when the Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("Ad-
ministration") required UPS to formalize its process for disposing of
packages leaking hazardous substances.' 6 0 To comply with OSHA,
UPS required all employees to be certified in wearing respiratory
equipment. 1 6 1 Rayha's limited respiratory capacity rendered him un-
able to pass his physical examination because he could not wear the
protective gear safely and without threat of physical injury. 16 2 In re-
sponse, UPS transferred Rayha from his job handling hazardous pack-
ages to another position without the respiratory requirement. 163
Claiming UPS violated the ADA, Rayha sued UPS. The district court
found Rayha was not a qualified individual with a disability, and,
even if he were, UPS made the appropriate accommodations. 164 How-
ever, relevant to this discussion, the court held "any attempt on the
part of UPS to permit Rayha to perform [his package] clerk duties
without proper certification would be in violation [of] OSHA regula-
tions." 16 5 Unfortunately, these cases do not furnish clear guidance on
how and when to apply the EEOC's conflict regulation to situations
involving workplace safety.
4. Federal Law May Require Employers to Exclude Certain
Individuals
When federal law requires specific action by employers, the
EEOC's conflict regulation routinely protects employers from claims of
disability discrimination in violation of the ADA. For example, the
Department of Transportation's motor carrier safety regulations re-
quire commercial drivers to have medical certification that they are
physically qualified to drive. 16 6 Courts have regularly held that sec-
tion 1630.15(e) provides a defense to an ADA charge to employers who
refuse to employ ADA-qualifying individuals who do not obtain the
158. Id.
159. 940 F. Supp. 1066 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
160. Rayha v. United Parcel Serv., 940 F. Supp. 1066, 1067 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
161. Rayha, 940 F. Supp. at 1067.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1068-70.
165. Id. at 1069.
166. See, e.g., 49 C.F.R. §§ 391.11(a), 391.41(a).
2005]
CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW
required medical certification. 16 7 Thus, when federal law requires
employers to exclude certain individuals, courts will not hold employ-
ers liable for disability discrimination under the ADA.
Nevertheless, federal law seldom requires an employer to exclude
a class of individuals from the workplace. Even when a federal law
does not specifically exclude workers from the workplace, employers
may still confront potential unsafe workers with disabilities. In these
situations, an employer must determine what to do when an individ-
ual with a disability poses a threat to the health or safety of herself or
others in the workplace. The ADA has provided guidance on this is-
sue-at least to some extent.
C. DIRECT THREAT DEFENSE 1 6 8
1. The ADA's Direct Threat Defense
In addition to the EEOC's conflict regulation, the ADA itself ex-
plicitly authorizes discrimination against individuals with disabilities
in limited circumstances: "lilt may be a defense to a charge of discrimi-
nation under this Act that an alleged application of qualification stan-
dards, tests, or selection criteria that screen out or tend to screen out
or otherwise deny a job or benefit to an individual with a disability has
been shown to be job-related and consistent with business necessity,
and such performance cannot be accomplished by reasonable accom-
modation." 16 9 In addition to that general defense, the ADA specifi-
cally provides for a defense to employment discrimination based on
qualification standards: "The term 'qualification standards' may in-
clude a requirement that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to
the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace." 170 This
provision sets forth the ADA's direct threat defense. The ADA defines
"direct threat" as "a significant risk to the health or safety of others
that cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation." 17 '
167. See Bay v. Cassens Transport Co., 212 F.3d 969, 974 (7th Cir. 2000); Prado v.
Continental Air Transp. Co., 982 F. Supp. 1304, 1307 (N.D. Ill. 1997); see also Thorns v.
ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1127 (E.D. Wis. 1998) (stating "[the ADA
does not override health and safety requirements established under other Federal laws.
If a standard is required by another Federal law, an employer must comply with it and
does not have to show that the standard is job related and consistent with business
necessity") (quoting EEOC Technical Assistance Manual at IV-16).
168. A portion of this section was published for the benefit of Nebraska attorneys in
the September 2003 edition of THE NEBRASKA LAWYER, with the understanding that it
was part of a larger paper to be published at a later date in another journal or law
review. See Tory L. Lucas, So What If I'm Gonna Hurt Myself The ADA's Direct Threat
Defense, THE NEBRASKA LAWYER (Sept. 2003).
169. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a).
170. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (emphasis added).
171. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3) (emphasis added).
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Clearly, an employer may assert this defense when an individual
with a disability poses a direct threat to the health or safety of other
individuals in the workplace. In these circumstances, an employer
would not need OSHA's protection when deciding how to respond to a
direct threat to the health or safety of others posed by an individual
with a disability. Instead, if the employer satisfied the requirements
of the direct threat defense, the employer will not be liable for discrim-
inating against an individual with a disability.
However, nothing in the ADA's direct threat defense authorizes
an employer to discriminate against an individual with a disability
when that individual poses a direct threat to her own health or safety,
as opposed to the health or safety of other individuals in the work-
place. Must an employer turn to OSHA to decide whether to protect
an employee with a disability from herself? Although this is an inter-
esting question, Congress did not wholly leave the issue to courts to
reconcile OSHA's General Duty Clause with the ADA's prohibition
against discrimination against individuals with disabilities. The ADA
specifically authorized the EEOC to issue and enforce regulations im-
plementing the ADA. 17 2 The EEOC, complying with this Congres-
sional charge, promulgated regulations adding the dangers
individuals with disabilities pose to themselves.
2. The EEOC's Direct Threat Defense
Under express Congressional authority, the EEOC has inter-
preted the ADA in an exhaustive set of regulations. 173 The EEOC has
specifically interpreted the direct threat defense and expanded the de-
fense under the EEOC's regulations. 17 4 While the ADA limits the di-
rect threat defense to the health or safety of others in the
workplace, 175 the EEOC extended the defense to include those circum-
stances where an individual with a disability poses a direct threat to
the health or safety of herself or others in the workplace. 1 76
The EEOC follows the ADA's general defense to discrimination
charges whenever qualification standards have "been shown to be job-
related and consistent with business necessity, and such performance
cannot be accomplished with reasonable accommodation." 17 7 How-
ever, when it comes to the direct threat defense, the EEOC charts a
different course: "The term 'qualification standard' may include a re-
quirement that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the
172. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12116, 12117.
173. See 42 U.S.C. § 12116; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.
174. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(b)(2).
175. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b).
176. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(b)(2).
177. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(b)(1).
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health or safety of the individual or others in the workplace." 178 As
can readily be seen, the EEOC extends the direct threat defense to
include direct threats to the individual's own health or safety in addi-
tion to others in the workplace. The EEOC defines direct threat as "a
significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the indi-
vidual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable
accommodation."1 79 The EEOC requires any direct threat determina-
tion "be based on an individualized assessment of the individual's pre-
sent ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job" and
"shall be based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the
most current medical knowledge and/or on the best available objective
evidence."' 8 0
In the summer of 2002, the United States Supreme Court, in
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal,l s l held the EEOC properly inter-
preted the ADA by expanding the direct threat defense to include
threats to self.'8 2 In doing so, the Court recognized the interaction
between OSHA and the ADA. 183 Before the Supreme Court decided
the EEOC properly expanded the ADA's direct threat defense, some
courts followed the EEOC regulations, allowing employers to discrimi-
nate against individuals with disabilities who posed a direct threat to
their own health or safety, regardless of the threat posed to other indi-
viduals in the workplace.' 8 4 Other courts refused to ordain the
EEOC's expansion of the direct threat defense because it contradicted
the ADA's plain language and legislative history. 'S5 While the courts
rejecting the EEOC's expansion of the direct threat defense provided
compelling reasons for doing so, the courts following the EEOC's di-
rect threat defense provided little analysis. However, the courts dis-
cussing the ADA's direct threat defense rarely mentioned how the
direct threat defense interacted with OSHA.
178. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(b)(2) (emphasis added).
179. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (emphasis added).
180. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r).
181. 536 U.S. 73 (2002).
182. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 76 (2002).
183. Echazabal, 536 U.S. at 85.
184. See, e.g., Borgialli v. Thunder Basin Coal Co., 235 F.3d 1284, 1290 (10th Cir.
2000); LaChance v. Duffy's Draft House, Inc., 146 F.3d 832, 835 (11th Cir. 1998); Moses
v. Am. Nonwovens, Inc., 97 F.3d 446, 447 (11th Cir. 1996).
185. See, e.g., Echazabal v. Chevron USA, Inc., 226 F.3d 1063, 1072 (9th Cir. 2000),
rev'd, 536 U.S. 73 (2002); Kalskett v. Larson Mfg. Co., 146 F. Supp. 2d 961, 985 (N.D.
Iowa 2001); Kohnke v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 932 F. Supp. 1110, 1111 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
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D. LOWER COURTS TACKLE DIRECT THREAT DEFENSE
1. Some Courts Defer to the EEOC's Direct Threat Defense
Some courts blindly followed the EEOC's expansion of the ADA's
direct threat defense. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit cavalierly addressed the direct threat defense in
Moses v. American Nonwovens, Inc. 186 In Moses, an employer fired an
employee because of the employee's epilepsy.18 7 The employee stipu-
lated that, had he continued working, he would have had seizures on
the job.18 8 His assigned jobs included sitting on a platform above fast-
moving rollers, sitting underneath a conveyor belt, and working next
to exposed machinery with temperatures of 350 degrees.' 8 9 The court
recognized each of the employee's "assigned tasks presented grave
risks to an employee with a seizure disorder."190 After his employer
fired him for posing a direct threat to his own safety, the employee
sued under the ADA. 19 1 The employer asserted the direct threat de-
fense and the district court granted summary judgment in the em-
ployer's favor.192 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, stating an "employer
may fire a disabled employee if the disability renders the employee a
'direct threat' to his own health or safety."1 93 In reaching this conclu-
sion, the court simply cited both the ADA's and the EEOC's direct
threat provisions.19 4 Two years later, the Eleventh Circuit again sug-
gested the direct threat defense applies to threats to one's own health
or safety. 19 5
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has also
confronted the ADA's direct threat defense. Without providing helpful
analysis, the Tenth Circuit, in Borgialli v. Thunder Basin Coal Co.,196
stated the ADA provides "a defense to a charge of discrimination if an
employee poses a direct threat to the health or safety of himself or
others."1 97 Regardless of the language used by the Tenth Circuit and
the Eleventh Circuit, neither court discussed the disparity between
the ADA's plain language and the EEOC's addition of the threat-to-
self defense. These courts also failed to discuss whether OSHA ap-
plies to a workplace situation in which an individual with a disability
186. 97 F.3d 446 (11th Cir. 1996).
187. Moses v. Am. Nonwovens, Inc., 97 F.3d 446, 447 (11th Cir. 1996).
188. Moses, 97 F.3d at 447.
189. Id. at 447-48.
190. Id. at 447.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b)).
194. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a), (b); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r)).
195. See LaChance v. Duffy's Draft House, Inc., 146 F.3d 832, 835 (11th Cir. 1998).
196. 235 F.3d 1284 (10th Cir. 2000).
197. Borgialli v. Thunder Basin Coal Co., 235 F.3d 1284, 1290 (10th Cir. 2000).
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poses a direct threat to her own health and safety. As seen below,
courts unwilling to yield to the EEOC had conducted the only rea-
soned analysis of the direct threat defense.
2. The Ninth Circuit Rejects EEOC's Expanded Direct Threat
Defense
In Echazabal v. Chevron USA, Inc.,198 the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals took direct aim at the EEOC's expansion of the direct threat
defense. 199 In Chevron, the court asked "whether the 'direct threat'
defense available to employers under the [ADA] applies to employees,
or prospective employees, who pose a direct threat to their own health
or safety, but not to the health or safety of other persons in the work-
place."20 0 Noting this was a question of first impression for the Ninth
Circuit, the court observed the issue had received little treatment in
other circuits, and, in the circuits that had addressed the issue, none
provided useful analysis. 20 1 Therefore, the court began an exhaustive
analysis of the threat-to-self defense.
a. The Majority Opinion
Quoting the ADA, the court aptly concluded, "the language of the
direct threat defense plainly does not include threats to the disabled
individual himself."20 2 Based on the plain language of the ADA, the
court stated it could have held, without further analysis, that the ADA
does not allow an employer to use the direct threat defense when the
employee poses a threat to his own health or safety.2 03 Notwithstand-
ing, the court analyzed the ADA's legislative history.20 4
Noting that "direct threat" is used hundreds of times in the ADA's
legislative history, the court observed that nowhere is the direct
threat defense accompanied by a reference to a threat to the employee
himself.20 5 The court explained that nearly every time direct threat is
mentioned it is joined by a reference to a threat to other individu-
als. 2 0 6 The Ninth Circuit then quoted the ADA's co-sponsor, Senator
198. 226 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2000), rev'd, 536 U.S. 73 (2002).
199. As demonstrated in Section II(E), infra, the Supreme Court later took direct
aim at the Ninth Circuit's decision.
200. Echazabal v. Chevron USA, Inc., 226 F.3d 1063, 1064 (9th Cir. 2000) rev'd, 536
U.S. 73 (2002).
201. Id. at 1066.
202. Id. at 1067.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 1067-69.
205. Id. at 1067.
206. Id.; see also Kalskett v. Larson Mfg. Co., 146 F. Supp. 2d 961, 984-85 (N.D.
Iowa 2001) (agreeing with Ninth Circuit's Echazabal opinion that legislative history
supports plain meaning that the direct threat defense does not include threats to self);
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Edward Kennedy, who pronounced "[it is important, however, that
the ADA specifically refers to the health and safety threat to others.
Under the ADA, employers may not deny a person an employment op-
portunity based on paternalistic concerns regarding the person's
health."20 7 The court also observed Congress believed "overprotective
rules and policies" are forms of discrimination confronting individuals
with disabilities, 20 8 and recognized the Supreme Court has generally
"interpreted federal employment discrimination statutes to prohibit
paternalistic employment policies." 20 9
After concluding the ADA's plain language and legislative history
rejected the EEOC's expansion of the direct threat defense, the court
squarely addressed the employer's arguments. 210 First, the employer
argued the court should defer to the EEOC's contrary interpretation of
the ADA. 2 11 Dismissing this argument, the court rejected the EEOC's
interpretation because it plainly contradicts Congress's clear intent:
"the language of the direct threat defense plainly expresses Congress's
intent to include within the scope of § 12113 defense only threats to
other individuals in the workplace." 2 12 The employer's second argu-
ment was Congress's clear intent should be ignored "because forcing
employers to hire individuals who pose a risk to their own health or
safety would expose employers to tort liability."2 13 Referring to dic-
tum from the Supreme Court in International Union, United Auto,
Aerospace, & Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW v.
Johnson Controls, Inc.,214 the Ninth Circuit rejected this argument
because "the Supreme Court strongly suggested that state tort law
would be preempted to the extent that it interfered with federal an-
tidiscrimination law."2 15
The court then discussed the employer's claim that the individual
with a disability posing a direct threat to his own safety is not a quali-
fied individual with a disability because he is not otherwise qualified
Kohnke v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 932 F. Supp. 1110, 1112 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (revealing that
"the House Judiciary Report mentions threat or risk 'to other individuals' or 'to others'
nine times without once mentioning threat or risk to the disabled person himself" and
stating "the legislative history provides little support for the EEOC's view that a 'direct
threat' includes a threat to the plaintiff himself").
207. Echazabal, 226 F.3d at 1067-68.
208. Id. at 1068 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5)).
209. Id. (citing Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); UAW v. Johnson Con-
trols, 499 U.S. 187 (1991)).
210. Id. at 1069-70.
211. Id. at 1069.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 1069-70.
214. 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
215. Echazabal, 226 F.3d at 1070.
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to perform the essential job functions. 21 6 The court summarily re-
jected this contention because the employer's "reading of 'essential
functions' would, by definitional slight-of-hand, circumvent Congress's
decision to exclude a paternalistic risk-to-self defense in circum-
stances in which an employee's disability does not prevent him from
performing the requisite work."21 7 Although the court stated it would,
in most circumstances, defer to an employer's decision as to what con-
stitutes an essential job function, it nevertheless rejected the em-
ployer's decision in the instant case, holding "the risk that [the
employee]'s employment might pose to his own health does not affect
the question whether he is a 'qualified individual with a disabil-
ity.'" 21 8 The court then summed up its analysis and holding:
[W]e conclude that the ADA's direct threat defense
means what it says: it permits employers to impose a require-
ment that their employees not pose a significant risk to the
health or safety of other individuals in the workplace. It does
not permit employers to shut disabled individuals out of jobs
on the ground that, by working in the jobs at issue, they may
put their own health or safety at risk. Conscious of the his-
tory of paternalistic rules that have often excluded disabled
individuals from the workplace, Congress concluded that dis-
abled persons should be afforded the opportunity to decide for
themselves what risks to undertake. 21 9
b. The Vociferous Dissent
However, the three-judge panel was not unanimous, as Judge Ste-
phen S. Trott wrote a scathing dissent.220 The dissent contended that
an employee who poses a direct threat to his own safety is not other-
wise qualified under the ADA: "I do not understand how we can claim
[an employee who poses a threat to his own safety] can perform the
essential functions of the position he seeks when precisely because of
his disability, those functions may kill him. To ignore this reality is
bizarre."2 21
The dissent noted both state and federal statutes overflow with
laws designed to protect workers from harm.2 22 Judge Trott recog-
nized America has readily "rejected the idea that workers toil at their
own peril in the workplace." 223 Citing California and Arizona laws
216. Id.
217. Id. at 1071.
218. Id. at 1072.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 1073-75 (Trott, J., dissenting).
221. Id. at 1073-74 (Trott, J., dissenting).
222. Id. at 1074 (Trott, J., dissenting).
223. Id. (Trott, J., dissenting).
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where "it is a crime knowingly to subject workers to life-endangering
conditions," the dissent maintained that the court, in effect, repealed
those laws with its ruling.2 24
The dissent also observed the potential interaction between
OSHA and the ADA when confronted with an individual with a disa-
bility who poses a direct threat to his own safety. Stating his concern
for workplace safety, Judge Trott made the following impassioned
plea: "[s]o much for OSHA. Now, our laws give less protection to work-
ers known to be in danger than they afford to those who are not. That
seems upside down and backwards. Precisely the workers who need
protection can sue because they receive what they need."22 5 In addi-
tion to concluding the employee was not otherwise qualified, the dis-
sent stated "the EEOC has rationally and humanely spoken" on the
direct threat defense and the court should have deferred to the
EEOC's interpretation. 2 26 Therefore, the dissent would have blessed
the EEOC's direct threat defense.
Gaining momentum in its perspicacious review of the majority
opinion, the dissent decried:
IT]he majority's holding leads to absurd results: a steel-
worker who develops vertigo can keep his job constructing
high rise buildings; a power saw operator with narcolepsy or
epilepsy must be allowed to operate his saw; and a person
allergic to bees is entitled to be hired as a beekeeper. The
possible examples of this Pickwickian ruling are endless. I
doubt that Congress intended such a result when it enacted
laws to protect persons with disabilities. 2 27
Finally, the dissent in Echazabal would have allowed the em-
ployer to assert undue hardship as an affirmative defense to the dis-
crimination charge: "I believe it would be an undue hardship to
require an employer to place an employee in a life-threatening situa-
tion. Such a rule would require employers knowingly to endanger
workers. The legal peril involved is obvious, and a simple human to
human matter, such a moral burden is unconscionable."2 2s In the fi-
nal analysis, the dissent gleefully acknowledged a conflict among the
224. Id. (Trott, J., dissenting).
225. Id. (Trott, J., dissenting).
226. Id. (Trott, J., dissenting).
227. Id. In a similar vein, a legal commentator criticized the Ninth Circuit's
Echazabal opinion for failing to understand the gravity of the safety issues involved: "In
its attempt to rid the workplace of paternalism, the court turned its back on the state
and federal safety laws that forbid employers from knowingly subjecting workers to life-
endangering conditions. As a result, employers now have an ugly choice to make: risk
an employee's life or risk a discrimination suit under the ADA." Deborah Leigh Bender,
Notes & Comments: Echazabal v. Chevron. A Direct Threat to Employers in the Ninth
Circuit, 76 WASH. L. REV. 859, 891 (2001).
228. Echazabal, 226 F.3d at 1074 (Trott, J., dissenting).
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circuits: "[flinally, and fortunately, we have created a conflict with the
Eleventh Circuit .... I say 'fortunately' because this conflict will com-
pel the Supreme Court-or Congress-to resolve this dispute-unless
we do so ourselves by way of en banc review."2 29 Judge Trott's proph-
esy was realized when the Supreme Court resolved the circuit split by
authorizing the EEOC's expansion of the direct threat defense. An
examination of the Supreme Court's decision is contained in section
II.(E).
3. Courts Adopting a Hybrid Analysis
Analyzing the direct threat defense as the Ninth Circuit did in
Echazabal, some courts have agreed the defense does not apply to
threats to one's own health or safety. These courts nevertheless al-
lowed employers to claim an employee is not protected under the ADA
as a qualified individual with a disability when he poses a direct
threat to his own health or safety. Unfortunately, these courts did not
discuss OSHA's impact on the EEOC's direct threat defense.
In one of the first cases to address the direct threat issue, an Illi-
nois federal trial court concluded, in Kohnke v. Delta Airlines, Inc. ,230
"that any 'direct threat' jury instruction must refer to a direct threat
to others, not a direct threat to [the disabled employee] himself."23 1
With a precise analysis, the court quickly dismissed, as untenable, the
EEOC's expansion of the direct threat defense to include threats to
self.232 Reviewing the ADA's plain meaning, legislative history, and
caselaw (which was nonexistent at the time), the court determined the
direct threat defense only applies to threats to others in the work-
place.2 3 3 Notwithstanding its refusal to concede the existence of a
threat-to-self defense, the court still allowed the employer to raise the
employee's safety in another context. Specifically, the court held an
employer may be able to assert the affirmative defense that a qualifi-
cation standard excluding an employee with a disability who poses a
direct threat to his own safety if the standard is job related and consis-
tent with business necessity. 23 4 The court also suggested an employee
still must prove he is a qualified individual with a disability, which he
may not be able to do if he poses a direct threat to his own safety.23 5
A federal district court in Iowa also provided a compelling discus-
sion of the direct threat defense, aligning itself with Kohnke. In Kal-
229. Id. at 1074-75 (Trott, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
230. 932 F. Supp. 1110 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
231. Kohnke v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 932 F. Supp. 1110, 1111 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
232. Kohnke, 932 F. Supp. at 1111.
233. Id. at 1113.
234. Id. at 1113 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(3), 12112(b)(6), 12113(a), (b)).
235. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(8), 12112(a)).
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skett v. Larson Manufacturing Co.,236 the court rejected the argument
that an employer can use the direct threat defense against an individ-
ual with a disability when the individual poses a direct threat to the
individual's own health or safety. 23 7 Specifically, the court concluded,
"the defense of direct threat to oneself is not a defense authorized by
the plain language of the statute authorizing the defense of direct
threat to others."238 Instead of analyzing the case under the direct
threat defense, the court analyzed the threat to the individual's own
health and safety under the qualification element of the individual's
prima facie ADA claim.2 39 Thus, the court held an individual with a
disability "has the burden to demonstrate whether she is qualified to
perform the essential functions of [her] job without risk of injury to
herself. In other words, if [the individual] cannot perform the essen-
tial functions of a job without risk of injury to herself, and that risk of
injury cannot be prevented by a reasonable accommodation, [the indi-
vidual] cannot perform the essential functions of the job as required
by the qualification element."240
With some courts accepting the EEOC's direct threat defense, the
Ninth Circuit rejecting it, and other courts transporting the direct
threat defense to the plaintiffs prima facie case, employees with disa-
bilities were subject to different standards depending on where they
worked. Additionally, the interaction between OSHA and the ADA's
direct threat defense barely had been raised or analyzed. Fortunately,
the Supreme Court entered the fray and ended the confusion, recog-
nizing the EEOC's expansion of the ADA's direct threat defense rea-
sonably harmonized OSHA and the ADA.
E. THE SUPREME COURT BLESSES EEOC's DIRECT THREAT DEFENSE,
SATISFIES OSHA's DEMANDS
Rejecting the Ninth Circuit's ruling with respect to the EEOC's
direct threat defense, the United States Supreme Court held the ADA
permits the EEOC's regulation. 2 4 1 In Echazabal, the Court scrupu-
236. 146 F. Supp. 2d 961 (N.D. Iowa 2001).
237. Kalskett v. Larson Mfg. Co., 146 F. Supp. 2d 961, 985 (N.D. Iowa 2001).
238. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b)).
239. Id. at 985-86.
240. Id. at 986; see Koshinski v. Decatur Foundry, Inc., 177 F.3d 599, 603 (7th Cir.
1999) (holding direct threat defense arises only after an individual with a disability
proves he is qualified to do his job); see also Rizzo v. Children's World Learning Ctrs.,
Inc., 213 F.2d 209, 212 (5th Cir. 2000) (stating that the "question of who bears the bur-
den of establishing that an individual's disability poses a direct health or safety threat
to the disabled employee or others is not a simple one"); Daughtery v. City of El Paso, 56
F.3d 695, 698 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding "that, as a matter of law, a driver with insulin
diabetes presents a genuine substantial risk that he could injure himself or others").
241. Echazabal, 536 U.S. at 78.
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lously explained its reasoning for deferring to the EEOC's interpreta-
tion of the direct threat defense. 2 4 2 The Court also harmonized OSHA
and the ADA. 2 4 3
The Court recognized the ADA "creates an affirmative defense for
action under a qualification standard 'shown to be job-related
[and] . . .consistent with business necessity."' 2 44 Citing the ADA's
direct threat defense as "[sluch a standard," the Court immediately
admitted the EEOC's direct threat regulation "carries the defense one
step further."2 45
Echazabal contended the ADA's direct threat defense constituted
a textual bar to the EEOC's expansive regulation, leaving no gaps for
the EEOC to fill.2 46 Echazabal recognized the "job-related" and "busi-
ness necessity" defense would have authorized a threat-to-self de-
fense, but argued the addition of the specific threat-to-others defense
eliminated the possibility of a threat-to-self defense. 247 To bolster this
argument, Echazabal showed how the EEOC had recognized a threat-
to-self defense under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973248 ("Rehabilita-
tion Act") before the ADA was enacted, arguing the limited ADA direct
threat defense precludes regulatory expansion.2 49 The Court recog-
nized the Ninth Circuit relied on this argument in applying the inter-
pretive canon, expressio unius exclusio alterius, which means
"expressing one item of an associated group or series excludes another
left unmentioned."2 50 However, the Court rejected the expression-ex-
clusion rule for three reasons. 2 5 1
First, the Court interpreted the ADA's text as indicating Congress
used the harm-to-others provision simply as an example of a legiti-
mate qualification standard that is job-related and consistent with
business necessity.2 52 The Court illustrated that the qualification
standards captured by the "job related" and "business necessity" de-
fense "may include" a direct threat to others. 253 Classifying the de-
fenses contained in sections 12113(a) and (b) as "spacious defensive
categories," the Court decided they gave the EEOC "a good deal of dis-
cretion in setting the limits of permissible qualification standards."2 54
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a)).
245. Id. at 78-79 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(b)(2)).
246. Id. at 79-80.
247. Id. at 79.
248. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797b.
249. Echazabal, 536 U.S. at 79-80.
250. Id. at 80 (quoting United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 65 (2002)).
251. Id. at 80-84.
252. Id. at 80.
253. Id.
254. Id.
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Second, the Court recognized the ADA does not contain an estab-
lished series of terms, including threats to others and self, from which
an omission of one establishes a negative implication of the other.2 55
Echazabal claimed history shows Congress deliberately omitted the
threat-to-self defense. 2 56 Specifically, Echazabal reminded the Court
how the Rehabilitation Act, like the ADA, contained only a threat-to-
others defense, but the EEOC expanded it to include threat-to-self as
well. 25 7 Echazabal argued that because Congress passed the ADA
without a threat-to-self defense after the EEOC had expanded the Re-
habilitation Act's threat-to-others defense, Congress deliberately re-
jected the threat-to-self defense. 2 58 The Court rejected this argument
for two reasons. First, although the EEOC amplified the Rehabilita-
tion Act's text by including a threat-to-self defense, three other inter-
preting agencies did not.2 59 Given no standard usage by agencies, the
Court refused to connect threat-to-self with threat-to-others such that
the expression-exclusion rule would apply to Congress's action. 260
The Court then recognized Congress passed the ADA's threat-to-
others defense by using the same language it had used in the Rehabili-
tation Act, "knowing full well what the EEOC had made of that lan-
guage."26 1 Thus, Congress's use of identical language could mean
either it rejected the EEOC's addition of the threat-to-self defense or
assumed the EEOC had the authority to expand the defense again
under the ADA as it had done under the Rehabilitation Act.26 2 "Omit-
ting the EEOC's reference to self-harm while using the very language
that the EEOC had read as consistent with recognizing self-harm is
equivocal at best. No negative inference is possible."2 63
Finally, the Court briefly engaged in slippery-slope reasoning as
further justification for rejecting the expression-exclusion rule. 2 6 4
Recognizing Congress chose to specify only threats to others in the
workplace, the Court noted strict application of the expression-exclu-
sion rule would disallow a defense when an employee poses a threat to
others outside the workplace as well.2 65 The Court then provided the
following example: "If Typhoid Mary had come under the ADA, would
255. Id. at 81-82.
256. Id. at 82.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 81-82.
259. Id. at 82.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 83.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 83-84.
265. Id.
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a meat packer have been defenseless if Mary had sued after being
turned away?"26 6
Concluding Congress's inclusion of the threat-to-others defense
did not exclude the threat-to-self defense, the Court then analyzed
whether Chevron deference should attach to the EEOC's direct threat
defense. 26 7 In deferring to the EEOC's expansion of the direct threat
defense, the Court focused on the interaction between the ADA and
OSHA. 268 Specifically, the Court acknowledged an employer's deci-
sion to hire an individual with a disability who poses a direct threat to
his own safety "would put Congress's policy in the ADA, a disabled
individual's right to operate on equal terms within the workplace, at
loggerheads with the competing policy of OSHA, to ensure the safety
of 'each' and 'every' worker."2 69 Thus, the Court concluded the EEOC
made a proper substantive choice between two competing objectives
found in federal employment law. 270
The Court then rejected the argument that the EEOC's direct
threat defense allows the type of paternalism the ADA tried to out-
law.2 7 1 The Court decided the EEOC reasonably interpreted the ADA
to strike at "untested and pretextual stereotypes," but refused to force
employers to ignore "specific and documented risks to the employee
himself, even if the employee would take his chances for the sake of
getting a job."2 7 2 In addition, the Court stressed the direct threat de-
fense's particularized enquiry requirement disallows an employer
from claiming it excluded an individual with a disability for the indi-
vidual's own good when the employee really does not pose a direct
threat to his own safety.2 73
Finally, the Court rejected the argument that the ADA's direct
threat defense had been rendered mere surplusage.2 74 The Court
stated that, just because the threat-to-self defense could reasonably
fall within the general job-related and business necessity defense,
Congress's decision to specifically include the direct threat defense
was not a useless act.27 5 For instance, specifically including the de-
fense avoided litigation or rulemaking fights over the issue.2 76 Fur-
266. Id. at 84.
267. Id. (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843 (1984)).
268. Id. at 85.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 85-86.
273. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r)).
274. Id. at 87.
275. Id.
276. Id.
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thermore, the Court noted "[a] provision can be useful even without
congressional attention being indispensable."2 77
Given the Supreme Court's blessing of the EEOC's direct threat
defense, any potential conflict between OSHA's workplace safety rules
and the ADA's anti-discrimination provisions should be minimal, at
best. Because the direct threat defense has been interpreted nar-
rowly, OSHA and the ADA should rarely conflict when analyzing
cases involving alleged threats to individuals in the workplace.
F. NARROWLY APPLYING THE DIRECT THREAT DEFENSE
Given the Supreme Court's validation of the EEOC's expanded di-
rect threat defense, it is imperative for courts, employers, employees,
and attorneys to understand when and how the defense applies. It is
equally important to understand Congress and the EEOC chose to ele-
vate workplace safety over accommodating individuals with disabili-
ties who pose a direct threat to themselves or other individuals in the
workplace. Although the Supreme Court has blessed this rational in-
terpretation of two competing federal labor laws, the Court has also
narrowly interpreted the direct threat defense. This narrow interpre-
tation should harmonize any conflict between OSHA and the ADA, as
well as assure the direct threat defense is sparingly utilized to pre-
clude employment opportunities for individuals with disabilities.
The direct threat defense creates complex and difficult issues. In-
dividuals with disabilities have been stereotyped for centuries and
fear is a huge discriminator. 27 8 The direct threat defense, as applied
to an individual who poses a threat to his own safety, could be applied
sporadically and illogically to individuals with disabilities based on
stereotypes and fear. Although OSHA mandates safe workplaces, the
ADA attempts to negate a paternalistic employer's ability to discrimi-
nate against individuals with disabilities based on unsubstantiated
stereotypes and fears. Americans clearly have an interest in assuring
individuals with disabilities have the right to make their own employ-
ment decisions rather than paternalistic employers. For the most
part, the ADA supports such a view. However, in the limited circum-
stances in which the direct threat defense may apply, the employee's
safety outweighs the employee's right to work. Because the direct
threat defense precludes an individual with a disability from working,
the defense should be asserted only in limited circumstances.
Although it may appear at first blush that an individual with a
disability could easily be denied a job opportunity based on the likeli-
277. Id.
278. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2), (a)(5)-(7).
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hood she would pose a direct threat to her own health or safety, that is
not true. If properly applied, the narrowly interpreted direct threat
defense will exclude individuals with disabilities in rare circum-
stances for three main reasons.
1. Individualized Assessment Required
First, decisions based on unsubstantiated fears and stereotypes
will not carry the day.2 79 To show an individual cannot perform her
job safely without posing a significant risk of substantial harm to her
own health or safety, an employer must rely on more than mere ste-
reotypes or simple speculation. As the EEOC has propounded, the di-
rect threat determination can be made only after an "individualized
assessment of the individual's present ability to safely perform the es-
sential functions of the job."28 0 Therefore, the threat cannot be based
on some future event, and the danger posed cannot be based on the
employee's duty to perform non-essential functions. Instead, the
threat must be based on the current state of the disability and the
existing threat it poses to the individual's safety while performing the
job's essential functions.
The direct threat assessment must also "be based on a reasonable
medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge
and/or on the best available objective evidence." 28 ' Assumptions and
best guesses will not suffice. When deciding whether the direct threat
defense applies, an employer should consider the following factors: "(1)
The duration of the risk; (2) The nature and severity of the potential
harm; (3) The likelihood that the potential harm will occur; and (4)
The imminence of the potential harm."2 8 2 A proper consideration of
these factors, along with the appropriate individualized assessment
based on "the most current medical knowledge and/or on the best
available objective evidence," will not allow the direct threat defense
to be abused. 28 3
279. See Echazabal, 536 U.S. at 86.
280. 29 U.S.C. § 1630.2(r); see also Murray, 175 F. Supp. at 1065 n.14 (stating the
direct threat defense does not apply when an employer fails to engage in an individual-
ized assessment of an employee's disability).
281. 29 U.S.C. § 1630.2(r).
282. 29 U.S.C. § 1630.2(r). These factors are commonly referred to as the "Arline
factors." Echazabal, 236 F.3d at 1027 n.2 (citing Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline,
480 U.S. 273, 288 (1987)).
283. See, e.g., id. at 1026-35 (reversing grant of summary judgment to employer on
direct threat defense because fact issues remained as to whether the employer properly
made an individualized assessment of the employee's disability and the threat
involved).
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2. Significant Threat Required
Second, the direct threat standard does not allow an employer to
exclude an individual with a disability when that individual's disabil-
ity might pose a direct threat to his own health or safety. Instead, the
employee must pose a significant risk to his health or safety.28 4 The
Supreme Court has recognized that, "[blecause few, if any, activities
in life are risk free, [the ADA does] not ask whether a risk exists, but
whether it is significant."28 5 Furthermore, the standard does not sim-
ply require a significant risk of any harm to the employee's health or
safety. Instead, the EEOC requires a significant risk of substantial
harm to meet this standard.28 6 Therefore, a high probability must ex-
ist that the individual with a disability is a danger to herself and that
the resulting injury would be substantial. When this heightened stan-
dard is combined with the required individualized assessment based
on a reasonable medical judgment, misuse of the direct threat defense
should be diminished.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has revealed the direct threat defense
is not readily attainable. In Bragdon v. Abbott,28 7 a dentist's exami-
nation of an HIV-infected patient discovered a cavity.28 8 The dentist
informed the patient that he did not fill cavities of HIV-infected pa-
tients at his office.2 89 However, the dentist offered to fill the cavity at
a local hospital, with the patient absorbing the additional cost of using
the hospital's facilities. 2 90 The patient sued the dentist under the
ADA's prohibition of disability discrimination in places of public ac-
commodation, 29 1 and the dentist asserted a direct threat defense. 29 2
The district court granted summary judgment to the patient, holding
the dentist presented no genuine issue of material fact that the pa-
tient posed a direct threat to others. 293 On appeal, the Supreme Court
recognized Title III of the ADA,2 9 4 like Title I dealing with employ-
ment,2 95 contains an exclusion where the "individual poses a direct
threat to the health or safety of others."296 As the Supreme Court
further recognized, Title III's direct threat provision parallels Title I's
284. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r).
285. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 649 (1998) (citing Arline, 480 U.S. at 287).
286. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(r), 1630.15(b)(2).
287. 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
288. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 629.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).
292. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 629.
293. Id. at 629-30.
294. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189.
295. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117.
296. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 629 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3)).
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employment provision, so the Court's analysis applies with equal force
to employment cases applying the direct threat defense.
In determining whether the direct threat defense applied, the Su-
preme Court had to decide whether the patient posed "a significant
risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by a
modification of policies, practices, or procedures or by the provision of
auxiliary aids or services."2 97 The Court stressed that "[t]he exis-
tence, or nonexistence, of a significant risk must be determined from
the standpoint of the person who refuses the treatment or accommo-
dation, and the risk assessment must based on medical or other objec-
tive evidence." 2 98 It is important to note the Court refused to defer to
the dentist's judgment of the potential risk: "[a] s a health care profes-
sional, [the dentist] had the duty to assess the risk of infection based
on the objective, scientific information available to him and others in
his profession. His belief that a significant risk existed, even if main-
tained in good faith, would not relieve him from liability... [because
he] receives no special deference simply because he is a health care
professional."2 9 9 The dentist was unable to show objective, medical
evidence that treating the patient in the hospital was safer than treat-
ing her in his well-equipped office. 300
The dentist argued "the use of high-speed drills and surface cool-
ing with water created a risk of airborne HIV transmission."30 1 The
Court rejected this assertion because it was based on inconclusive
studies.30 2 The dentist also asserted that the Center for Disease Con-
trol ("CDC") "had identified seven dental workers with possible occu-
pational transmission of HIV."30 3 The Court also rejected this
evidence because, although the "dental workers were exposed to HIV
in the course of their employment," the "CDC could not determine
whether HIV infection had resulted from this exposure . . . because
[the workers] did not present themselves for HIV testing at an appro-
priate time after this occupational exposure."30 4 Regardless, the
Court stated this evidence, "[s]tanding alone, [would not likely] meet
the objective, scientific basis for finding a significant risk to the
[dentist]."305
At its core, the Bragdon Court announced the direct threat de-
fense's medical judgment or objective evidence standards cannot be
297. Id. at 648-49 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3)).
298. Id. at 649.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 651.
301. Id. at 653.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 653-54.
304. Id. at 654.
305. Id.
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based on good faith beliefs, inconclusive studies, or potential threats.
The threat must be current and objectively verifiable. Bragdon is a
high hurdle for those wishing to assert the direct threat defense
against an individual with a disability who seeks to work.30 6
3. Reasonable Accommodation May Eliminate Threat
Finally, even if an employer has diligently conducted the individ-
ualized assessment based on objective medical evidence that would
satisfy Bragdon's high standard, and concluded the employee poses an
immediate direct threat to her own health or safety, the direct threat
defense is still not authorized. Even if an individual's disability poses
a direct threat to her health or safety, the ADA requires an employer
to make a reasonable accommodation (that would not pose an undue
hardship on the employer) so an individual with a disability can per-
form a position's essential functions.30 7 In the informal, interactive
process, the employer and employee should strive to accommodate the
individual's disability to eliminate the threat to the employee's health
or safety.30 8 When engaging in the interactive process, the employer
and employee should seek to "identify the precise limitations resulting
from the disability and potential reasonable accommodations that
could overcome those limitations."30 9 The ADA and EEOC regula-
tions do not provide an exhaustive list of the types of reasonable ac-
commodations available. However, reasonable accommodations are
306. See also Echazabal, 336 F.3d at 1027-35 (discussing Bragdon and emphasizing
need for individualized assessment of disability's threat based on objective evidence).
Another hurdle employers might face when asserting the direct threat defense will oc-
cur when courts place the burden of proof on the employer to establish the employee
actually presents a direct threat to the health and safety of herself or others in the
workplace. See, e.g., id. (stating that "Because it is an affirmative defense, the burden
of establishing a direct threat lies with the employer"); Hargave v. Vermont, 340 F.3d
27, 35 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding employer bears the burden to prove an employee poses a
direct threat to others in the workplace); Dadian v. Village of Wilmette, 269 F.3d 831,
841 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting "it is the employer's burden to show that an employee posed
a direct threat to workplace safety that could not be eliminated by a reasonable accom-
modation"). However, not all courts place the burden on employers to establish an em-
ployee poses a direct threat. See Branham v. Snow, 392 F.3d 896, 907 n.5 (7th Cir.
2004) (noting "there is a dispute among the circuits regarding the burden of proof with
respect to the question of whether an employee poses a direct threat to his own safety or
that of others"). In some circuits, an employee with a disability may very well bear the
burden to prove she does not pose a direct threat to the safety of herself or others. See,
e.g., McKenzie v. Benton, 388 F.3d 1342, 1356 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding the burden of
proof is on the employee to prove she is not a direct threat to other people in the work-
place); EEOC v. Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d 135, 144 (1st Cir. 1997) (placing burden of proof
on employee to show she is a qualified employee and does not pose a direct threat to
others); Moses v. Am. Nonwovens, Inc., 97 F.3d 446, 447 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam)
(same).
307. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
308. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3).
309. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3).
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only limited by the imagination and creativity of those seeking an ap-
propriate accommodation. At a minimum, the EEOC regulations
state reasonable accommodations may include: "[miaking existing fa-
cilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by individu-
als with disabilities; [jiob restructuring; part-time or modified work
schedules; reassignment to a vacant position; acquisition or modifica-
tions of equipment or devices; appropriate adjustment or modifica-
tions of examinations, training materials, or policies; the provision of
qualified readers or interpreters; and other similar accommodations
for individuals with disabilities." 3 10 With some work from both the
employer and employee, the use of the direct threat defense should be
rendered moot whenever an appropriate accommodation can be
discovered.
The interactive process might discover reasonable accommoda-
tions that would avoid an unsafe workplace in violation of OSHA
while protecting an individual's right to work. Surely, a serious, inter-
active discussion of possible accommodations could thwart the absurd
results hypothesized by Judge Trott's dissent in Echazabal.3 1 ' An
ironworker walking the high beams cannot be placed at risk of falling
because of a severe case of vertigo. However, a reasonable accommo-
dation might be the use of a harness or reassignment to a job that is
fully enclosed. Surely, OSHA would frown on a honey producer al-
lowing a beekeeper who is deathly allergic to bees to roam freely
amongst the bees. A reasonable accommodation could be the provision
of shots or protective gear. Finally, a power saw operator with narco-
lepsy should not just operate the saw as though no risk of injury ex-
ists, awaiting a serious OSHA violation. A reasonable accommodation
might include a unique shut-off device or protective guards to protect
the employee from injury. These protective devices would protect
other employees in the workplace as well, which would satisfy both
OSHA and the ADA.
You may recall the Eleventh Circuit, in Moses, held that because
an employee posed a direct threat to his own health or safety, the em-
ployer could fire him.3 12 The employee had epilepsy and stipulated he
would have had seizures on the job if he continued to work.3 13 His
essential job functions included working above fast-moving rollers, un-
derneath a conveyor belt, and next to hot machines.3 14 Was no rea-
sonable accommodation available to ensure the employee's safety?
Once the court determined the direct threat defense may apply, the
310. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2).
311. Echazabal, 226 F.3d at 1074-75 (Trott, J., dissenting).
312. Moses, 97 F.3d at 447.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 447-48.
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court should have focused on whether a reasonable accommodation
would have protected the employee from harm while still being able to
perform his job's essential functions. Focusing on the interactive pro-
cess and the reasonable accommodation element would have protected
both the employee's and employer's rights, which would also satisfy
OSHA and the ADA. The bottom line is that, once it has been properly
shown an individual with a disability poses a direct threat to her own
health or safety, the employer and employee still must seek a reasona-
ble accommodation to eliminate the threat. This interactive process,
combined with the tough standards discussed above, should limit mis-
use of the direct threat defense.
4. Summary
The ADA's direct threat defense, as expanded by the EEOC, ele-
vates workplace safety over accommodating individuals with disabili-
ties who pose direct threats to the health and safety of themselves and
others in the workplace. The Supreme Court has ordained this ra-
tional interpretation, which harmonizes two competing federal labor
laws-OSHA and the ADA. The ADA's direct threat defense will have
two practical purposes. First, if an employer cannot meet the strict
requirements of the direct threat defense, then he may not discrimi-
nate against the individual with a disability who the employer be-
lieves might be unsafe. Second, if the employer can meet the strict
requirements of the direct threat defense, then the ADA's defense pro-
vides the employer protection against violating OSHA. Thus, the Su-
preme Court's strict interpretation of when the direct threat defense
applies should void all safety concerns. The threat-to-self defense al-
lows some paternalistic behavior to ensure a safe work environment,
without gutting the purposes behind either OSHA or the ADA. Al-
though some members of Congress clearly did not intend the ADA's
direct threat defense to apply to threats to self, the EEOC has made
the rational policy decision to harmonize OSHA and the ADA by pro-
tecting individuals with disabilities who threaten their own health
and safety.
G. CONCLUSION
The interaction and potential conflict between OSHA and the
ADA becomes abundantly clear when an individual with a disability
poses a direct threat to herself or others in the workplace. Fortu-
nately, the direct threat defense, as expanded by the EEOC, harmo-
nizes the two federal labor laws. If an employee does not pose a direct
threat to the health or safety of herself or other individuals in the
workplace, then OSHA is not impacted. Similarly, if the employee
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does pose a direct threat, then OSHA requires the employer-and em-
ployee-to take protective precautions. The ADA's direct threat de-
fense is a protective measure. The direct threat defense allows the
employer to remove the employee from the dangerous position unless
a reasonable accommodation would remove the potential threat. How-
ever, the direct threat defense is a narrow defense, and, if properly
applied, OSHA's safe-workplace requirement will be met, as will the
ADA's anti-discrimination mandate.
When the Supreme Court unanimously announced the EEOC
properly expanded the direct threat defense to include threats to self,
it only reinforced the EEOC's attempt to harmonize any potential con-
flict between OSHA and the ADA. Applying the direct threat defense
to threats to self will ensure individuals with disabilities will not en-
danger themselves in violation of OSHA, while the strict application of
the defense will ensure individuals with disabilities are not discrimi-
nated against based on stereotypes, myths, speculation or unfocused
paternalism. Requiring employers to conduct an individualized as-
sessment based on the most current medical knowledge or best availa-
ble objective evidence to determine whether an individual poses a
significant risk of substantial harm to himself will not allow stereo-
types, fear and unreasonable inferences to run amok. By buttressing
this heightened standard with the required interactive process to find
reasonable accommodations, the direct threat defense should be used
only as a last resort. With these standards in mind, courts, employers,
employees, and attorneys should be well equipped to analyze the diffi-
cult question of whether an individual poses a direct threat to her own
health or safety. These standards will also ensure employers and em-
ployees comply with the national employment policies enunciated in
OSHA and the ADA.
III. DISABILITY-BASED HARASSMENT: NOT TITLE VII'S
CLONE
A. INTRODUCTION
Sexual harassment, outlawed by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964315 ("Title VII"), has been discussed frequently in landmark
United States Supreme Court cases.3 16 While the Supreme Court has
held sexual harassment violates Title VII, which has spawned a tre-
315. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
316. See, e.g., Pa. State Police v. Suders, 124 S. Ct. 2342 (2004); Clark County Sch.
Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (2001); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742
(1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Oncale v. Sundowner Off-
shore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993);
Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
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mendous amount of harassment litigation, the court has never decided
whether disability-based harassment claims exist under the ADA.
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's lack of involvement in this
area of the law, lower federal courts have had little trouble holding
disability-based harassment claims cognizable under the ADA. 3 17 In
doing so, these courts simply have applied traditional Title VII sexual
harassment jurisprudence to the ADA-based claims.3 18 Although it
seems readily apparent and hardly debatable that the ADA outlaws
disability-based harassment, a simple overlay of Title VII harassment
analysis onto ADA-based harassment claims may be inappropriate.
This section discusses the interaction between disability-based har-
assment and sexual harassment, noting disability-based harassment
has developed in the shadows of Title VII sexual harassment jurispru-
dence. Although Title VII sexual harassment jurisprudence is highly
analogous and clearly assists when analyzing disability-based harass-
ment cases, disability-based harassment jurisprudence requires a
somewhat different understanding than sexual harassment jurispru-
dence to protect fully the rights of individuals with disabilities af-
forded them under the ADA. 3 19
B. THE ADA FOLLOWS TITLE VII's LEAD
1. Prohibited Employment Practices under the ADA and Title VII
The ADA prohibits an employer from discriminating "against a
qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such
individual in regard to... terms, conditions, and privileges of employ-
ment."320 Likewise, Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminat-
ing against an individual "with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 32 1 As can readily be seen
by a simple reading of these two statutes, the ADA closely tracks the
language Congress used in enacting Title VII twenty-six years before
it enacted the ADA. Specifically, both statutes use the "terms, condi-
tions [and] privileges of employment" language. Therefore, Title VII
harassment cases interpreting that identical language should provide
317. Lanman v. Johnson County, Kan., 393 F.3d 1151, 1155 (10th Cir. 2004); Shaver
v. Indep. Stave Co., 350 F.3d 716, 720 (8th Cir. 2003); Flowers v. S. Reg'l Physician
Servs., Inc., 247 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2001); Fox v. GMC, 247 F.3d 169 (4th Cir. 2001);
Haysman v. Food Lion, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 1092, 1106 (S.D. Ga. 1995);.
318. Id.
319. See, e.g., Shaver, 350 F.3d at 720 ("In determining whether a hostile work envi-
ronment claim has been made out under the ADA, we think it proper to turn to stan-
dards developed elsewhere in our anti-discrimination law, adapting them to the unique
requirements of the ADA").
320. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (emphasis added).
321. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (emphasis added).
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guidance as to Congress's intent when it used identical language when
enacting the ADA.
Until 2001, no federal circuit court had decided whether the ADA
prohibits disability-based harassment. District courts, on the other
hand, had been faced with numerous disability-based harassment
cases, routinely holding the ADA prohibits disability-based harass-
ment.3 2 2 Legal literature was not chock full of discussions about the
viability of disability-based harassment claims, but commentators had
begun to write on the subject a few years after the ADA's passage.3 23
In the spring of 2001, two circuit courts joined district courts in hold-
ing the ADA prohibits disability-based harassment. Before discussing
those two cases, it is prudent to discuss the first district court case
that provided a thorough analysis of the issue when it recognized a
disability-based harassment claim under the ADA.
2. District Court Uncovers Harassment Theory Under the ADA
In 1995, the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of Georgia held the ADA prohibits disability-based harass-
ment.32 4 In reaching this conclusion, the court provided a powerfully
reasoned opinion that cannot be lightly brushed aside. In Haysman v.
Food Lion, Inc.,325 Neil Haysman suffered an on-the-job injury to his
knee and back after just four months of working for his employer.3 26
After missing a year and a half of work while collecting temporary
total disability benefits, Haysman returned to work in a temporary
light duty job.3 2 7 Over the next year and a half, Haysman allegedly
endured a harassing work environment.3 28 According to Haysman,
his supervisors required him to do more than his doctor allowed him
to do.3 2 9 Haysman also alleged numerous other acts of harassment,
like his store manager berating him in front of others and accusing
him of "snowballing" the company based on his disability. 330 The
322. See Ballard v. Healthsouth Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d 529 (N.D. Tex. 2001); John-
ston v. Henderson, 144 F. Supp. 2d 1341 (S.D. Fla. 2001); Johnson v. City of Mason, 101
F. Supp. 2d 566 (S.D. Ohio 2000); Rodriguez v. Loctite Puerto Rico, Inc., 967 F. Supp.
653 (D.P.R. 1997); Haysman v. Food Lion, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 1092 (S.D. Ga. 1995);
Hogue v. MQS Inspection, 875 F. Supp. 714 (D. Colo. 1995); Mannell v. American To-
bacco Co., 871 F. Supp. 854 (E.D. Va. 1994).
323. See, e.g., Frank S. Ravitch, Beyond Reasonable Accommodation: The Availabil-
ity and Structure of a Cause of Action for Workplace Harassment under the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 15 CARDozo L. REV. 1475 (1994).
324. Haysman, 893 F. Supp. at 1106.
325. 893 F. Supp. 1092 (S.D. Ga. 1995).
326. Haysman, 893 F. Supp. at 1097.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 1097-98.
329. Id. at 1098.
330. Id.
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manager thought Haysman was a "joke" and stated he was "so called
hurt."3 31 The assistant manager told Haysman he "would break him"
and "ride him" until he quit. 33 2 In addition, this manager told Hays-
man to work every minute of his workday regardless of the pain.33 3
Haysman claimed the assistant manager also used extreme profanity
towards him and would strike and kick the injured parts of his
body.33 4
Because a theory of disability-based harassment had not yet de-
veloped, Haysman asserted a failure to accommodate theory under the
ADA.3 3 5 Specifically, he claimed his employer failed to reasonably ac-
commodate his disability by verbally harassing and physically abus-
ing him to make him quit.33 6 The district court rejected this theory
and recast his claim as one of being subjected to a hostile work envi-
ronment, but the employer contended hostile work environment is not
an actionable theory under the ADA.3 3 7
The court initially provided a summary of Title VII harassment
jurisprudence that affords employees the right to be free from harass-
ment that affects a "term, condition or privilege of employment," the
language used in Title VII. 3 38 Comparing the ADA's language to that
of Title VII, the court wrote, "[iut would seem illogical to hold that
ADA language identical to that of Title VII was intended to afford dis-
abled individuals less protection than those groups covered by Title
VII."3 3 9 The court also pointed out the ADA relies on Title VII's "en-
forcement powers, remedies and procedures."34 0 After reviewing the
two federal anti-discrimination statutes' identical language and same
enforcement provisions, the court recognized the EEOC's regulations
prohibit disability-based harassment. 34 1 Under its regulation prohib-
iting retaliation and coercion, the EEOC makes it "unlawful to coerce,
intimidate, threaten, harass or interfere with any individual in the
exercise or enjoyment of, or because that individual aided or en-
couraged any other individual in the exercise of, any right granted or
protected by this part."3 4 2
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. See id. at 1106.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id. (citing Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989), Meritor Sav.
Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986)).
339. Id. at 1106-07
340. Id. at 1107.
341. Id. at 1106 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.12).
342. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.12(b) (emphasis added). Although the EEOC recognizes the
ADA prohibits disability-based harassment, it is interesting to note the EEOC has not
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The court then briefly mentioned that the few other district courts
that had addressed this issue had held that disability-based harass-
ment is actionable under the ADA and that standard Title VII harass-
ment analysis should apply.3 43 In doing so, the court recognized that
not a single case held that disability-based harassment is not prohib-
ited under the ADA.3 44
Finally, the court used the ADA's purpose to protect qualified in-
dividuals with disabilities from workplace discrimination to bolster its
holding that harassment is actionable under the ADA.34 5 The court
stated that a "contrary rule would have the illogical result of making
an employer liable for firing a qualified individual because of a disabil-
ity or its necessary consequences, while leaving untouched the unscru-
pulous employer who took the 'safe route' by harassing a disabled
individual with the intent of making him quit."34 6
Based on this sound and persuasive reasoning, the court held har-
assment is actionable under the ADA. 3 47 After deciding such a theory
exists, the court then simply followed standard Title VII analysis of
harassment claims. 348 In doing so, the court provided the necessary
elements to prove a harassment claim under the ADA: (1) the em-
ployee is a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA; (2)
the employee was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harass-
ment was based on the employee's disability; (4) the harassment was
severe and pervasive enough to affect a "term, condition or privilege of
employment;" and (5) employer liability. 34 9 The Haysman court's pre-
cision analysis would be replicated six years later when two circuit
reported the number of such charges filed in the 1990s. Instead, the EEOC only tracked
sexual, racial and national origin harassment claims under Title VII. See Trends in
Harassment Charges Filed With The EEOC, available at eeoc.gov/stats/harass-
ment.html. Specifically, the EEOC reports that 109,472 charges of harassment based
on sex, race and national origin were filed with it in the 1990s, but does not report the
number of disability-based harassment charges filed under the ADA during that time.
343. Haysman, 893 F. Supp. at 1106 (citing Hogue v. MQS Inspection, Inc., 875 F.
Supp. 714 (D. Co. 1995); Mannell v. Am. Tobacco Co., 871 F. Supp. 854 (E.D. Va. 1994);
Davis v. York Int'l Corp., 1993 WL 524761 (D. Md. 1993)).
344. Id.
345. Id. The ADA's purpose is "(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
(2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination
against individuals with disabilities; (3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a
central role in enforcing the standards established in this Act on behalf of individuals
with disabilities; and (4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the
power to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to ad-
dress the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities." 42
U.S.C. § 12101(b).
346. Haysman, 893 F. Supp. at 1106-07.
347. Id. at 1107.
348. Id.
349. Id.
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courts finally confronted the transparent question of whether the ADA
prohibits disability-based harassment.
3. Circuit Courts Validate Disability-Based Harassment Claim
Following the Haysman court's clear and articulate endorsement
of a disability-based harassment theory, no circuit court followed suit
for almost six years. Finally, during a fifteen-day stretch in 2001, two
circuit courts held for the first time that disability-based harassment
is actionable under the ADA, each proclaiming to be the first circuit
court to so hold. Both courts followed the sound reasoning found in
Haysman.
a. The Fifth Circuit Affirms the Obvious
In Flowers v. Southern Regional Physician Services, Inc.,3 50 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit became the first
appellate court to decide "whether the ADA embodies a claim for disa-
bility-based harassment."35 1 The Fifth Circuit held that it does.3 5 2
Sandra Flowers had been a medical assistant for a doctor for a year
and a half when her supervisor discovered she was infected with
Human Immunodeficiency Virus ("HIV").3 53 She was discharged
eight months later.3 54 Claiming she had been discharged because of
her disability and had been subjected to harassment, Flowers sued her
employer under the ADA and tried her case to a jury.3 55 The jury
determined her disability was a motivating factor in her discharge
and that she had been subjected to disability-based harassment.3 56
The jury awarded Flowers $350,000 on her hostile work environment
harassment claim, which was later reduced pursuant to statute.3 5 7
The employer appealed, arguing the ADA does not recognize a harass-
ment claim.3 58
After noting a number of circuit courts had indicated a harass-
ment claim is cognizable under the ADA, the court recognized none
had affirmatively held such a cause of action exists. 359 Like the Hays-
man court, the Fifth Circuit's analysis focused on "the ADA's lan-
guage, purpose and remedial framework," deciding Congress intended
350. 247 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2001).
351. Flowers, 247 F.3d at 233.
352. Id. at 235.
353. Id. at 231.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 231-32.
356. Id. at 232.
357. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(B)).
358. Id.
359. Id.
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the ADA "to eradicate disability-based harassment in the
workplace." 3 60
Initially, the court simply looked at the ADA's plain language and
compared it to Title VII.36 1 The court recognized the anti-discrimina-
tion provisions of both statutes were almost identical.36 2 Because of
the near identical language of the ADA and Title VII, the court dis-
cussed how the Supreme Court has authorized harassment claims
under Title VII based on the "term, condition, or privilege of employ-
ment" language. 3 63 Based on the Supreme Court's interpretation of
Title VII, the court interpreted the ADA's use of the same "terms, con-
ditions, and privileges of employment" language as evincing Congres-
sional intent to "strike at harassment in the workplace." 36 4
In addition to recognizing the similar language in Title VII and
the ADA, the court also recognized like purposes and remedial struc-
tures.3 65 Specifically, the court stated "Title VII and the ADA are
aimed at the same evil -employment discrimination against individ-
uals of certain classes." 3 66 Similarly, the court stated the ADA is also
"part of the same broad remedial framework" as Title VII.3 67 Thus,
courts routinely subject the ADA to Title VII analysis.36 8 The court
then concluded that, in addition to identical language, the purposes
and remedial framework of Title VII and the ADA command the recog-
nition of a disability-based harassment cause of action.369
b. Other Circuit Courts Approve the Disability-Based Harassment
Theory
Fifteen days later, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Fox v.
GMC,3 70 presented the following "issue of first impression in the ap-
pellate courts: is a hostile work environment claim cognizable under
the Americans with Disabilities Act?"3 7 1 After working for GM for
twelve years, Robert Fox suffered a non-work related injury to his
360. Id. at 233.
361. Id.
362. Id. (comparing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)).
363. Id. (citing Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989), and Meritor
Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986)).
364. Id.
365. Id. at 234.
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. 247 F.3d 169 (4th Cir. 2001).
371. Fox, 247 F.3d at 172. Of course, the Fourth Circuit's assertion that it faced an
issue of first impression in the appellate courts was simply not true, as the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals had issued its decision in Flowers two weeks earlier. See Flowers, 247
F.3d at 229.
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back and was placed on disability leave. 37 2 Over a decade later, he
returned to work, but reinjured his back within a year and took disa-
bility leave again, this time for two months.3 73 Once he returned to
work with a light-duty restriction, he lasted just over a year until he
once again hurt his back and took another year of disability leave.3 74
He then returned to work, this time lasting ten months, before taking
disability leave again. 37 5 During this final period, he was restricted to
light-duty work. 37 6 It was during this time period that he claimed he
was subjected to a hostile work environment based on his
disability.3 7 7
Fox claimed his co-workers resented his supervisor's accommoda-
tion of his restrictions and complained about it to another supervisor,
Tom Dame, and the general foreman, Bill Okal.3 78 Dame and Okal
then took pictures of the work Fox was performing and told Fox's su-
pervisor not to accommodate Fox because the tasks Fox refused to do
were no different from the tasks he was performing. 37 9 Okal insisted
that Fox perform the tasks Fox claimed aggravated his back.38 0
For two days, Dame actually supervised Fox. 38 1 While Fox was
working at a light-duty table, Dame, using loud and profane language,
asked Fox to perform a task outside of his ability. 38 2 When Fox said
he could not do it, Dame asked "Why the F can't you do it?"38 3 When
Fox explained he was limited because of his medical condition, Dame
said, "I don't need any of you handicapped M-F-'s. As far as I am
concerned you can go the H home."38 4 During a meeting with several
management and union officials, Okal asked, "how in the F do you
take a S-H-I-T with these restrictions?"38 5 Other officials then started
making fun of workers with disabilities. 38 6 After the meeting, Okal
372. Fox, 247 F.3d at 172.
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Id. at 173.
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. Id. Fox and many other witnesses did not want to use profane language at
trial, so they either spelled the word or used the first letter instead. Id. n.2. Thus, it is
left to the reader to interpret the meaning of "Why the F can't you do it?" and other
similar phrases used at Fox's trial.
384. Fox, 247 F.3d at 173.
385. Id.
386. Id.
2005]
CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW
did not stop requiring Fox to perform jobs he could not physically
perform.387
Fox then met with his neurologist, who restricted him to the light-
duty table work only.38 8 Instead of assigning Fox to the large group
light-duty table, Okal made Fox sit at an individual table and chair
directly in front of his office, which was located in a hazardous
area.38 9 To make matters worse, the table and chair were too low for
the six-feet, seven-inch Fox, causing a reaggravation of his back
injury.390
Because of the alleged harassment, Fox applied for a truck driver
position, but Okal refused to allow Fox to take the physical examina-
tion required for that position.3 9 1 Okal also allegedly told other em-
ployees not to talk to employees with disabilities.3 92 Co-workers often
ostracized those individuals with disabilities and would not even bring
them materials when they were at the light-duty table.3 93 Okal also
would not let employees with disabilities work overtime. 394 Other em-
ployees confirmed Fox's allegations.3 95 Fox alleged the verbal harass-
ment was almost constant.3 96 Okal referred to workers with
disabilities as "handicapped people" and "hospital people."39 7 Okal
and Dame would also refer to workers with disabilities as "handi-
capped MFs" and "911 hospital people."398
Because of this conduct, Fox suffered physical and emotional in-
jury.39 9 His doctor concluded the harassment caused depression and
anxiety, which worsened Fox's condition. 40 0 Although Fox could phys-
ically perform the light-duty work, he was no longer able to continue
to work in the environment because of the ongoing harassment.40 1 He
was placed on disability leave once again. 40 2 This time, he was on
disability leave for three years, during which time he received over
two years of temporary total disability benefits. 40 3 Fox then brought a
hostile work environment lawsuit against GM, claiming a violation of
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. Id. at 173-74.
392. Id. at 174.
393. Id.
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. Id.
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. Id.
400. Id.
401. Id.
402. Id. at 175.
403. Id.
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the ADA.404 After the first trial ended in a hung jury, a second jury
found Fox had been subjected to a hostile work environment and
awarded him $200,000 in compensatory damages, $3,000 in medical
bills, and $4,000 in lost overtime.405 GM appealed, claiming the ADA
does not recognize a hostile work environment claim. 406
Following a Flowers-like analysis, the Fourth Circuit had "little
difficulty in concluding that the ADA, like Title VII, creates a cause of
action for hostile work environment harassment."407 In so holding,
the court focused on the ADA's express reference to Title VII, the two
statutes' identical language, and the same purposes of the two civil
rights statutes-to prohibit illegal employment discrimination. 408
The court then analyzed the facts of the case to determine
whether the jury's verdict could stand.409 In doing so, the court listed
the prima facie case as the court did in Haysman.410 GM argued Fox
was not a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA and
that the harassment was not severe or pervasive enough to constitute
a hostile work environment. 411 Rejecting these arguments, the court
affirmed the jury verdict that Fox was subjected to a hostile work en-
vironment and upheld the jury's award, except for the overtime
award. 412
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recently joined the Fourth
and Fifth Circuits in officially proclaiming the ADA prohibits disabil-
ity-based harassment. In Shaver v. Independent Stave Co., 4 13 the
court recognized "[e]ven broad, remedial statutes such as the ADA do
not give federal courts a license to create causes of action after the
manner of the common law," but instead courts "must be disciplined
by the text of the statute itself."4 14 Turning to the ADA's text, the
court realized Congress, when enacting the ADA, "borrowed the
phrase 'terms, conditions, and privileges of employment' directly from
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."415 Given Congress's decision
to borrow exact language from Title VII, the court noted that, "[a]s
early as 1971, courts had construed the [identical] phrase in Title VII
to create an action based on a hostile work environment, and by the
404. Id.
405. Id.
406. Id.
407. Id. at 176.
408. Id. at 175-76.
409. Id. at 176-79.
410. Id. at 177.
411. Id.
412. Id. at 179.
413. 350 F.3d 716 (8th Cir. 2003).
414. Shaver, 350 F.3d at 720.
415. Id. (comparing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)).
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time that the ADA was passed in 1991, this interpretation was clearly
established as the controlling federal law on the subject."4 16
Based on this succinct and straightforward analysis, the court
had no difficulty concluding that, when Congress "included the phrase
'terms, conditions, and privileges of employment' in the ADA, it was
using a legal term of art that prohibited a broad range of employment
practices, including workplace harassment."4 1 7 To date, no court has
been willing to deny individuals with disabilities a harassment theory
under the ADA, and it seems highly unlikely a creative court could
distinguish the identical language contained in the ADA and Title
VII.41s
C. DISABILITY-BASED HARASSMENT INDISPUTABLY PROHIBITED BY
ADA
No court has rejected the idea that disability-based harassment is
a cognizable claim under the ADA. Any real debate over whether to
recognize such a claim would be somewhat misplaced. The reasoning
in Haysman, Flowers, Fox and Shaver is simply too compelling for any
court to reject a disability-based harassment claim. Based on the sim-
ilar language, purpose and broad remedial framework of the ADA and
Title VII, it seems safe to conclude Congress intended the ADA to pro-
hibit disability-based harassment. This position is bolstered by the
fact that Congress, in enacting the ADA, used Title VII's identical lan-
guage, which the Supreme Court had already held prohibited harass-
ment under Title VII. It would fly in the face of statutory construction
and common sense to hold that Congress, in using Title VII's exact
language in the ADA's remedial framework, did not wish to protect
individuals with disabilities from harassment in the workplace, even
though it intended that same language to protect other individuals
from workplace harassment.
416. Id. (citing Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 65-66), and Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d
234, 238-39 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
417. Shaver, 350 F.3d at 720.
418. No court has denied the existence of a disability-based harassment theory
under the ADA, while numerous courts of appeal have indicated a proclivity to recog-
nize such a cause of action. See, e.g., Trepka v. Bd. of Educ. of the Cleveland City Sch.
Dist., 28 Fed. Appx. 455, 460-62 (6th Cir. 2002) (unpublished opinion) (affirmed sum-
mary judgment for employer on ADA hostile work environment claim); EEOC v. Sears,
233 F.3d 432, 440 (7th Cir. 2000); Silk v. City of Chicago, 194 F.3d 788, 803 (7th Cir.
1999); Vollmert v. Wisconsin DOT, 197 F.3d 293, 297 (7th Cir. 1999) (assumed without
deciding that a hostile work environment claim is cognizable under the ADA); Walton v.
Mental Health Ass'n, 168 F.3d 661, 666-67 (3d Cir. 1999) (assumed without confirming
that a cause of action for disability-based harassment exists based on the ADA's similar-
ity to Title VII); Keever v. City of Middletown, 145 F.3d 809, 813 (6th Cir. 1998) (af-
firmed dismissal of ADA harassment claim).
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Although the United States Supreme Court has not had an oppor-
tunity to extend its Title VII harassment jurisprudence to the ADA, it
is doubtful any court will deny the existence of a disability-based har-
assment theory. Such a confusing holding would provide individuals
with disabilities less protection than those protected under Title VII,
even though Congress used identical language in the two anti-discrim-
ination statutes. Therefore, this issue is-or will become-well set-
tled as more disability-based harassment claims are litigated and
more appellate courts explicitly recognize such claims. Therefore, the
critical issue surrounding disability-based harassment is not whether
such a claim is cognizable, but how closely such a theory will follow
Title VII's lineage.
D. CRITICAL ISSUES Focus ON PROPER ANALYSIS OF DISABILITY-
BASED HARASSMENT CLAIMS
The focal point of these disability-based harassment claims will
not be whether such claims exist. The important issues will revolve
around an employee's prima facie case and the employer's available
defenses to such claims. As stated in both Haysman and Fox, the
prima facie case for disability-based harassment has parroted the
prima facie case for hostile work environment claims under Title VII.
Specifically, courts have routinely used the following prima facie case
for disability-based harassment under the ADA: (1) the employee is a
qualified individual with a disability under the ADA; (2) the employee
was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment was
based on the employee's disability; (4) the harassment was severe and
pervasive enough to affect a "term, condition or privilege of employ-
ment"; and (5) employer liability.4 19
This cookie-cutter approach to analyzing ADA-based harassment
claims under the cloak of Title VII jurisprudence, 4 20 without addi-
tional analysis taking into account the unique aspects of the ADA,
may create a number of analytical problems. Courts must resolve any
analytical problems so a consistent body of disability-based harass-
ment law develops that adequately supports the ADA's unique pur-
poses, rather than simply bowing to Title VII jurispruderkce.
419. See, e.g., Fox, 247 F.3d at 177; Haysman, 893 F. Supp. at 1107.
420. See Silk, 194 F.3d at 804 (stating that, to establish a harassment claim under
the ADA, plaintiffs "must follow the methodology already established in the parallel
area of Title VII litigation").
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1. Does An Individual Have a Disability under the ADA?
Title VII protects individuals from discrimination based on "race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin."4 2 1 The first element of the
prima facie case in a Title VII harassment case-that an employee is a
member of a protected class-is usually rather easy to establish.
Rarely will litigation focus on whether an individual claiming Title
VII harassment is a member of a protected class.
Under the ADA, however, determining whether an individual is
protected is not an easy task. Instead, this crucial determination is
made on an individualized, case-by-case basis.4 22 To gain the ADA's
protection against disability-based harassment, an individual must be
a qualified individual with a disability. 42 3 As seen by the discussion
in Section I covering Supreme Court decisions interpreting the ADA,
the determination of whether an individual even has an ADA-qualify-
ing disability is not an easy one. Indeed, the Supreme Court has set a
high hurdle for qualifying as an individual with a disability under the
ADA by announcing that the ADA's definition of disability must "be
interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard."4 24 An individ-
ual claiming disability-based harassment under the ADA will not be
able to "merely submit evidence of a medical diagnosis of an impair-
ment" to gain the ADA's protection.4 25 Instead, the ADA requires in-
dividuals seeking the ADA's protection "to prove a disability by
offering evidence that the extent of the limitation [caused by their im-
pairment] in terms of their own experience . . . is substantial."42 6
Given the ADA's demanding standard, numerous individuals claiming
to have an ADA-qualifying disability fail in their endeavors to estab-
lish such a disability.4 27 Given the lack of success for many ADA liti-
421. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
422. See, e.g., Toyota, 534 U.S. at 197-98.
423. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(8) (defining qualified individual with a disability), 12112(a)
(prohibiting discrimination against a qualified individual with a disability).
424. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 197.
425. Id. at 198.
426. Id. (quoting Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. at 567).
427. See, e.g., McGeshick v. Principi, 357 F.3d 1146, 1148-51 (10th Cir. 2004) (hold-
ing individual's Meniere's disease, tinnitus and vertigo not ADA-qualifying disabilities);
Ristrom v. Asbestos Workers Local 34 Joint Apprenticeship Comm., 370 F.3d 763, 769-
72 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding individual's attention deficit disorder and depression not
ADA-qualifying disabilities); Brunke v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 344 F.3d 819, 821-
22 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding individual's epilepsy not an ADA-qualifying disability);
Doebele v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 342 F.3d 1117, 1130 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding indi-
vidual's bipolar disorder, Attention Deficit Disorder and hypothyroidism not ADA-quali-
fying disabilities); Liljedahl v. Ryder Student Transp. Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 836, 841
(8th Cir. 2003) (holding individual's cancer and lung cancer not qualifying disabilities
under ADA-analogous state statute); Waldrip v. Gen. Elec. Co., 325 F.3d 652, 655-57
(5th Cir. 2003) (holding individual's chronic pancreatitis not an ADA-qualifying disabil-
ity); Whitlock v. Mac-Gray, Inc., 345 F.3d 44, 46 (1st Cir. 2003) (holding individual's
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gants in disparate treatment cases, individuals claiming disability-
based harassment may also meet the same fate.
Similarly, the ADA utilizes a three-prong definition of disability.
In addition to protecting individuals who actually have disabilities,4 28
the ADA also protects individuals who have a record of or are re-
garded as having a disability.4 29 This unique aspect of ADA jurispru-
dence differs from other protected characteristics. Instead of simply
focusing on the difficult question of whether an individual actually
has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a major
life activity-which in itself is more difficult than determining, for ex-
ample, whether an individual is black or is a woman under Title VII-
a court must also determine whether the individual has a record of or
is regarded as having a disability.
In addition to facing a demanding standard under the ADA on the
first element, the Supreme Court has made the first prong of the anal-
ysis even more difficult to apply in a disability-based harassment
claim by its Sutton trilogy. As discussed in Section I above, an indi-
vidual claiming to have an ADA-qualifying disability must show she
has a disability in light of available mitigating measures. 4 30 Given
the Supreme Court's restrictive interpretation of what constitutes an
ADA-qualifying disability, an individual seeking the ADA's protection
against workplace harassment will not be able to establish easily the
first element of her prima facie case. Thus, although an ADA harass-
ment claim may track a Title VII harassment claim, the difficulty of
satisfying the first element of the prima facie varies greatly. The
ADA's unique and demanding requirement for qualifying as an indi-
vidual with a disability makes it difficult for individuals to satisfy the
first element of a harassment claim under the ADA.
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder not an ADA-qualifying disability); Wood v.
Crown Redi-Mix, Inc., 339 F.3d 682, 686 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding individual's back im-
pairment not an ADA-qualifying disability); Mahon v. Crowell, 295 F.3d 585, 591-92
(6th Cir. 2002) (same); Orr v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 297 F.3d 720, 724 (8th Cir. 2002)
(holding individual's diabetes not ADA-qualifying disability).
428. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).
429. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B)-(C); Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489 (discussing the require-
ments to be regarded as being disabled).
430. See, e.g., Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475 (holding "the determination of whether an
individual is disabled should be made with reference to measures that mitigate the indi-
vidual's impairment"); see also Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. at 565-66 (holding mitigating
measures include "measures undertaken with artificial aids, like medications and de-
vices, and measures undertaken, whether consciously or not, with the body's own sys-
tems"); Murphy, 527 U.S. at 521 (holding employee's hypertension was not an ADA-
qualifying disability when controlled by medication).
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2. Is the Harassment Unwelcome?
The second element of the prima facie case may also cause
problems if simply recast in Title VII terms. As routinely stated, the
second element of an employee's prima facie case is that the employee
was subjected to unwelcome harassment. Although conduct must be
unwelcome to constitute harassment, an individual with a disability
may not be able to communicate that the conduct at issue is indeed
unwelcome.
If an employee's disability precludes the employee from asserting
that the conduct is unwelcome, would the employee be precluded from
making a disability-based harassment claim? This issue would cut
both ways. On the one hand, conduct is not prohibited unless it is
unwelcome. I wear glasses. If a co-worker consistently called me the
potentially derogatory term "four eyes" and I also participated by call-
ing her four-eyes, it would stretch the imagination to conclude that
one of us was subjected to unwelcome harassment. It is wholly rea-
sonable to expect at least some indication that a person who feels she
is subjected to unwelcome harassment would show some disfavor and
inform the harasser that the conduct is indeed unwelcome. To be
sure, welcome conduct does not meet the definition of harassment.
On the other hand, an individual's disability potentially could
make it difficult to adequately inform a harasser that his conduct is
unwelcome. For instance, a person with bi-polar disorder may not be
capable of complaining about offensive conduct while in the depressive
state. The depression may be so debilitating that the employee simply
endures abuse without taking any action. Likewise, a person with a
multiple personality disorder might actually enjoy taking part in cer-
tain conduct at times, while at other times would not wish to take part
because of her disability. Based on these potential issues, which may
be farfetched and theoretical, courts should be vigilant to look for such
cases. If such issues arise, courts may be required to fashion a second
element that allows an exception if the employee's disability prevents
the employee from informing the harasser or others that the harass-
ment is unwelcome.
3. Is the Harassment Based on the Employee's Disability?
The third element of the prima facie case requires the harassment
to be based on an employee's disability. To meet this element, an indi-
vidual with a disability must be able to show the alleged harasser
knew or at least should have known of the employee's disability. As
an individual's disability may not be known or readily apparent, this
element could result in the preclusion of numerous disability-based
harassment claims. Indeed, a number of discrimination lawsuits
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under the ADA have failed because a plaintiff was unable to show the
employer knew of the employee's alleged disability.
4 3 1
A few examples will illustrate how this element might be difficult
to implement. If an employee has a mental disability, many co-work-
ers will have no knowledge that the employee has such a disability.
For example, an employee with dyslexia may not inform anyone at
work of this disability. 43 2 If co-workers or supervisors consistently
poke fun at the employee based on spelling mistakes or reading errors,
and these harassers have no knowledge of the employee's dyslexia,
would the employee with dyslexia be able to satisfy this element of the
prima facie case? Furthermore, if the employee wanted the harass-
ment to stop, does the employee have to inform the harassers that she
has dyslexia?
What about this scenario: A supervisor in a hospital consistently
uses such items as pens, highlighters and notepads, which oftentimes
are provided freely by pharmaceutical representatives to market their
products. The supervisor just hit the "jackpot" and has reams of
notepads marketing the anti-depressant Prozac. The supervisor often
uses these notepads when writing notes to employees. This supervisor
has repeatedly written distasteful and nasty comments on these
notepads when addressing one employee. For instance, the supervisor
has made comments like "you must not be thinking," "get your head in
the game," "stop moping around and pouting while at work," and "you
must be totally out of your mind to act this way." If the employee is
clinically depressed and taking Prozac, would the supervisor who con-
sistently criticizes the employee by using the Prozac notepad be sub-
ject to a harassment claim? What if the supervisor had absolutely no
idea about the employee's mental disability?
Finally, the mere fact an individual with a disability receives a
legally required accommodation under the ADA may lead to harassing
workplace conditions. 43 3 When an employee receives an accommoda-
tion for her disability, most employees will never know the employee
even has a disability. Only those with a need to know of the em-
ployee's disability should ever find out, unless of course the employee
voluntarily shares such information with individuals who have no
need to know. What happens when other employees harass an indi-
431. See, e.g., Ristrom, 370 F.3d at 371-72 (holding employer did not know plaintiff
had an ADA-qualifying disability); Rinehimer v. Cemcolift, Inc., 292 F.3d 375, 380-81
(3d Cir. 2002) (holding employee failed to establish discrimination claim because em-
ployer did not know about employee's asthma).
432. Dyslexia is defined as a learning disorder marked by impairment of the ability
to recognize and comprehend written words. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 432 (4th ed. 2000).
433. See Haysman, 893 F. Supp. at 1106 (converting a claim for failure to provide a
reasonable accommodation to a claim of disability-based harassment).
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vidual with a disability because they believe the employee is receiving
preferential treatment, but, in reality and unbeknownst to the harass-
ers, the employee is receiving a legally required accommodation under
the ADA?
For example, an employee with an ADA-qualifying disability may
be forced to undergo medical treatment every morning from 6:00 a.m.
to 8:00 a.m. and cannot arrive at work on time for her 7:30 a.m. shift.
The employer accommodates her disability and allows her to arrive at
work every day at 8:30 a.m., a full hour after other employees are re-
quired to arrive. The employee does not inform any of her co-workers
of her medical treatment and they begin to consistently harass her on
her "relaxed" schedule and how she gets treated so well while every-
one else would be fired if they showed up late every day. Would this
conduct be based on the individual's disability, even though co-work-
ers do not know the employee has a disability?
The earlier discussion of the workplace harassment an individual
with a disability endured in Fox reveals how the third element can be
satisfied. 4 34 Once Fox sought accommodations for his debilitating
back injury, and after Fox's supervisor sought to accommodate Fox's
injury with certain restrictions, "some of Fox's co-workers resented
this accommodation." 4 35 Indeed, these co-workers even complained to
another supervisor and the general foreman of the plant.4 3 6 The cul-
ture even changed at the plant, as several employees testified they
and other individuals with disabilities were harassed because of their
disabilities. 43 7 The supervisors actually encouraged co-workers "to os-
tracize the disabled workers and prevent them from doing their as-
signed tasks by refusing to give them necessary materials," which was
a part of the medical restrictions placed on Fox.43 8 Given the severe
and pervasive nature of the workplace harassment Fox endured at the
hands of his supervisors and co-workers, the Fourth Circuit refused to
disturb the jury's finding that Fox had been harassed based on his
disability. 43 9
Harassing an individual with a disability is unlawful, but it will
not always be as clear-cut that the harassment is based on the individ-
ual's disability. Cases such as Fox will come along where the evidence
shows supervisors actively encouraged other employees to harass an
434. Fox, 247 F.3d at 172.
435. Id.
436. Id.
437. Id. at 174.
438. Id. at 179.
439. Id. But see Silk, 194 F.3d at 803, 808 (holding "the barrage of harassing con-
duct after he was given permanent day-shift work" as an accommodation for his disabil-
ity was not actionable under the ADA); Walton, 168 F.3d at 667 (holding a supervisor's
offensive conduct toward an employee was not based on the employee's disability).
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employee with a disability. However, this certainly will not be the
rule. Instead, courts, and juries later in the litigation process, must
scour the evidence to determine whether the alleged harassment was
based on a disability. Given the existence of an employee's disability
is oftentimes masked in the workplace, it may not be readily apparent
that harassing conduct-even if it appears to implicate an individual's
disability-is actually based on an employee's disability. Thus, courts
and juries must be vigilant when considering the third element of a
prima facie case of disability-based harassment.
4. Does the Harassment Alter a Term, Condition or Privilege of
Employment?
The fourth element of the prima facie case of disability-based har-
assment requires a finding that the harassment is "severe and perva-
sive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work
environment-an environment that a reasonable person would find
hostile or abusive."440 This element oftentimes sinks harassment
cases.4 4 1 Indeed, one circuit court has described this standard as an
"elusive category."44 2 The category will be no less elusive in the ADA
context.
a. Reasonable Person Versus Reasonable Person with a Disability?
The fourth element of the prima facie case requires an employee
to show that the harassment was so severe and pervasive that it al-
tered a term, condition and privilege of employment. Whether work-
place harassment becomes sufficiently abusive or hostile is based on
whether "a reasonable person would find [the environment] hostile or
abusive."4 43 Under Title VII, a debate had ensued whether this stan-
dard should be that of a reasonable person or a reasonable person in
the protected class. For example, in Ellison v. Brady,"4 the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals stated "that in evaluating the severity and
pervasiveness of sexual harassment, we should focus on the perspec-
tive of the victim." 44 5 The court reasoned, "[ilf we only examined
whether a reasonable person would engage in allegedly harassing con-
duct, we would run the risk of reinforcing the prevailing level of dis-
440. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22.
441. See, e.g., Breeden, 532 U.S. at 271-74 (holding harassing conduct was not so
severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of employment) (Title VII); Shaver,
350 F.3d at 721-22 (same) (ADA); Tuggle v. Mangan, 348 F.3d 714, 722 (8th Cir. 2003)
(same) (Fourteenth Amendment); Duncan v. GMC, 300 F.3d 928, 935 (8th Cir. 2002)
(same) (Title VII).
442. Shaver, 350 F.3d at 721.
443. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22.
444. 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
445. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991).
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crimination. Harassers could continue to harass merely because a
particular discriminatory practice was common, and victims of harass-
ment would have no remedy."4 4 6 Thus, the Ninth Circuit decided "to
analyze harassment from the victim's perspective," holding "a female
plaintiff states a prima facie case of hostile environment sexual har-
assment when she alleges conduct which a reasonable woman would
consider sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of em-
ployment and create an abusive working environment." 44 7
This same debate-whether harassment under the ADA should
be viewed under a reasonable person standard or under a reasonable
person with a disability standard-could ensue in this area. Which
standard should apply? Under Title VII, the Supreme Court has inti-
mated that the reasonable person standard applies.4 8 In addition to
following the Supreme Court's lead that Title VII harassment is to be
viewed under a reasonable person standard, the ADA's policy will also
be fulfilled by following a reasonable person standard as opposed to a
reasonable person with a disability standard.
By using the reasonable person with a disability standard, jurors
without disabilities would be authorized to go into "paternalistic
mode" and decide that individuals with disabilities are somehow emo-
tionally inferior or need more protection. This paternalistic viewpoint
has no place in our society, as the ADA strives to eradicate treatment
of individuals with disabilities based on myths and stereotypes. As
part of its findings to support passage of the ADA, Congress found
"individuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority who
have been faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a his-
tory of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of
political powerlessness in our society, based on characteristics that are
beyond the control of such individuals and resulting from stereotypic
assumptions not truly indicative of the individual ability of such indi-
viduals to participate in, and contribute to, society."4 4 9 Allowing ju-
rors to assume the role of deciding what a reasonable person with a
disability would find offensive would inappropriately allow paternalis-
tic behavior by the jury, which would re-emphasize what individuals
with disabilities cannot do or tolerate, as opposed to what they can do
or tolerate. It would also re-emphasize that individuals with disabili-
ties somehow differ from other individuals, as a standard that differ-
entiates between a reasonable person with a disability and a
446. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 878.
447. Id. at 878-79.
448. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21 (stating that "[c]onduct that is not severe or pervasive
enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment-an environment
that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive-is beyond Title ViI's purview").
449. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (emphasis added).
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reasonable person inherently decrees those categories are not the
same. Individuals with disabilities do not need individuals without
disabilities to try to understand their plight. They simply wish to be
mainstreamed and not to be discriminated against based on having a
disability. Therefore, the reasonable person standard should also ap-
ply to disability-based harassment claims.
b. Is the Harassment Severe or Pervasive?
According to the Supreme Court, workplace harassment will only
be actionable when the harassing conduct is "sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and cre-
ate an abusive working environment."4 50 The Court has "made it
clear that conduct must be extreme to amount to a change in the
terms and conditions of employment."4 5 1 Only "[wihen the workplace
is permeated with 'discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult"'
can a plaintiff successfully assert a workplace harassment claim.4 52
The Court also has developed a few factors to consider when determin-
ing whether a workplace environment is sufficiently hostile or abu-
sive: "the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity;
whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offen-
sive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an em-
ployee's work performance."4 53
The Supreme Court has recognized a "recurring point in [its]
opinions is that 'simple teasing,' offhand comments, and isolated inci-
dents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory
changes in the 'terms and conditions of employment.'" 45 4 The Court
has noted that, although Title VII does not tolerate sexual harass-
ment, it does not prohibit "genuine but innocuous differences in the
ways men and women routinely interact with members of the same
sex and of the opposite sex."4 55 The Supreme Court has set a lofty and
demanding standard for judging hostility "to ensure that Title VII
does not become a 'general civility code.'" 45 6 The Court promised that,
if its Title VII harassment standards are "[piroperly applied, they will
filter out complaints attacking 'the ordinary tribulations of the work-
450. Meritor Say. Bank, 477 U.S. at 67; Gowesky v. Singing River Hosp. Sys., 321
F.3d 503, 509 (5th Cir. 2003) (recognizing the legal standard for workplace harassment
is high).
451. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788.
452. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21 (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 65).
453. Id. at 23.
454. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788.
455. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81.
456. Faragher, 524 U.S. 788 (quoting Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80).
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place, such as the sporadic use of abusive language, gender-related
jokes, and occasional teasing.'" 4 57
These demanding standards most certainly apply in the ADA con-
text as well. The Eighth Circuit recently decided a harassment case
under the ADA based on the lack of severe or pervasive harassing con-
duct.4 58 In Shaver, an employee suffered from nocturnal epilepsy
since his teenage years.4 59 The employee underwent an operation to
remove part of his brain, which was replaced with a metal plate. 460
The employee brought an ADA harassment claim based on the follow-
ing incidents of workplace harassment: his co-workers referred to him
as "platehead"; his co-workers suggested he was stupid; and a co-
worker said the employee "pissed his pants when the microwave was
on." 46 1 Determining the harassment was not so severe or pervasive to
alter a term or condition of employment, the Eighth Circuit affirmed
the district court's summary judgment in the employer's favor on the
harassment claim.46 2
Title VII standards for sexual harassment are unquestionably de-
manding, and these demanding standards will most certainly be ap-
plied to ADA harassment cases. Notwithstanding the demanding
federal harassment standards, individuals with disabilities will still
be protected when they successfully prove hostile or abusive harass-
ment altered the terms and conditions of employment. 4 63 Similar to
the earlier discussion concluding that disability-based harassment
cases should be judged under the reasonable person standard, individ-
uals with disabilities also should not have a different standard when
it comes to whether their harassment is severe or pervasive. To hold
otherwise would accentuate the differences between individuals with
disabilities and everyone else. This differential treatment is intolera-
ble. To fully mainstream individuals with disabilities into the work-
place and to treat them as equals once there, 464 the standard for
determining whether a hostile or abusive environment exists should
be the same as the standard for other forms of workplace harassment.
457. Id. (citation omitted).
458. Shaver, 350 F.3d at 721.
459. Id. at 719.
460. Id.
461. Id. at 721.
462. Id.
463. See Flowers, 247 F.3d at 237 (holding evidence supported a finding that the
disability-based harassment was so severe or pervasive to alter the terms and condi-
tions of employment); Fox, 247 F.3d at 179 (upholding the jury's verdict in favor of the
employee because the evidence supported a finding that the harassment was so severe
or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of employment).
464. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (stating Congress found "the Nation's proper goals
regarding individuals with disabilities are to assure equality of opportunity, full partici-
pation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for such individuals").
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If an individual without a disability would not be federally protected
from certain harassing conduct, then an individual with a disability
should not receive federal protection based on the same language that
did not provide protection to the individual without a disability. Not
only does this result logically flow from the similarity of the ADA and
Title VII, but the result reinforces the ADA's goal to end harassment
against individuals with disabilities. 46 5
5. Employer Liability
The final element of a prima facie case of Title VII sexual harass-
ment requires the employee to prove employer liability for the harass-
ment, since respondeat superior liability-as opposed to individual
liability-is built into Title VII's remedial scheme. 4 66 Because the
ADA follows the same remedial scheme as Title VII,4 6 7 the ADA has
been interpreted to disallow individual liability, creating a respondeat
superior standard for liability for ADA claims as well. 468
Under Title VII, employer liability depends on whether the
harassing conduct was carried out by co-workers or supervisors.
When the harassment is carried out by co-workers, the plaintiff must
show the employer was somehow negligent in allowing the harass-
ment to take place or by failing to remedy the harassment. Specifi-
cally, the plaintiff must show "the employer knew or should have
known of the harassment and failed to take prompt and effective re-
medial action."4 69
When the harassment is carried out by supervisors, the standard
for employer liability is a bit more complicated. Although employer
liability for harassing acts perpetrated by supervisors may be a bit
more convoluted, one thing is crystal clear under Title VII-employers
465. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2) (stating one of the ADA's purposes is "to provide
clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against indi-
viduals with disabilities").
466. Mandell v. County of Suffolk, 316 F.3d 368, 377 (2d Cir. 2003); Indest v. Free-
man Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258, 262 (5th Cir. 1999); Bales v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 143
F.3d 1103, 1111 (8th Cir. 1998); Lissau v. S. Food Serv., Inc., 159 F.3d 177, 180 (4th Cir.
1998); Pink v. Modoc Indian Health Project, Inc., 157 F.3d 1185, 1189 (9th Cir. 1998);
Wathen v. G.E. Co., 115 F.3d 400, 405 (6th Cir. 1997); Haynes v. Williams, 88 F.3d 898,
901 (10th Cir. 1996); Mason v. Stallings, 82 F.3d 1007, 1009 (11th Cir. 1996); Sheridan
v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1077 (3d Cir. 1996); Williams v. Ban-
ning, 72 F.3d 552, 554 (7th Cir. 1995).
467. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (defining employer), with 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(b) (defining employer).
468. See, e.g., Silk, 194 F.3d at 797-98 n.5; Sullivan v. River Valley Sch. Dist., 197
F.3d 804, 808 n.1 (6th Cir. 1999); Mason, 82 F.3d at 1009.
469. See, e.g., Erenberg v. Methodist Hosp., 357 F.3d 787, 792 (8th Cir. 2004); Cain
v. Blackwell, 246 F.3d 758, 760 (5th Cir. 2001); Fenton v. HiSAN, Inc., 174 F.3d 827,
830 (6th Cir. 1999); Walton, 168 F.3d at 667.
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are not always strictly liable for supervisor sexual harassment.4 70 In-
stead, the Supreme Court has commanded lower courts to follow
agency principles when determining whether employers are liable for
supervisor harassment under Title VII. 4 7 1 In deciding agency princi-
ples control employer liability for supervisor harassment, the Court
acknowledged "Congress's decision to define 'employer' to include any
'agent' of an employer 4 72 surely evinces an intent to place some limits
on the acts of employees for which employers under Title VII are to be
held responsible."47 3 Given Congress's decision to define employer
under the ADA 4 74 the same way it defined employer under Title VII,
employer liability for supervisor harassment under the ADA will be
the same.
In Meritor Savings Bank, the Supreme Court held employers are
not to be strictly liable for supervisor harassment.4 7 5 A little over a
decade later, the Supreme Court again confronted the issue of em-
ployer liability for supervisor harassment in Ellerth and Faragher.4 76
Before addressing the issue of employer liability once again, the Court
recognized that, "[slince our decision in Meritor, Courts of Appeals
have struggled to derive manageable standards to govern employer
liability for hostile environment perpetrated by supervisory
employees." 4 77
In Ellerth, an employee suffered repeated and constant sexual
harassment from her supervisor.4 78 Although the employee knew
about her employer's anti-harassment policy, she never reported her
supervisor's harassing conduct to management. 47 9 Despite the persis-
tent harassment endured by the employee, she did not suffer a tangi-
ble employment action.48 0 When considering employer liability for
the supervisor's harassment, the Court, following Meritor, applied
agency principles.4 8 l Recognizing "[tihe general rule is that sexual
harassment by a supervisor is not conduct within the scope of employ-
ment," the Court rejected a traditional scope-of-employment analy-
sis. 48 2 The Court also discussed a negligence standard, which asks
470. Meritor Say. Bank, 477 U.S. at 72 (holding "employers are [not] always auto-
matically liable for sexual harassment by their supervisors").
471. Id.
472. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
473. Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 72.
474. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A).
475. Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 72.
476. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 742; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 775.
477. Id.
478. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 747-48.
479. Id.
480. Id. at 766.
481. Id. at 754-65.
482. Id. at 757.
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whether the employer's negligence causes the harassment; an appar-
ent authority standard, which asks whether the supervisor used ap-
parent authority to engage in the harassing conduct; and the aided in
the agency relation standard, which asks whether the supervisor was
aided in the agency relation to engage in the harassing conduct. 48 3
The Court focused on the aided in the agency relation standard, which
"requires the existence of something more than the employment rela-
tionship itself."48 4 Based on this standard, the Court determined em-
ployers are strictly liable "when a supervisor takes a tangible
employment action against the subordinate."48 5 According to the Su-
preme Court, tangible employment actions involve "a significant
change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to pro-
mote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a
decision causing a significant change in benefits."48 6 In concluding
employers are strictly liable for supervisor harassment culminating in
a tangible employment action, the Court reasoned, "When a supervi-
sor makes a tangible employment decision, there is assurance the in-
jury could not have been inflicted absent the agency relation." 4 7
After making short thrift of announcing a standard for employer
liability when supervisor sexual harassment culminates in a tangible
employment action, the Court observed the question of "[wihether the
agency relation aids in commission of supervisor harassment which
does not culminate in a tangible employment action is less obvi-
ous."48 8 The Court recognized agency principles are only part of the
liability analysis when confronted with a case involving supervisor
harassment without a tangible employment action. In addition to
agency principles, the Court recognized other principles are relevant
to the employer liability analysis: "Title VII is designed to encourage
the creation of antiharassment policies and effective grievance mecha-
nisms. Were employer liability to depend in part on an employer's ef-
fort to create such procedures, it would [affect] Congress's intention to
promote conciliation rather than litigation in the Title VII context,
and the EEOC's policy of encouraging the development of grievance
procedures." 4 9 The Court further recognized that, "[t]o the extent
limiting employer liability could encourage employees to report
483. Id. at 759.
484. Id. at 760.
485. Id.
486. Id. at 761.
487. Id. at 761-62.
488. Id. at 763.
489. Id. at 764 (citations omitted).
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harassing conduct before it becomes severe or pervasive, it would also
serve Title VII's deterrent purpose." 490
Balancing "the agency principles of vicarious liability for harm
caused by misuse of supervisory authority, as well as Title VII's
equally basic policies of encouraging forethought by employers and
saving action by objecting employees," the Supreme Court held "[ain
employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for
an actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor with imme-
diate (or successively higher) authority over the employee. When no
tangible employment action is taken, a defending employer may raise
an affirmative defense to liability or damages, subject to proof by a
preponderance of the evidence."49 1 The Court announced an em-
ployer's affirmative defense for supervisor harassment "comprises two
necessary elements: (a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to
prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b)
that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of
any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or
to avoid harm otherwise."4 92 After listing the necessary elements of
the employer's affirmative defense, the Court then briefly explained
the defense:
[W]hile proof that an employer had promulgated an an-
tiharassment policy with complaint procedure is not neces-
sary in every instance as a matter of law, the need for a
stated policy suitable to the employment circumstances may
appropriately be addressed in any case when litigating the
first element of the defense. And while proof that an em-
ployee failed to fulfill the corresponding obligation of reasona-
ble care to avoid harm is not limited to showing any
unreasonable failure to use any complaint procedure pro-
vided by the employer, a demonstration of such failure will
normally suffice to satisfy the employer's burden under the
second element of the defense.4 93
490. Id.
491. Id. at 764-65.
492. Id. at 765; see Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; see also Silk, 194 F.3d at 805 (apply-
ing EllerthIFaragher affirmative defense to disability-based harassment claim perpe-
trated by a supervisor).
493. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. In his dissent in Ellerth, Justice Clarence Thomas
charged the Court with "manufactur[ing] a rule that employers are vicariously liable if
supervisors create a sexually hostile work environment, subject to an affirmative de-
fense that the Court barely attempts to define." Id. at 766 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Justice Thomas also levied the charge against the Court that its decision "provides
shockingly little guidance about how employers can actually avoid vicarious liability,"
which would "ensure a continuing reign of confusion in this important area of the law."
Id. at 771, 773. Justice Thomas prophesied that "[t]he Court's holding does guarantee
one result: There will be more and more litigation to clarify applicable legal rules in an
area in which both practitioners and the courts have long been begging for guidance."
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Finally, the Court again made crystal clear that employers are
strictly liable for supervisor harassment involving a tangible employ-
ment action: "[n]o affirmative defense is available, however, when the
supervisor's harassment culminates in a tangible employment action,
such as discharge, demotion, or undesirable reassignment."49 4
The employer liability element of a Title VII harassment claim, as
well as the affirmative defense crafted by the Supreme Court in El-
lerth and Faragher, should apply to disability-based harassment
claims as well. Given Congress's decision to use the same liability lan-
guage in the ADA as it had used in Title VII, it would be nonsensical
for courts to somehow distinguish employer liability under the ADA
from employer liability under Title VII. 49 5
However, one area of contention or division may exist between the
ADA and Title VII when it comes to employers asserting the Ellerthi
Faragher affirmative defense to employer liability for supervisor har-
assment. While an individual protected by Title VII's cloak must util-
ize an employer's anti-harassment procedures, an individual with a
disability may have issues surrounding an ability to understand or
utilize those procedures. For instance, a blind person might be unable
to read a written anti-harassment policy, so an employer could provide
a Braille copy to the blind employee or explain the policy to the em-
ployee. Another circumstance that may arise would be the inability of
an employee with a disability to effectively take advantage of em-
ployer-provided preventive or corrective opportunities. Although a
case involving such a situation has not been reported, employers must
be aware that their reasonable accommodation duty would also apply
to assisting employees with disabilities in understanding and utilizing
the employer's anti-harassment policies.49 6
Id. at 774. If Justice Thomas's prediction rings true, individuals with disabilities as-
serting claims of disability-based harassment will be affected to the same extent as indi-
viduals asserting harassment claims under Title VII.
494. Id.; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808; see also Penn. State Police v. Suders, 124 S. Ct.
2342, 2352 (2004) (recognizing that Ellerth and Faragher "delineate two categories of
hostile work environment claims: (1) harassment that 'culminates in a tangible employ-
ment action,' for which employers are strictly liable, and (2) harassment that takes
place in the absence of a tangible employment action, to which employers may assert an
affirmative defense") (citations omitted).
495. The Supreme Court's most recent foray into employer liability for supervisor
harassment involved a constructive discharge claim. In Suders, the Court recognized
that a constructive discharge involving official action constitutes a tangible employment
action, such that no affirmative defense is available to an employer in those cases. To
establish a constructive discharge claim involving supervisor harassment, the Court
held that "[a] plaintiff who advances such a compound claim [i.e., harassment plus con-
structive discharge] must show working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable per-
son would have felt compelled to resign." Id. Of course, the Supreme Court's decision in
Suders confronting constructive discharge cases should apply to ADA claims as well.
496. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
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The bottom line is that, if employers have a consistent anti-har-
assment policy covering the necessary protected classes, including dis-
ability, employers and employees should be satisfied. Indeed,
providing individuals with disabilities the same protections as individ-
uals without disabilities makes sense and fulfills the ADA's dream of
equal opportunity for individuals with disabilities. The only caveat
would be the ADA's additional requirement that employers provide in-
dividuals with disabilities reasonable accommodations. If employers
keep this in mind, they will faithfully follow the ADA and meet
America's expectations of them.
E. CONCLUSION
One thing should be entirely certain-the ADA prohibits disabil-
ity-based harassment to the same extent Title VII does. If courts were
to deny individuals with disabilities a harassment-free work environ-
ment, while guaranteeing a harassment-free work environment for in-
dividuals without disabilities, the ADA's goal of equal opportunity for
individuals with disabilities would be annihilated. As no court has
erroneously held the ADA does not provide for a disability-based har-
assment claim, the focus when analyzing disability-based harassment
claims should be on ensuring the ADA's lofty goals are met. Because
the ADA and Title VII differ somewhat, most significantly in the
ADA's definition of disability and its reasonable accommodation re-
quirement, harassment claims pursued under the ADA should not
simply be treated as Title VII clones. Instead, courts, attorneys, em-
ployers and individuals with disabilities must recognize where the
ADA charts a different course from Title VII, and then navigate ac-
cordingly. If courts, attorneys, employers and individuals with disa-
bilities can critically understand the differences between the ADA and
Title VII, individuals with disabilities will be assured of harassment-
free work environments to the same degree as other individuals in the
workplace.
IV. "I CAN'T WORK; ACTUALLY I CAN": THE ADA'S
TREATMENT OF STATEMENTS MADE WHILE
APPLYING FOR SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY
INSURANCE BENEFITS UNDER THE
SOCIAL SECURITY ACT OF 1935
A. INTRODUCTION
While scuba diving in the Caymans, a woman is seriously injured
when her oxygen tank explodes. The woman's doctor informs her she
is permanently disabled and she most likely will never work again,
especially not in her current job planning major events. Based on her
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doctor's prognosis, the woman applies for Social Security Disability In-
surance ("SSDI") benefits under the Social Security Act ("SSA"),
claiming she is totally and permanently disabled and unable to work
at all. Notwithstanding her sworn statements to the Social Security
Administration, the woman asks her employer to accommodate her
disability and allow her to return to work. Surmising this employee
wants to have her cake and eat it, too, the employer ponders whether
the employee is a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA
if she applies for SSDI benefits claiming she is totally and perma-
nently disabled.
Must the employer independently determine whether the em-
ployee is a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA-or
can the employer rely on the employee's sworn statements to the So-
cial Security Administration that she is unable to work? Stated an-
other way, if an employee seeks federal benefits by saying "I am
permanently and totally disabled and can't work at all," must an em-
ployer disregard that claim and independently determine whether the
employee is a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA
who is entitled to a reasonable accommodation that would allow her to
continue working? According to a unanimous United States Supreme
Court in Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp.,49 7 the em-
ployee's application for SSDI benefits does not preclude her from seek-
ing a reasonable accommodation from her employer in order to
work.
4 9 8
This section discusses the conflict between the ADA's pro-work
policy and the SSA's no-work policy. Some background on the two di-
vergent disability statutes-the ADA and the SSA-will first be pro-
vided, followed by a discussion of the issue as it existed before the
High Court decided it in Cleveland. The landmark Cleveland case will
then be discussed, followed by a brief discussion of a few post-Cleve-
land cases to reveal how lower courts are dealing with this conflicting
and complex area of disability law. Finally, this section will make the
case that Congress must take action to assure the ADA and the SSA
do not conflict, but instead carry out a consistent national policy on
disability. The current national disability policy-as reflected in the
ADA and the SSA-is simply unworkable and frustrates any unified
national policy.
497. 526 U.S. 795 (1999).
498. Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 797-98 (1999).
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B. Two DISABILiTY-BASED FEDERAL STATUTES: THE ADA AND THE
SSA
When the ADA was enacted, Congress found that approximately
43,000,000 Americans had at least one disability, and that this num-
ber would only grow as the population ages.49 9 Congress announced
our national policy is to "assure equality of opportunity, full participa-
tion, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency" for individuals
with disabilities. 500 Congress also found discrimination against indi-
viduals with disabilities "costs the United States billions of dollars in
unnecessary expenses resulting from dependency and nonproductiv-
ity."5 0 L By enacting the ADA, Congress sought "to provide a clear and
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination
against individuals with disabilities."50 2
Thus, Congress announced a national goal of allowing individuals
with disabilities to reach self-sufficiency, avoiding the enticing trap
set by dependency on government programs. Indeed, a primary spon-
sor of the ADA hailed it as "a broad and remedial bill of rights for
individuals with disabilities" and "the 20th century Emancipation
Proclamation for all persons with disabilities."50 3 When President
George H.W. Bush signed the ADA into law in the summer of 1990, he
announced it was a day "to rejoice in and celebrate another 'Indepen-
dence Day,' one that is long overdue."50 4 By signing the ADA, Presi-
dent Bush boldly declared that "every man, woman, and child with a
disability can now pass through once-closed doors into a bright new
era of equality, independence and freedom." At the time the ADA was
enacted, two-thirds of individuals with disabilities who were not work-
ing wanted to work, and, even more telling, eighty-two percent of
those individuals with disabilities would have gladly forfeited govern-
ment disability benefits to gain full-time employment. 50 5 The four-
teen years since the enactment of the ADA have apparently not
produced a sea change in the numbers of individuals with disabilities
who are self-sufficient.
According to some authors, "the ADA has not led to an improve-
ment of employment conditions to disabled persons generally."50 6 One
499. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1).
500. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8).
501. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(9).
502. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1).
503. 135 Cong. Rec. S. 4984 (Sen. Tom Harkin May 9, 1989); 136 Cong. Rec. S. 9689
(Sen. Tom Harkin July 13, 1990).
504. President George H.W. Bush, Remarks on Signing the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act of 1990 (July 26, 1990).
505. 135 Cong. Rec. S. 4985 (Sen. Tom Harkin May 9, 1989).
506. Susan Schwochau & Peter David Blanck, The Economics of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, Part III: Does the ADA Disable the Disabled?, 21 BERKELE= J. EMp. &
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article reports that "[o]nly 26.6% of individuals with work disabilities
were employed [in 1998], compared to 78.4% of nondisabled individu-
als. Of disabled individuals who were employed, 63.9% held full-time
jobs. For nondisabled employed persons, the comparable figure is
81.5%."507 Some studies have even concluded the employment rates
of individuals with disabilities are actually decreasing since the ADA
was enacted. 508 Some commentators have surmised the decrease in
employment for individuals with disabilities, even in the wake of the
ADA's broad national policy favoring work, can be attributed to "in-
creases in the receipt of federal disability payments, which disabled
individuals do not wish to relinquish for the sake of working."50 9
Juxtaposed with the ADA's dream of empowering individuals
with disabilities to reach self-sufficiency in the job market without
fear of discrimination, federal disability benefit programs stand on the
opposite end of our Nation's policy toward individuals with disabili-
ties. For the most part, our federal disability benefit programs require
individuals with disabilities to be totally unable to work in order to
receive benefits, leading to total dependence on government aid.
The SSA has two disability-based benefit programs. 5 10 One pro-
gram provides for SSDI, 5 11 which "is a social insurance program
linked to earnings."5 12 The other program provides Supplemental Se-
LAB. L. 271, 272 (2000) (citing H. Stephen Kaye, Is the Status of People with Disabilities
Improving?, (Disability Stat. Center, Disability Stat. Abstract No. 21, 1998)). Indeed,
some authors have concluded the ADA has not yielded the outcomes Congress expected.
Id. (citing Mairjorie L. Baldwin, Can the ADA Achieve its Employment Goals?, 549 AN-
NALs 37, 52 (1997) (concluding that the ADA is "least likely to help those workers with
disabilities who are most disadvantaged in the labor market"); WALTER Y. OI, EMPLOY-
MENT AND BENEFITS FOR PEOPLE WITH DIVERSE DISABILITIES, IN DISABILITY, WORK AND
CASH BENEFITS 103 (Jerry L. Mashaw et al. eds., 1996) (stating that the ADA has not
produced the anticipated growth in employment rates of the disabled); Lisa J. Stansky,
Opening Doors, 82 A.B.A. J. 66 (Mar. 1996) (noting lack of consensus regarding whether
ADA was meeting its goals); Sue A. Krenek, Note, Beyond Reasonable Accommodation,
72 TEx. L. REV. 1969, 1970 (1994) (describing the ADA as a "compromise that is fail-
ing"); Scott A. Moss & Daniel A. Malin, Note, Public Funding for Disability Accommoda-
tions: A Rational Solution to Rational Discrimination and the Disabilities of the ADA,
33 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 197, 198 (1998) ("[Tlhe ADA has not been as effective as
hoped in increasing employment among persons with disabilities."); Steven A. Holmes,
In 4 Years, Disabilities Act Hasn't Improved Jobs Rate, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1994, at
A18)).
507. Id. (citing Current Population Survey (1998), available at httpJ/www.census.
gov/hhes/www/disable /disabcps.html).
508. See, e.g., id. (citing Thomas DeLeire, The Wage and Employment Effects of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 35 J. HUMAN RES. 693, 704-05 (2000), DARON
ACEMOGLU & JOsHUA ANGRIST, THE CASE OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 11
(1998)).
509. Id.
510. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-434, 1381-1383f.
511. 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-434.
512. Ken Matheny, Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp. & The Need for
a Consistent Disability Policy, 21 HAMLINE J. PuB. L. & POL'Y 283, 283 n.3 (2000).
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curity Income ("SSI"),513 which "is a public assistance program that
provides subsistence benefits for those who have never worked or who
have worked very little."514 This article focuses on the SSA's main
SSDI program.
To be entitled to benefits under the SSA, a person must have a
disability, which is the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has
lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less
than 12 months."5 15 The SSA further states that an:
[i]ndividual shall be determined to be under a disability only
if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of
such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous
work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work ex-
perience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful
work which exists in the national economy, regardless of
whether such work exists in the immediate area in which he
lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or
whether he would be hired if he applied for work. 5 16
A simple reading of 42 U.S.C. § 423(d) leads to the obvious conclu-
sion that America's noble SSDI program focuses on an individual's in-
ability to work.
Congress gave full authority to the Social Security Administra-
tion to promulgate regulations implementing the SSA to award disa-
bility benefits to individuals with disabilities. 5 17 The Social Security
Administration responded with a five-step process for determining
whether a claimant is disabled and entitled to disability benefits
under the SSA.5 18 Five questions must be answered before an indi-
vidual may obtain disability benefits under the SSA. First, is the
claimant engaged in substantial gainful activity?5 19 Second, does the
claimant have a severe impairment?520 Third, is the claimant's disa-
bility listed by the Social Security Administration in its regula-
tions? 52 1 If the claimant's disability is listed, she is entitled to
benefits. If the disability is not listed, then the Social Security Admin-
istration proceeds to the fourth step, which asks whether she can per-
513. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383f.
514. Matheny, 21 HAMLINE J. PUB. & POL'Y at 283 n.3.
515. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
516. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
517. 42 U.S.C. § 405(a).
518. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.
519. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b).
520. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c).
521. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d); 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 1.
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form her past work.5 2 2 Finally, considering the claimant's age,
educational experience, work experience, and residual functional ca-
pacity, the Social Security Administration determines whether the
claimant can perform other work, which includes work that "exists in
significant numbers in the national economy." 5 23
The ADA, on the other hand, attempts to provide work opportuni-
ties for individuals with disabilities. Only those individuals with disa-
bilities who can indeed work are protected by the ADA, as the ADA
only protects a "qualified individual with a disability. . . who, with or
without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential func-
tions of the employment position that such individual holds or
desires."5 24 When enacting the ADA, Congress was not focused on the
interaction between the ADA and the SSA. Congressional leaders
simply gave assurances the ADA would lower disability benefit pay-
ments to Americans with disabilities. 52 5
Obviously, an individual with a disability can receive SSDI bene-
fits under the SSA if she cannot work anywhere in the national econ-
omy. This entitlement to federal disability benefits would seemingly
preclude workplace protection under the ADA. On the other hand, if
an individual with a disability can work and is thus protected under
the ADA, it would seem apparent she is no longer qualified to receive
SSDI benefits under the SSA. This obvious dichotomy of choices is
seemingly inevitable given our current national policy toward individ-
uals with disabilities. Unfortunately, our national disability policy
does not follow seemingly straightforward logic. Instead, courts have
been dealt the hand of trying to determine whether individuals receiv-
ing SSDI benefits are still entitled to sue employers for disability-
based discrimination in violation of the ADA. To avoid this unfortu-
nate passing of the legislative buck from Congress to our federal
courts, Congress must rework our national disability policy.
C. LOWER COURTS TACKLE THE ISSUE
Before the Court "settled" the issue in Cleveland in 1999, the cir-
cuit courts of appeals were split on the issue of how to deal with an
employee who applies for SSDI benefits and claims she is totally dis-
abled, while at the same time requests an ADA accommodation from
her employer. The courts were basically divided into three distinct
camps. In one camp, courts considered the application for and receipt
522. 20 C.F.R. § 404;1520(e).
523. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 404.1560(c).
524. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
525. H.R. Rep. No. 101-485(11) at 43 (1990) ("ttlhe Committee also heard testimony
and reviewed reports concluding that discrimination results in dependency on social
welfare programs that cost the taxpayers unnecessary billions of dollars each year").
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of SSDI benefits estopped an employee from claiming entitlement to
ADA protection. 52 6 The second camp held the application for and re-
ceipt of SSDI benefits created a rebuttable presumption an employee
could not be a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA.5
2 7
Finally, the third camp held the application for and receipt of SSDI
benefits was relevant to whether an employee could be a qualified in-
dividual with a disability under the ADA, but the employee was not
estopped from claiming ADA rights. 528
1. Application for SSDI Benefits Estops ADA Claims
In McNemar v. The Disney Store, Inc.,529 Leonard McNemar was
diagnosed with HIV in October. In November, McNemar used money
from the store in which he worked to buy cigarettes. After learning
about this infraction of store policy, the employer terminated
McNemar, who then applied for and received New Jersey state disa-
bility benefits, Social Security disability benefits, and an exemption
from repaying his education loan from the Pennsylvania Higher Edu-
cation Agency. In obtaining these benefits, McNemar and his doctors
certified under oath that McNemar was totally and permanently dis-
abled and unable to work to earn money since October, even though he
had continued working after the dates he provided.
Despite his statements to obtain benefits based on his permanent
and total disability, McNemar filed suit against his employer for vio-
lating the ADA. The federal district court held McNemar "was judi-
cially estopped from asserting his claims under the ADA... because of
his prior sworn statements to various government agencies that he
was totally and permanently disabled and unable to work."530
McNemar appealed the adverse ruling.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit asked
"whether [McNemar] is judicially estopped from contending that he is
a 'qualified person with a disability.., who, with or without a reason-
able accommodation, can perform the essential functions' of a job as
526. Blanton v. Inco Alloys Int'l, Inc., 108 F.3d 104, 108-09 (6th Cir. 1997);
McNemar v. The Disney Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610, 620 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519
U.S. 1115 (1997); Rissetto v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 343, 94 F.3d 597, 606 (9th
Cir. 1996); DeGuiseppe v. Village of Bellwood, 68 F.3d 187, 192 (7th Cir. 1995).
527. Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 120 F.3d 513 (5th Cir. 1997), rev'd, 526
U.S. 795 (1999).
528. Griffith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 135 F.3d 376, 382 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied,
526 U.S. 1144 (1999); Rascon v. U.S. West Communications, Inc., 143 F.3d 1324, 1332
(10th Cir. 1998); Swanks v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 116 F.3d 582, 586 (D.C.
Cir. 1997); D'Aprile v. Fleet Servs. Corp., 92 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1996); Kennedy v. Ap-
plause, Inc., 90 F.3d 1477, 1480 (9th Cir. 1996); Robinson v. Neodata Servs., Inc., 94
F.3d 499, 502 (8th Cir. 1996).
529. 91 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1115 (1997).
530. McNemar, 91 F.3d at 616.
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contemplated by the [ADA] in light of his representations to federal
and state government agencies that he is totally disabled and unable
to work."53 1 The court began its analysis by examining the doctrine of
judicial estoppel, stating this equitable doctrine preserves the judicial
system's integrity "by preventing parties from playing fast and loose
with the courts in assuming inconsistent positions."5 32 In determin-
ing whether the district court properly used its discretion to apply the
doctrine of judicial estoppel, the court of appeals articulated a two-
prong inquiry: "(1) Is the party's present position inconsistent with a
position formerly asserted? (2) If so, did the party assert either or
both of the inconsistent positions in bad faith-i.e., 'with intent to play
fast and loose' with the court?"5 33
The court decided McNemar clearly asserted inconsistent posi-
tions. On the one hand, he represented to a federal agency and two
state agencies that he was totally and permanently disabled and una-
ble to work and earn money. On the other hand, he represented to the
courts in his ADA claim that he was a qualified individual with a disa-
bility who was able to perform the essential functions of a job, with or
without a reasonable accommodation. Thus, the Third Circuit deemed
it wholly appropriate for a court to judicially estop a plaintiff from
"speaking out of both sides of [his] mouth with equal vigor and credi-
bility before [the] court."534 Because McNemar made "unconditional
assertions as to his disability" when applying for disability benefits,
the circuit decided a court should not permit McNemar to "qualify
those statements where the application [for benefits] itself is
unequivocal." 53 5
The court also addressed the argument that an individual with a
disability should not be placed "in the untenable position of choosing
between his right to seek disability benefits and his right to seek re-
dress for an alleged violation of the ADA."5 36 In response, the court
concluded "there is no indication that . . . the United States Con-
gress... intended to provide disability benefits to persons capable of
obtaining gainful employment, and it is the province of the legislature
rather than this Court to authorize such a double recovery." 53 7 Addi-
tionally, the court noted the "fact that the choice between obtaining
531. Id. at 612-13.
532. Id. at 617 (quoting Ryan Operations G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81
F.3d 355, 361 (3d Cir. 1996)).
533. Id. at 618.
534. Id. (citations omitted).
535. Id. (quoting Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 911 F. Supp. 1351, 1361 (D. Kan.
1995)).
536. Id. at 620 (quoting Smith v. Dovenmuehle Mortgage, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 1138,
1142 (1994).
537. Id.
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federal or state disability benefits and suing under the ADA is difficult
does not entitle one to make false representations with impunity...
[or permit] one to undermine the integrity of the judicial system 'by
playing fast and loose with the courts by asserting inconsistent posi-
tions.'" 538 Thus, the court affirmed the district court's decision to ju-
dicially estop McNemar from arguing he is qualified under the ADA
after he consistently asserted to federal and state agencies he was per-
manently and totally disabled and unable to work.53 9 Although the
Third Circuit strictly construed statements made in the SSA setting
against the claimant, other courts refused to be so strict.
2. Application for SSDI Benefits Creates a Rebuttable Presumption
Not Protected under ADA
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was un-
willing to go as far as the Third Circuit, rejecting the application of the
doctrine of judicial estoppel in these cases. In Cleveland U. Policy
Management Systems Corp.,540 the court noted the ADA requires a
plaintiff to prove that he is a "qualified individual with a disability...
who, with or without a reasonable accommodation, can perform the
essential functions" of his position. 54 1 To receive SSDI benefits, on
the other hand, the court recognized an individual must show he can-
not "'engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medi-
cally determined physical or mental impairment' and only if that
impairment is of such severity that he is unable to do his previous
work and cannot engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work
which exists in the national economy."54 2
The court recognized that, when reading the ADA and the SSA "in
pari materia, it seems logically inconsistent, at first blush, for an indi-
vidual to claim that he qualifies for social security disability benefits
while simultaneously maintaining that he can perform the essential
functions of his position for purposes of asserting an ADA claim."5 4 3
Undeterred by this apparently straightforward observation, the court
searched for an answer to this "dilemma."5 44
The court immediately rejected a per se rule that application for
or receipt of SSDI benefits judicially estops an individual from assert-
ing a claim of discrimination under the ADA. The court provided
538. Id. (citation omitted).
539. Id.
540. 120 F.3d 513 (5th Cir. 1997), rev'd, 526 U.S. 795 (1999).
541. Because this case resulted in the Supreme Court opinion discussed below, only
the Fifth Circuit's holding will be discussed in this section.
542. Id. (citation omitted).
543. Id.
544. Id.
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three reasons. First, the court noted the ADA and the SSA have dif-
ferent analytical frameworks. Whereas the ADA requires an individu-
alized inquiry regarding whether a person is a qualified individual
with a disability, the court stated the SSA authorizes general pre-
sumptions about a person's ability to work. The court boldly con-
cluded "an individual can have a 'disability' under the SSA definition
and still be able to work."54 5
Second, the court stated the SSA does not undertake a reasonable
accommodation analysis as required under the ADA. Thus, while an
individual may not be able to work in the national economy without a
reasonable accommodation, the court concluded the individual may be
able to work if provided such an accommodation. Thus, the court con-
cluded an individual can be "both a person with a 'disability' under the
SSA and a 'qualified individual with a disability' under the ADA."5 46
Finally, the court recognized the SSA realizes an individual may
be able to work while still qualifying as "disabled."5 4 7 Specifically, the
court discussed the SSA's trial work period that allows SSDI benefi-
ciaries to work for nine months without losing their benefits.
Based on this analysis, the court held application for SSDI bene-
fits creates a rebuttable presumption that the claimant is estopped
from asserting an ADA claim:
[W]e hold therefore that the application for or the receipt
of social security disability benefits creates a rebuttable pre-
sumption that the claimant or recipient of such benefits is ju-
dicially estopped from asserting that he is a "qualified
individual with a disability." We thus leave open the possibil-
ity that there might be instances in which the nature and
content of the disability statements submitted to the SSA, in
the context of the particular facts of the case, would not abso-
lutely bar a plaintiff from attempting to demonstrate that de-
spite his total disability for Social Security purposes he is a
"qualified individual with a disability." Consequently, such a
plaintiff might be able to rebut this presumption if he were
able to present credible, admissible evidence such as his so-
cial security disability benefits application, other sworn docu-
mentation, and his allegations relevant to his ADA claim
sufficient to show that, even though he may be disabled for
purposes of social security, he is otherwise qualified to per-
form the essential functions of his job with a reasonable ac-
commodation and thus not estopped from asserting an ADA
claim.548
545. Id. at 517.
546. Id. at 518.
547. Id.
548. Id.
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While the Fifth Circuit was willing to allow SSDI claimants more
leeway to show eligibility for ADA protection than the Third Circuit
allowed, some courts went even further. These courts refused to em-
ploy estoppel or presumptions.
3. Application for SSDI Benefits Relevant in ADA Case Without
Estoppel or Presumptions
The United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit was such
a court. In Swanks v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Author-
ity,5 49 the D.C. Circuit asked whether an employee, "alleging he was
fired because of his disability, is barred from seeking relief under the
[ADA] because he receives Social Security disability benefits."550 In
response, the court wrote, "[biecause the [SSA] and the ADA employ
quite different standards and objectives-the ADA requires employers
reasonably to accommodate the needs of otherwise qualified disabled
individuals, while the [SSA] awards benefits to persons who, because
of their disability [sic], cannot perform 'work which exists in the na-
tional economy,' without regard to reasonable accommodation-we
hold that the receipt of Social Security disability benefits does not pre-
clude ADA relief."55 1
The district court had granted summary judgment to the em-
ployer after concluding the employee's application for and receipt of
disability benefits under the SSA barred his ADA claim. The D.C. Cir-
cuit condemned the district court for simply barring the ADA claim
without addressing whether the employee could perform the essential
functions of his position with a reasonable accommodation. 55 2 The
court characterized the district court's conclusion as "a misunder-
standing of Social Security disability determinations; in assessing eli-
gibility for disability benefits, the Social Security Administration
gives no consideration to a claimant's ability to work with reasonable
accommodation." 55 3 According to the D.C. Circuit, the SSA simply fo-
cuses on the "general availability of work," and does not address the
effects an accommodation might have on a claimant's disability
status. 5
54
The court then discussed the Social Security Administration's
five-step process for determining whether a claimant is disabled and
549. 116 F.3d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1061 (1999).
550. Swanks v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 116 F.3d 582, 583 (D.C. Cir.
1997).
551. Id. (citation omitted).
552. Id. at 584.
553. Id.
554. Id.
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entitled to disability benefits under the SSA.555 After describing the
five-step process employed by the Social Security Administration, the
court readily recognized that nowhere in this process is the possible
effect of an accommodation considered as to the claimant's ability to
work.55 6 For example, the court recognized that, if a claimant is not
working and has a listed disability, a claimant is automatically enti-
tled to benefits, regardless of whether the individual could work with
a reasonable accommodation. 55 7 Furthermore, the court noted the
fourth question simply asks whether the claimant can do her past
work, but does not ask whether the claimant can do her past work
with a reasonable accommodation. 558 The court decided the fact an
individual may be able to return to her past work with a reasonable
accommodation is simply irrelevant to the Social Security Administra-
tion when it doles out benefits. 559 Finally, the court reiterated the
fifth step requires the claimant to be qualified for "jobs that exist in
significant numbers in the national economy," which does not include
"isolated jobs that exist only in very limited numbers."560 Thus, the
court concluded possible accommodations by an employer are usually
irrelevant, unless an accommodation would be "representative of a
significant number of other such jobs in the national economy."561
The court bolstered its conclusion by noting both the Social Secur-
ity Administration and the EEOC-the agencies that implement the
SSA and the ADA, respectively-agree that application for and receipt
of disability benefits do not automatically preclude an ADA claim.56 2
555. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 405(a), 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. As a reminder, the SSA asks five
questions: First, is the claimant engaged in substantial gainful activity? Swanks, 116
F.3d at 585; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). Second, does the claimant have a severe impair-
ment? Swanks, 116 F.3d at 585; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). Third, is the claimant's disa-
bility listed by the agency in its regulations? Swanks, 116 F.3d at 585; 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(d); 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 1. If the claimant's disability is
listed, she is entitled to benefits. If the disability is not listed, then the agency proceeds
to the fourth step, which asks whether she can perform her past work. Swanks, 116
F.3d at 585; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). Finally, "considering the claimant's age, educa-
tional experience, past work experience, and residual functional capacity, [the agency]
determines whether the claimant can do other work-jobs that exist in significant num-
bers in the national economy." Swanks, 116 F.3d at 585 (quotations omitted); 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(f); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(c)).
556. Swanks, 116 F.3d at 585.
557. Id.
558. Id.
559. Id.
560. Id.; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(c); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566(b).
561. Swanks, 116 F.3d at 585 (quoting Daniel L. Skoler, Assoc. Comm'r, Soc. Sec.
Admin., Disabilities Act Info. Mem. at 3 (June 2, 1993) (No. SG3P2)).
562. Id. at 586 (citing Disabilities Act Info. Mem. at 3; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1504; EEOC
Enforcement Guidance on the Effect of Representations Made in Applications for Benefits
on the Determination of Whether a Person is a "Qualified Individual with a Disability"
under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 at 3 (Feb. 12, 1997)).
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The court then quoted the EEOC at length: "Iblecause of the funda-
mental differences in the definitions used in the ADA and the terms
used in disability benefits programs, an individual can meet the eligi-
bility requirements for receipt of disability benefits and still be a
'qualified individual with a disability' for ADA purposes. Thus, a per-
son's representations that s/he is 'totally disabled' or 'unable to work'
for purposes of disability benefits are never an absolute bar to an ADA
claim."56 3 Based on the two agencies' standards and procedures, the
court stated it was clear the critical issue in ADA cases, that of a rea-
sonable accommodation, is never even considered in SSDI determina-
tions.5 64 Thus, the court concluded disability benefit awards cannot
bar ADA relief.5 65
Furthermore, the court noted a decision deciding that awarding
such benefits precludes ADA protection:
[w]ould force disabled individuals into an 'untenable' choice
between receiving immediate subsistence benefits under the
Social Security Act or pursuing discrimination remedies.
Forcing such a choice would undermine the pro-employment
and anti-discrimination purposes of the two statutes. Claim-
ants choosing benefits would sacrifice an opportunity for rein-
statement while simultaneously shielding their employers
from liability for allegedly unlawful discrimination. Individu-
als choosing instead to seek ADA relief would, by doing so,
forego their entitlement to Social Security disability benefits.
Nothing in either statute requires disabled individuals to
make this choice. 566
The court cautioned that its conclusion "does not mean that claim-
ants' statements in support of disability claims are never relevant in
ADA suits." 56 7 For example, the court recognized that a claimant for
disability benefits could not assert that he could not perform a job's
essential functions even with an accommodation and then pursue an
ADA claim. 568 Given the circuit split on how to resolve the apparent
contradiction between applying for and receiving SSDI benefits and
making an ADA claim, the Supreme Court was forced to resolve the
conflict.
563. Id. (quoting EEOC Enforcement Guidance at i).
564. Id.
565. Id.
566. Id.
567. Id. at 587.
568. Id.
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D. THE SUPREME COURT RESOLVES CIRCUIT SPLIT
In 1999, the Supreme Court confronted this perplexing issue. In
Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp.,5 69 Carolyn Cleveland
suffered a disabling stroke only four months after beginning employ-
ment with Policy Management Systems ("Policy Management"). 57 0
Three weeks after her stroke, Cleveland filed an SSDI application,
claiming she was "disabled" and "unable to work."5 7 1 Nearly three
months after filing for SSDI benefits, Cleveland returned to work with
Policy Management and reported this fact to the Social Security Ad-
ministration two weeks later.5 72 Three months to the day after re-
turning to work, the Social Security Administration denied her SSDI
application because she had returned to work.573 Four days later, Pol-
icy Management terminated Cleveland.
Two months later, Cleveland sought reconsideration of the denial
of her SSDI benefits, claiming she was terminated by Policy Manage-
ment "due to my condition and.., have not been able to work since. I
continue to be disabled."5 74 She later claimed she had been termi-
nated because she "could no longer do the job [in light of her] condi-
tion."57 5  The Social Security Administration denied her
reconsideration request, but Cleveland sought a Social Security Ad-
ministration hearing, again claiming that she was "unable to work
due to my disability."5 76 Nearly a year later, the Social Security Ad-
ministration awarded Cleveland her SSDI benefits and made them
retroactive to her stroke date.5 77 A week before this award, Cleveland
sued Policy Management claiming it had violated the ADA by dis-
charging her without reasonably accommodating her disability. 57 8
She alleged she requested accommodations such as training and addi-
tional time to complete her work, but such accommodations were
denied. 579
The district court granted summary judgment for Policy Manage-
ment because Cleveland had conceded she was totally disabled by ap-
plying for and receiving SSDI benefits.5 80 Thus, the court determined
Cleveland was estopped from proving the essential element of her
569. 526 U.S. 795 (1999).
570. Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795 (1999).
571. Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 798.
572. Id.
573. Id.
574. Id. at 798-99.
575. Id. at 799.
576. Id.
577. Id.
578. Id.
579. Id.
580. Id.
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ADA claim that she could perform the essential functions of her job
with a reasonable accommodation.5 8 1
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed
the district court, stating the "application for or the receipt of social
security disability benefits creates a rebuttable presumption that the
claimant or recipient of such benefits is judicially estopped from as-
serting that he is a 'qualified individual with a disability.'" 58 2 After
noting there was a "theoretically conceivable" chance under "some lim-
ited and highly unusual set of circumstances the two claims would not
necessarily be mutually exclusive," the Court of Appeals stated that
Cleveland was nonetheless judicially estopped from claiming she was
a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA because she
had "consistently represented to the SSA that she was totally
disabled."58 3
The United States Supreme Court refused to adopt any type of
presumption based on an application for SSDI benefits by neglecting
to focus on the apparent conflict between the SSA and the ADA. In-
stead, the Court discussed how the SSA and the ADA assist individu-
als with disabilities in different ways. In this respect, the Court
mostly followed the analysis provided in Swanks.
The Court recognized that, under the SSA, an individual receives
monetary benefits if she "is under a disability," which means an "in-
ability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any
... physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in
death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than 12 months."58 4 However, the individual's im-
pairment must be "of such severity that [she] is not only unable to do
[her] previous work but cannot, considering [her] age, education, and
work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work
which exists in the national economy." 58 5 The ADA, on the other
hand, "seeks to eliminate unwarranted discrimination against dis-
abled individuals in order both to guarantee those individuals equal
opportunity and to provide the Nation with the benefit of their conse-
quently increased productivity." 58 6
The Court initially rejected a per se conclusion that a person who
claims to be totally disabled under the SSA is also unqualified under
the ADA. The Court explained that an "SSA representation of total
disability differs from a purely factual statement in that it often im-
581. Id.
582. Id. at 800.
583. Id.
584. Id. at 801 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(a)(1), 423(d)(1)(A)).
585. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A)).
586. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) & (9)).
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plies a context-related legal conclusion, namely 'I am disabled for pur-
poses of the Social Security Act. '"'58 7 The Court then stated that,
"despite the appearance of a conflict arising from the language of the
two statutes," SSA and ADA "claims do not inherently conflict to the
point where courts should apply a special negative presumption ...
because there are too many situations in which an SSDI claim and an
ADA claim can comfortably exist side by side."5 8 8
The Court recognized that, while the ADA focuses on whether an
individual with a disability can perform the essential functions of a
job, with or without a reasonable accommodation, the SSA simply does
not take into account the possibility of an accommodation. 58 9 Thus,
according to the Court, "the result is that an ADA suit claiming that
the plaintiff can perform her job with reasonable accommodation may
well prove consistent with an SSDI claim that the plaintiff could not
perform her own job (or other jobs) without it." 59 0
Notwithstanding, the Court recognized some statements made in
SSDI proceedings certainly can affect the claimant's ADA claim. Be-
cause "a plaintiffs sworn assertion in an application for disability ben-
efits that she is, for example, 'unable to work' will appear to negate an
essential element of her ADA case-at least if she does not offer a
sufficient explanation," the Court held "that an ADA plaintiff cannot
simply ignore the apparent contradiction that arises out of the earlier
SSDI total disability claim. Rather, she must proffer a sufficient ex-
planation."5 9 1 Specifically, "[t]o defeat summary judgment, that ex-
planation must be sufficient to warrant a reasonable juror's
concluding that, assuming the truth of, or the plaintiffs good faith be-
lief in, the earlier statement, the plaintiff could nonetheless 'perform
the essential functions' of her job, with or without 'reasonable accom-
modation.'" 5 92 The Court provided a brief summary of its holding:
We believe that, in context, these two seemingly diver-
gent statutory contentions are often consistent, each with the
other. Thus pursuit, and receipt, of SSDI benefits does not
automatically estop the recipient from pursuing an ADA
claim. Nor does the law erect a strong presumption against
the recipient's success under the ADA. Nonetheless, an ADA
plaintiff cannot simply ignore her SSDI contention that she
was too disabled to work. To survive a defendant's motion for
summary judgment, she must explain why that SSDI conten-
587. Id. at 802.
588. Id. at 802-03.
589. Id. at 803.
590. Id.
591. Id. at 806.
592. Id. at 807.
20051
CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW
tion is consistent with her ADA claim that she could "perform
the essential functions" of her previous job, at least with "rea-
sonable accommodation." 5
9 3
Given these marching orders, lower courts took up the task of
making sense out of the Supreme Court's attempt to reconcile the
ADA and the SSA.
E. POST-CLEVELAND CASES
In the wake of Cleveland, courts are still confronted with seem-
ingly inconsistent statements in ADA suits when the individual with a
disability applied for and received SSDI benefits. Congress has cho-
sen to avoid reconciling the two competing national disability statutes.
Therefore, based on Cleveland, courts must determine whether the
ADA plaintiff has provided sufficient evidence to overcome statements
made in the SSDI setting to overcome summary judgment. This is not
an easy task for the judicial branch.
1. SSDI Statements Irreconcilable with ADA Claim
In Holtzclaw v. DSC Communications Corp.,5 94 Holtzclaw's
chronic idiopathic pancreatitis forced him to be hospitalized and take
short-term disability leave from his employment with DSC.5 95 Holtz-
claw then applied for and received social security disability benefits.
In obtaining disability benefits, he told his insurance carrier and the
Social Security Administration that his conditions "play havoc on [his]
thinking and memory skills," "make it impossible to have a clear and
normal mind," and "keep [him] from being able to think and concen-
trate."59 6 He also told the Social Security Administration that his
"mental and physical abilities had decreased to a level where [he is] no
longer self-supportive" and that he is "unable to function in the real
world" for a couple days a week.5 9 7 He also told his insurance carrier
that it was not possible to return to work, even with an accommoda-
tion, and that he was "too sick" for retraining and "unable to work at
all."598 Finally, he stated that he never expected to return to work
and was "doing good [sic] to be alive."5 99
Notwithstanding these comments, Holtzclaw reapplied for em-
ployment with DSC. When DSC did not rehire Holtzclaw, he filed suit
alleging he was discriminated against in violation of the ADA. The
593. Id. at 797-98.
594. 255 F.3d 254 (5th Cir. 2001).
595. Holtzclaw v. DSC Communications Corp., 255 F.3d 254, 254 (5th Cir. 2001).
596. Holtzclaw, 255 F.3d at 258.
597. Id.
598. Id.
599. Id.
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district court granted summary judgment to DSC because Holtzclaw
was unable to perform the job with or without an accommodation.
Noting the statements Holtzclaw made to the insurance carrier
and the Social Security Administration indicated he was unable to
work at all regardless of an accommodation, the Fifth Circuit stated
that Holtzclaw "must produce an explanation of this apparent incon-
sistency that is sufficient to defeat summary judgment on the issue of
whether the plaintiff is a qualified individual with a disability."
60 0
Thus, the court considered Holtzclaw's only evidence of his ability to
work, which was his belief that he was "physically able to return to
work" and his presentation of a medical release form that merely said
he could return to work, which was based on his assertion that he
could work. The court rejected this evidence, noting Holtzclaw could
not manufacture a genuine issue of fact to survive summary judgment
simply by contradicting his previous sworn statement:
Cleveland teaches that a plaintiff cannot change his story
during litigation without a sufficient explanation for his in-
consistent assertions. Holtzclaw has offered no sufficient ex-
planation for the contradiction between his disability
applications and his claim that, when he re-applied for the
job, he could have worked even without reasonable accommo-
dation. He therefore has failed to create a material issue of
fact whether he is qualified for the position he sought. Be-
cause he cannot establish that element of his prima facie
claim, summary judgment was appropriate on the ADA
claim.6 0 1
In Detz v. Greiner Industries, Inc. ,602 the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals confronted an age-discrimination plaintiff who had received
SSDI benefits. The court was confronted with the issue of whether an
employee's statements to obtain SSDI benefits preclude his subse-
quent age-discrimination claim.60 3 The employee had worked for
years as a millwright, but, after an injury, was limited to light duty
work as a tool room helper. 60 4 When the employer downsized and laid
the employee off, the employee sought SSDI benefits from the Social
Security Administration. 60 5 In the application, the employee stated he
became unable to work due to his disability on the date of his layoff
and was still unable to work on the date of he filed for benefits. 60 6 The
600. Id. (citing Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 807).
601. Id. at 259.
602. 346 F.3d 109 (3d Cir. 2003).
603. Detz v. Greiner Indus., Inc., 346 F.3d 109, 111 (3d Cir. 2003).
604. Detz, 346 F.3d at 111-12.
605. Id. at 112.
606. Id.
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Social Security Administration denied his claim, recognizing the em-
ployee was still able to work in his tool room job.60 7
The employee sought a hearing from an administrative law judge
after he was twice denied SSDI benefits.60 8 He again swore he was
"disabled and unable to work."60 9 Finding he had been disabled since
his layoff date, the Social Security Administration granted his applica-
tion for SSDI benefits.6 10 Following its five-step analysis, the Social
Security Administration determined the employee had no past rele-
vant work or was unable to perform his past relevant work, and was
unable to perform any jobs that existed in significant numbers. 6 1 1
After gaining his right to receive SSDI benefits, the employee
filed an age discrimination complaint with the EEOC.6 12 The em-
ployee swore he could perform his tool room position with restric-
tions.6 13 Eventually, the employee brought an age discrimination
lawsuit in federal court against his employer. 6 14 The employee al-
leged he was fully qualified to perform his position, but was replaced
by a younger employee. 6 15 The employer moved for summary judg-
ment, contending the employee was precluded from showing he was
qualified to perform his position because that statement was irrecon-
cilably inconsistent with his earlier statements made to obtain SSDI
benefits.6 16 Defending the summary judgment motion, the employee
alleged he had become disabled, for SSDI purposes, because the em-
ployer discharged him.6 17 The employee contended he was not dis-
abled before the employer discharged him, arguing he was able to
perform his tool room job.6 18 The employee, in essence, argued his
tool room job with the limitations was the only job in the economy he
could perform. 6 19 According to the employee, once the employer took
that job away from him, the employee was unable to perform any
other work.62 0 Based on this explanation, the employee argued that,
for purposes of his age discrimination claim, he was still qualified to
perform the tool room position. 62 1 The district court rejected the em-
607. Id.
608. Id. at 113.
609. Id.
610. Id.
611. Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e)-(f), 404.1560(b)-(c)).
612. Id.
613. Id.
614. Id. at 114.
615. Id.
616. Id.
617. Id.
618. Id.
619. Id.
620. Id.
621. Id.
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ployee's attempt to explain his seemingly inconsistent statements,
and granted summary judgment to the employer.6 2 2 The employee
appealed. 62
3
The Third Circuit decided that the Cleveland analysis applies
with equal force to an age discrimination case, as the employee could
not maintain an age discrimination action if he was not qualified for
his position.6 24 Following Cleveland, the court evaluated whether the
employee's "assertions [before the Social Security Administration and
before the court] are genuinely in conflict, and then evaluate[d] that
[employee]'s attempt to explain away the inconsistency." 625 Borrow-
ing from a disability discrimination case from the Seventh Circuit, the
court laid out its analytical framework:
Cleveland's analysis suggests that an ADA plaintiff may not,
simply by disavowing a prior claim of total disability, perform
an about-face and assert that he is a 'qualified individual'
who is capable of working. Rather, . . . the plaintiff must pro-
ceed from the premise that his previous assertion of an inabil-
ity to work was true, or that he in good faith believed it to be
true, and he must demonstrate that the assertion was none-
theless consistent with his ability to perform the essential
functions of his job .... Explanations of the sort Cleveland
requires are, in short, contextual-they resolve the seeming
discrepancy between a claim of disability and a later claim of
entitlement to work not by contradicting what the plaintiff
told the Social Security Administration, but by demonstrat-
ing that those representations, understood in light of the
unique focus and requirements of the SSA, leave room for the
possibility that the plaintiff is able to meet the essential de-
mands of the job to which he claims a right under the
ADA. 6
2 6
Given this background, the court began its analysis by asking the
first question, i.e., "whether the position taken by [the employee] in
his SSDI Application and his [age discrimination] claim genuinely
conflict."6 27 It took little effort for the court to conclude the two posi-
tions taken by the employee "are truly inconsistent with one an-
other."6 28 Recognizing that the employee told the Social Security
Administration he was unable to work while maintaining before a fed-
eral court that he was able to work, the court stated the employee
622. Id.
623. Id. at 115.
624. Id. at 118.
625. Id.
626. Id. (quoting Lee v. City of Salem, 259 F.3d 667, 674-75 (7th Cir. 2001)).
627. Id.
628. Id. at 118-19.
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"appear[ed] to be making facially incompatible assertions, as the sec-
ond seems to be an 'about face' from, or 'disavowal' of, the first."6 2 9
The court recognized the Social Security Administration initially de-
nied the employee's request for SSDI benefits, stating the employee's
restrictions did not prevent him from performing his past work in the
tool room.63 0 Undeterred, the employee twice more asserted to the
Social Security Administration that he was unable to work.6 3 1
The Third Circuit was not impressed with the employee's attempt
to explain away his statements to the Social Security Administration.
Recognizing the employee swore to the Social Security Administration
he was physically incapable of performing his job, and then brought a
federal lawsuit alleging he was discharged from a job he was physi-
cally capable of performing, the court concluded the employee's "sec-
ond position 'crashes face first against' his prior claim."63 2 Finding
the employee's assertions "patently inconsistent," the court proceeded
to ask Cleveland's second question of "whether [the employee] has ad-
equately reconciled the two positions."6 33
The court flatly refused to believe the employee was able to recon-
cile his position before the Social Security Administration and his po-
sition before the court.6 34 The court noted the employee never
informed the Social Security Administration that he was physically
capable of performing his tool room work, but asserted he was able to
perform that position in support of his age discrimination claim.63 5
The court reasoned the result may have been different had the em-
ployee indicated in his application for disability benefits that he could
still perform the tool room position, but his disability prevented him
from performing any other jobs. 6 3 6 Instead, the court stated the em-
ployee "appears to have manipulated the facts and perhaps the sys-
tem, to obtain SSDI benefits." 63 7 Because the employee succeeded in
convincing the Social Security Administration to render benefits
based on his assertion he was unable to work, the court held his new-
est assertion in his age discrimination lawsuit was doomed.638 Thus,
629. Id. at 119.
630. Id.
631. Id.
632. Id. at 119-20 (quoting Feldman v. Am. Mem'l Life Ins. Co., 196 F.3d 783, 791
(7th Cir. 1999)).
633. Id. at 120 (quoting Motley v. N.J. State Police, 196 F.3d 160, 167 (3d Cir.
1999)).
634. Id.
635. Id.
636. Id. at 120-21.
637. Id. at 121.
638. Id.
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the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in
the employer's favor.6 39
Although numerous courts have forbidden individuals receiving
disability benefits from asserting the right to work under the ADA, 640
other courts have reconciled an individual's statement he is unable to
work when requesting disability benefits with the individual's conten-
tion in the ADA setting that he is indeed qualified to work.
2. SSDI Statements Reconcilable with ADA Claim
Although a logical application of the test enunciated in Cleveland
almost presupposes most individuals who inform the Social Security
Administration they cannot work at all will fail when suing employers
based on a contention they actually can work, some courts have con-
torted the standard to allow individuals receiving SSDI benefits to
have their cake and eat it too. These courts have been willing to allow
the SSA and the ADA to coexist, as though they are not part of some
unified policy towards individuals with disabilities.
In EEOC v. Stowe-Pharr Mills, Inc.,641 the EEOC brought an
ADA discrimination suit on behalf of Catherine Treece, a Stowe-Pharr
employee with osteoarthritis, against Stowe-Pharr. 64 2 After Stowe-
Pharr terminated Treece's employment, Treece sought SSDI bene-
fits. 64 3 Although Treece initially told the Social Security Administra-
tion intake officer that she was able to work with an accommodation,
Treece's SSDI application said, "I became unable to work because of
my disabling condition."6 4 4 The Social Security Administration
awarded SSDI benefits to Treece.6 45 During the course of discovery in
the ADA case, Treece admitted her health had deteriorated so badly
she was probably unable to work in her past field anymore, but as-
639. Id.
640. See Holtzclaw, 255 F.3d at 259 (affirming summary judgment to an employer in
an ADA case brought by an employee who recovered SSDI and long-term disability ben-
efits, because the employee was unable to "change his story during litigation without a
sufficient explanation for his inconsistent assertions"); Lane v. BFI Waste Sys. of N.
Am., 257 F.3d 766, 770 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding individual who received SSDI benefits
was unable to harmonize statements made to the Social Security Administration with
his statements in his ADA lawsuit alleging he was qualified to perform the essential
functions of his job); Lee v. City of Salem, Ind., 259 F.3d 667, 675-78 (7th Cir. 2001);
DiSanto v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 220 F.3d 661, 664-65 (2d Cir. 2000); Reed v. Petroleum
Helicopters, Inc., 218 F.3d 477 (5th Cir. 2000); Lloyd v. Hardin County, 207 F.3d 1080
(8th Cir. 2000); Townley v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 254 F. Supp. 2d 661, 667
(E.D. Mich. 2003); Varga v. Clark Foodservice of Ind., 240 F. Supp. 2d 851, 857-58 (N.D.
Ind. 2003).
641. 216 F.3d 373 (4th Cir. 2000).
642. EEOC v. Stowe-Pharr Mills, Inc., 216 F.3d 373, 375-76 (4th Cir. 2000).
643. Id. at 376.
644. Id.
645. Id.
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serted she was able to work at Stowe-Pharr had the company provided
a reasonable accommodation. 646
The district court granted summary judgment in Stowe-Pharr's
favor, concluding Treece was not a qualified individual with a disabil-
ity under the ADA "because [Treece had] previously taken the position
[in her SSDI application] that she was not."64 7 The Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed the district court, holding Treece suffi-
ciently explained the inconsistency between her SSDI statements and
the ADA claim that she was a qualified individual with a disability.6 48
The court concluded Treece, when applying for SSDI benefits, "was
not required to refer to the possibility of reasonable accommoda-
tion."64 9 Thus, the court decided the EEOC could pursue an ADA
claim against Stowe-Pharr because Treece could show she would have
been able to continue working for Stowe-Pharr had it offered reasona-
ble accommodations.6 0
In Kiely v. Heartland Rehabilitation Services, Inc.,651 an individ-
ual with a degenerative eye disease, which caused him to be legally
blind, had a checkered employment past. When the individual's em-
ployer decided the individual's poor vision created a safety concern,
the employer discharged the employee. 65 2 The individual sought and
received unemployment compensation benefits for one year, and then
applied for SSDI benefits. 6 53 In his application for SSDI benefits, the
blind individual stated he was "unable to work because of [his] disa-
bling condition" and was currently still disabled. 65 4 Despite his re-
ceipt of unemployment and SSDI benefits, the blind individual sued
his employer for disability discrimination. 65 5 Given these circum-
stances, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals asked "whether, notwith-
standing the plaintiff's attempt to reconcile what looked like
inconsistent positions, the fact that the plaintiff had signed a social
security disability application in which he swore that he was 'disabled'
and 'unable to work' precluded him as a matter of law from showing
that he was capable of performing the essential functions of his
job."6 56 The court concluded, "the statements made by the plaintiff in
his application for social security disability benefits were not necessa-
646. Id. at 376-77.
647. Id. at 377.
648. Id. at 380.
649. Id. at 379 (citation omitted).
650. Id.
651. 359 F.3d 386, 387-88 (6th Cir. 2004).
652. Id. at 388.
653. Id.
654. Id. (alterations in original).
655. Id.
656. Id. at 387.
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rily inconsistent with the claim that he could do his job, and also con-
cluded "the plaintiff proffered an adequate explanation of the seeming
inconsistency." 65 7
To reach this conclusion, the court needed to reconcile the plain-
tiff's statements he was disabled and unable to work with his litiga-
tion position in his disability case that he was able to work. The
plaintiff attempted to reconcile the seemingly contradictory positions
by stating he never claimed to be totally disabled, but simply blind.65 8
The court accepted this contention, deciding the "thrust" of the plain-
tiffs "explanation is reasonably clear: he applied for SSDI benefits on
the basis of his legal blindness-a listed impairment-and not on the
basis of an inability to work."6 59 Thus, the court determined the
plaintiffs SSDI statements were consistent with his claim that he
could actually still work and perform his required job duties.6 60 In
making this determination, the court recognized "a reasonable juror
could conclude that when [the plaintiff] stated in his application that
he was 'disabled' and 'unable to work,' he meant only 'I am entitled to
SSDI benefits."' 6 6 1 Thus, deciding the plaintiff did not obtain SSDI
benefits by actually claiming he could not work, the court decided the
plaintiffs disability discrimination claim could proceed against his
employer because the plaintiff could show he was still qualified to per-
form the essential functions his old job required.6 62
F. THE NEED FOR A UNIFORM NATIONAL POLICY ON DISABILITY
The Cleveland "test" to determine whether an SSDI applicant's
statements conflict with her allegations in unrelated litigation that
she is physically qualified to work relies on the whim of the particular
court confronted with the question. Painfully aware of the precarious
bind some individuals with disabilities find themselves in when they
seek SSDI benefits while continuing to work, or, alternatively, when
they assert a disability-discrimination claim after successfully ob-
taining SSDI benefits for being unable to work, courts have used the
Cleveland test as a malleable tool to allow individuals to get paid by
the federal government for being totally unable to work, while pursu-
ing federal lawsuits against employers by alleging an ability to work.
657. Id.
658. Id. at 389-91.
659. Id. at 390.
660. Id.
661. Id.
662. Id. at 391; see also Giles v. Gen. Elec. Co., 245 F.3d 474, 484-85 (5th Cir. 2001)
(holding plaintiffs SSDI statements did not preclude an ADA discrimination claim);
Parker v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 204 F.3d 326 (2d Cir. 2000); Voisin v. Ga. Gulf
Corp., 245 F. Supp. 2d 853, 857, 861 (M.D. La. 2002).
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Such painful application of a confusing standard does not lead to a
consistent application of a national disability policy. Instead, this
"case-by-case" approach will certainly lead to increased cynicism and
inconsistent results, with individuals with disabilities suffering the
most.
Recognizing an individual's statement that he cannot perform
jobs in the national economy or past relevant work-while excluding
all reasonable accommodations from the analysis-unintentionally
guts the ADA's purpose to change attitudes about individuals with
disabilities. This unfocused logic guarantees the ADA's goal to main-
stream individuals with disabilities will go unfulfilled until our Na-
tion unifies its disability policy. The ADA's dream of focusing on what
individuals with disabilities can do is significantly hamstrung by the
SSA's focus on what individuals with disabilities cannot do. Unfortu-
nately, some individuals with disabilities who can work may choose
SSDI benefits over work. This thirst for federal disability benefits for
being unable to work while maintaining the ability to work should
never be acceptable.
Therefore, the ADA and the SSA should not be treated as two
ships passing in the night. Instead, they should be reworked to
achieve a unified, rational and compassionate national disability pol-
icy. Some could argue courts are best equipped to harmonize the two
statutes. However, courts do not consistently decide these cases. Be-
sides, a consistent disability policy is a policy decision of enormous
magnitude. Congress should wade back into the disability waters and
speak loudly with a clear policy toward individuals with disabilities.
Senator James Jeffords has called America's national disability
policy "schizophrenic." 663 While introducing the Work Incentive and
Self-Sufficiency Act of 1996, Senator Jeffords said, "I believe that few
people are returning to work after becoming eligible for Social Secur-
ity disability income (SSDI) not because they can no longer find gain-
ful employment, but because of a greater systemic problem we face as
a nation. What I am referring to is this country's current schizo-
phrenic national disability policy." Other Congressional leaders have
acknowledged the same systemic problem. Senator Edward Kennedy
recently said, "We are spending billions of dollars today in the Federal
budget on programs that make disabled citizens dependent, not inde-
pendent."6 64 Senator Don Riegle has stated, "One of the prime goals
of legislatiori affecting disabled Americans has been the effort to incor-
porate them into the mainstream. While the Americans With Disabil-
ities Act would remove the barriers to participation in the workforce,
663. 142 CONG. REC. S. 8472 (Sen. James Jeffords July 22, 1996).
664. 135 CONG. REC. S. 4993 (Sen. Edward Kennedy May 9, 1998).
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efforts must also be made to ensure that participation is possible. The
present system of disability insurance encourages retirement from the
workforce. This approach is wrong. Americans with disabilities
should have every encouragement to take advantage of the options
opened up by the Americans With Disabilities Act."6 65 As impliedly
recognized by these congressional leaders, courts are ill-equipped to
apply legal principles to effectuate these policy goals.
Three possibilities exist as to what our national policy should be
as reflected in the SSA and the ADA. First, our national policy could
be that, if an individual with a disability can work, that individual
should be protected under the ADA but should not be eligible to re-
ceive SSDI benefits under the SSA. Second, our policy could be that
an individual with a disability who cannot work can receive SSDI ben-
efits under the SSA, but cannot also seek protection under the ADA.
Third, our national disability policy could fall somewhere in between
the first two possibilities. Specifically, our national policy could allow
individuals with disabilities to work and be protected against disabil-
ity discrimination by the ADA, while at the same time provide SSA
protection in the form of SSDI benefits, whether partial or total.6 66
Before the Supreme Court decided Cleveland, the EEOC had ad-
dressed the effects of contradictory statements made by individuals
with disabilities before courts and the Social Security Administra-
tion.66 7 In arguing the ADA and the SSA seek to achieve totally dif-
ferent purposes, the EEOC posited that the ADA's definition of
disability "requires an individualized assessment of a particular indi-
vidual's capabilities; focuses on the essential functions of a particular
position; looks at particular positions, not work in general; and consid-
ers whether a person can work with reasonable accommodations." 6 68
The EEOC considered the SSA to serve a different purpose-"to pro-
vide income to individuals with disabilities who generally are unable
665. 135 CONG. REC. S. 4997 (Sen. Don Riegle May 9, 1989).
666. As recently recognized by the Eighth Circuit, a disability insurance policy
which allows individuals with disabilities to work without losing all disability benefits
is completely consistent with the ADA's policy seeking to allow individuals with disabili-
ties to work without fear of discrimination. See, e.g., Murphey v. City of Minneapolis,
358 F.3d 1074, 1079 (8th Cir. 2004) (recognizing that, unlike the SSA requirements, an
individual with a disability can work and still receive disability benefits in Minnesota,
because "a person receiving [Public Employees Retirement Association] disability bene-
fits based on total and permanent disability is allowed to return to work without losing
his benefits").
667. See EEOC Enforcement Guidance on the Effect of Representations Made in Ap-
plications for Benefits on the Determination of Whether a Person Is a "Qualified Individ-
ual with a Disability" Under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, EEOC Notice
915.002 (Feb. 12, 1997).
668. Id. at 3.
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to work."66 9 The EEOC determined the SSA's definition of disability
"permits general presumptions about an individual's ability to work;
considers all tasks as jobs are customarily performed without focusing
on the essential functions of a particular position; looks generally at
whether an individual can do work which exists in the national econ-
omy rather than whether s/he can perform the essential functions of
particular position; and does not consider whether a person can work
with reasonable accommodation." 6 70 This analysis renders one of the
statutes impotent-and that statute regrettably is the ADA.
One of the ADA's stated purposes is "to provide a clear and com-
prehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination
against individuals with disabilities."67 1 With the SSA continuing to
permit Americans to view individuals with disabilities as generally
unable to work-and thus allow financial dependence on federal aid-
the ADA's dream of full integration cannot and will not be fulfilled.
Society's views of individuals with disabilities can be gleaned from the
SSA and the ADA. The SSA reflects an outdated myth that individu-
als with disabilities are somehow dependant on government aid. The
ADA attempted to shatter this myth by announcing individuals with
disabilities have been kept from the job market for far too long. In-
deed, when an individual with a disability is unable to perform a job's
essential functions, the ADA requires affirmative action on an em-
ployer's part to reasonably accommodate the individual's disability so
the individual can work.6 7 2 For the SSA to effectively relegate this
noble accommodation aspect of the ADA nearly meaningless when ex-
amining an individual's disability benefits application forces the ADA
to take a backseat to the SSA's outdated policy of viewing individuals
with disabilities as needing a government hand-out to survive.
Surely, a middle ground can be found for Congress to achieve a consis-
tent national policy for individuals with disabilities when it comes to
choosing work versus government aid.
America "ought not to measure people by what they cannot do
but, rather we ought to measure them by what they can do."6 73 In-
deed, it can be powerfully argued that all individuals are "dignified by
work; the community is enriched by work.... Without meaningful
work, crushing poverty of both material and spiritual life is inevita-
669. Id. (emphasis added).
670. Id. at 3-4.
671. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1).
672. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (unlawful for an employer not to make "reasonable
accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of a qualified individual").
673. 136 CONG. REC. S. 9690 (Sen. George Mitchell July 13, 1990).
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ble."6 74 Because work can be "a powerful force in shaping a person's
sense of identity,"675 the SSA, implementing a national anti-work pol-
icy for individuals with disabilities, should not trump the ADA, imple-
menting a national pro-work policy for individuals with disabilities.
Senate arguments that eradicating "discrimination in employ-
ment against persons with disabilities will result in a stronger work
force and lessen dependency on the welfare system" 6 76 can be proven
true only if the SSA and the ADA are interpreted consistently. To
accomplish this solemn task, the Social Security Administration can-
not discount reasonable accommodations when analyzing whether
jobs exist in the national economy. The bottom line is the ADA's rea-
sonable accommodation requirement must be included in determining
whether an SSDI claimant can work. Congress must recommit itself
to the ADA's promise; thus setting a uniform national policy so indi-
viduals with disabilities get fair, consistent and equal treatment by
employers, the Social Security Administration and courts.
The Social Security Administration reports that approximately
$62 billion in total disability benefit payments was paid in 2002.677
These disability payments were made to almost 6.5 million individu-
als, with 91% of the payments made to workers with disabilities.678
America can no longer afford to view individuals with disabilities as
unable to work under the SSA, increasing government aid and depen-
dence, while trying to adhere to the ADA's vision of viewing individu-
als with disabilities as able to work, with or without a reasonable
accommodation. As one author has argued, the SSDI program "should
be redesigned in light of the work-encouraging philosophy of the ADA
so that we have a consistent disability policy instead of our current
schizophrenic policy that simultaneously encourages and discourages
work."679 When Congress steps in to reconcile the ADA and the SSA,
674. David L. Gregory, Catholic Labor Theory & The Transformation of Work, 45
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 119, 129-30 (1988).
675. Work in America: Report of a Special Task Force to the Secretary of Heath, Edu-
cation and Welfare 3-7 (1973).
676. 135 CONG. REC. S. 10791 (Sen. Bob Dole Sept. 6, 1989). An old Chinese proverb
may correlate with the current policy toward individuals with disabilities as it relates to
work: "Give a man a fish and you feed him for a day. Teach a man to fish and you feed
him for a lifetime." This age-old saying applies to the current discussion of our Nation's
national disability policy as either it favors or it disfavors work.
677. Annual Statistical Report on Social Security Disability Insurance Program,
2002 (Aug. 2003), available at http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/di-asr/2002/
di-asr02.pdf, p.2.
678. Id.
679. Matheny, 21 HAMLINE J. PuB. L. & POL'v at 286; see also Samuel R. Bagenstos,
The Americans with Disabilities Act as Welfare Reform, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 921
(2003); Matthew Diller, Dissonant Disability Policies: The Tensions Between the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act and Federal Disability Benefit Programs, 76 TEx. L. REV. 1003
(1998); Mark C. Weber, Beyond the Americans with Disabilities Act: A National Employ.
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the courts will be able to avoid legislating a consistent national policy
toward individuals with disabilities. Courts will also be able to end
the charade that the ADA, passed decades after the SSA, did not in-
tend to affect the SSA's viewpoints toward individuals with
disabilities.
G. CONCLUSION
The SSA and the ADA cannot be reconciled through judicial inter-
vention. To interpret the SSA as not including jobs that can be per-
formed with reasonable accommodations guts the full impact of the
ADA on the American workplace. Such a strained interpretation of
the SSA also reinforces negative-and outdated-societal myths
about individuals with disabilities. Individuals with disabilities
should be viewed for what they can do, not what they cannot do. We
should focus on the individual; not the disability. Courts should stop
interpreting the SSA and the ADA in such a way as to diminish indi-
viduals with disabilities by allowing them to make inconsistent state-
ments depending on what federal benefit they seek. This unfortunate
attempt to harmonize the two federal disability statutes puts
America's policy towards individuals with disabilities in the hands of
our federal courts, and not our elected policy leaders in the Congress.
A judicial case-by-case approach to this national issue assures individ-
uals with disabilities will receive dissimilar treatment depending on
which court views a particular case.
For courts to somehow usurp Congress's role by legislating a na-
tional policy towards individuals with disabilities is wholly inappro-
priate. Congress must act to set America on the proper course with a
consistent pro-work, anti-discrimination policy toward individuals
with disabilities. Forcing individuals with disabilities to choose be-
tween complete dependence on government aid versus no aid from
government whatsoever is the epitome of a Hobson's Choice. The ADA
tried mightily to reduce governmental dependence from those individ-
uals with disabilities in our society. With the SSA acting as either a
carrot or a stick to those courageous individuals with disabilities who
would rather be working than receiving a federal hand-out, the ADA
cannot reach its true potential. When the ADA does not reach its true
potential, Americans with disabilities cannot reach their true poten-
tial. When Americans with disabilities do not reach their true poten-
ment Policy for People with Disabilities, 46 BUFF. L. REV. 123 (1998); Jorge M. Leon,
Two Hats, One Head: Reconciling Disability Benefits and the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act of 1990, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 1139; Dana S. Connell, The Plaintiffs Two-Sided
Mouth: Defeating ADA Claims Based on Inconsistent Positions Taken by the Plaintiff in
Other Claims, 22 EMPLOYEE REL. L. J. 5 (1996).
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tial, America as a nation will not reach its true potential. The time for
a consistent national disability policy is past due. Congress must
speak with one clear voice so courts can avoid superlegislating when
confronted with ADA cases involving SSA benefits.
V. "EXCUSE ME, BUT IS THAT POSITION VACANT?" THE
FALSE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE ADA'S REASONABLE
ACCOMMODATION REQUIREMENT AND NATIONAL
LABOR POLICY
A. INTRODUCTION
The ADA's goal of providing reasonable accommodations to indi-
viduals with disabilities to allow those individuals employment oppor-
tunities may conflict with the national labor policy supporting
collective bargaining and seniority systems. When an employee with
a disability seeks reassignment to another position to accommodate
the employee's disability, reassigning the employee may satisfy the
ADA's reasonable accommodation requirement. However, if the posi-
tion the employee with a disability seeks is covered by a seniority sys-
tem, courts are faced with a potential conflict between the ADA and
national labor policy supporting seniority systems. This section dis-
cusses that potential conflict, but concludes courts have labored under
a false conflict.
Based on the ADA's plain language, when an employee with a dis-
ability seeks reassignment to a position that is legally vacant, the em-
ployer must accommodate the employee by reassigning her to the
vacant position.68 0 Of course, if reassignment would work an undue
hardship on the employer, then the employer can refuse to reassign
the employee. 68 1 On the other hand, when an employee with a disa-
bility seeks reassignment to a position that is not vacant, such an ac-
commodation request is unreasonable on its face, and the employee
must show special circumstances to make the reassignment request
reasonable. This simple application of straightforward principles
would resolve any potential conflict between the ADA and national
labor policy. Unfortunately, the judicial application of accommodation
principles involving reassignment to vacant positions is neither sim-
ple nor straightforward.
680. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B).
681. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
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B. ADA's REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION REQUIREMENT
The ADA prohibits discrimination "against a qualified individual
with a disability because of the disability of such individual."68 2 An
employer discriminates against an individual with a disability when it
does not make "reasonable accommodations to the known physical or
mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disabil-
ity who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can
demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hard-
ship on the operation of the business of such covered entity."683 A
reasonable accommodation under the ADA includes "reassignment to
a vacant position."68 4 Does the ADA's reasonable accommodation re-
quirement force an employer to reassign an employee with a disability
to an unfilled position covered by a seniority system? Does it make a
difference whether the seniority system finds its genesis in a collective
bargaining agreement or an employer's unilateral policy decision?
This straightforward issue has split the federal circuit courts and even
the Supreme Court. Unfortunately, courts' analysis of this seemingly
simple issue has been frustratingly complex.
C. LOWER COURTS UNNECESSARILY PIT NATIONAL LABOR POLICY
AGAINST THE ADA
Given the ADA's clear and simple language stating reassign-
ments to vacant positions are reasonable, the issue seems exceedingly
vulnerable to a quick and easy resolution. This is not the case. Courts
have not been content to base their opinions on the ADA's plain lan-
guage. Instead, courts have created a firestorm of litigation-and
frustration-by pitting collective bargaining agreements and national
labor policy against the ADA. This unfortunate confrontation has
been based on a false conflict. The resolution of this issue has nothing
to do with national labor policy-of which the ADA is an equal partner
-but should be decided based on the ADA's plain language. A fair
and reasonable interpretation of the ADA resolves all conflicts without
allowing an appearance that national labor policy trumps the ADA's
formidable and just-as-worthy goals. When an apparently vacant po-
sition is legally covered by a seniority system, there simply is no con-
flict between national labor policy and the ADA worthy of the lengthy
treatment given the issue by many courts.
682. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
683. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
684. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (emphasis added).
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1. Reassignment in the Collective Bargaining Context
When an individual with a disability seeks reassignment to a po-
sition covered by a collectively bargained seniority system, the circuit
courts have focused on the apparent conflict between the national la-
bor policy favoring collective bargaining and the ADA's reasonable ac-
commodation requirement. Thus, federal circuit courts have
unanimously agreed the ADA does not require an employer to transfer
an employee with a disability to a position covered by the seniority
provisions of a collective bargaining agreement.68 5 The reasoning has
been that such a reassignment would be unreasonable because it
would implicate union members' rights under the National Labor Re-
lations Act ("NLRA"). 68 6
It is elemental that national labor policy supports collective bar-
gaining. When passing the NLRA, Congress declared our national
policy encourages "the practice and procedure of collective bargain-
ing.., by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of associa-
tion, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own
choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of
their employment or other mutual aid or protection."68 7 The Supreme
Court has consistently recognized a national policy supporting collec-
tive bargaining agreements. 68 8
If the ADA and the NLRA truly squared off against each other in
the face of an actual conflict, which part of our national labor policy
should prevail? As discussed above, the EEOC has promulgated regu-
lations to address situations in which the ADA conflicts with other
federal laws: "It may be a defense to a charge of discrimination ...
that a challenged action is required or necessitated by another Fed-
eral law or regulation, or that another Federal law or regulation pro-
hibits an action (including the provision of a particular reasonable
685. Willis v. Pac. Maritime Assoc., 244 F.3d 675 (9th Cir. 2001); Boersig v. Union
Elec. Co., 219 F.3d 816 (8th Cir. 2000); Burns v. Coca-Cola Enterprises, 222 F.3d 247,
257 (6th Cir. 2000); Davis v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 205 F.3d 1301, 1307 (11th Cir.
2000); McGregor v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 187 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 1999); Pond v.
Michelin N. Am., Inc., 183 F.3d 592 (7th Cir. 1999); Aldrich v. Boeing Co., 146 F.3d 1265
(10th Cir. 1998); Cassidy v. Detroit Edison Co., 138 F.3d 629, 634 (6th Cir. 1998); Felici-
ano v. Rhode Island, 160 F.3d 780, 787 (1st Cir. 1998); Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox
Co., 117 F.3d 800, 810 (5th Cir. 1997); Kralik v. Durbin, 130 F.3d 76, 83 (3d Cir. 1997);
Eckles v. Consol. Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1051 (7th Cir. 1996); Benson v. Northwest
Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1114 (8th Cir. 1995); Milton v. Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118,
1125 (10th Cir. 1995).
686. See, e.g., Willis, 244 F.3d at 680-81 (citations omitted).
687. 29 U.S.C. § 151.
688. Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 265 (1964); N.L.R.B. v. Sands
Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332, 342 (1939); Consol. Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 236
(1938).
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accommodation) that would otherwise be required by this part."6 8 9
According to the EEOC and some federal courts, this conflict would
result in the NLRA trumping the ADA's accommodation require-
ment.6 90 Notwithstanding this conflict provision, the ADA's accom-
modation requirement does not pit the ADA against the NLRA or
national labor policy. Briefly, a position covered by a legally enforcea-
ble collective bargaining agreement does not become vacant because
another employee has a legal right to the position once it becomes
available. As no vacant position exists, such a reassignment to the
position would not be per se reasonable under the ADA's plain lan-
guage. Thus, in the run of the mill cases, an employee's request to be
reassigned to a position covered by a collective bargaining agreement
will be unreasonable, absent special circumstances that would show
the reassignment would indeed be reasonable.
Focusing on the apparent conflict between the ADA and the na-
tional labor policy supporting seniority systems also provides complex
inconsistencies in federal labor law. The ADA does not provide an ex-
ception to its accommodation requirements for seniority systems-
whether in the collective bargaining context or by an employer's uni-
lateral decision to provide them to employees. Congress's decision not
to protect seniority systems from its reach varies from its approach
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964691 and the Age Discrim-
ination in Employment Act of 1967.692 To allow seniority systems to
trump the ADA's reasonable accommodation requirement - in the face
of Congress's decision not to explicitly codify this conflict resolution
mechanism-would render the ADA a second-class labor statute. One
can surmise Congress's failure to use language it has used in other
labor statutes was not a scrivener error.
689. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(e).
690. See id.; Willis, 244 F.3d at 680-81.
691. "Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an un-
lawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensa-
tion, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide
seniority or merit system." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h).
692. "It shall not be unlawful for an employer, employment agency, or labor organi-
zation to take any action otherwise prohibited under [previous] subsections . . . to take
any action otherwise prohibited.., to observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system
that is not intended to evade the purposes of this chapter.. . ." 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)(A);
see Barnett, 535 U.S. at 420-21 ("Because Congress modeled several of the ADA's provi-
sions on Title VII, its failure to replicate Title VII's exemption for seniority systems
leaves the statute ambiguous, albeit with more than a hint that seniority rules do not
inevitably carry the day") (Souter, J., dissenting).
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2. Courts Address Seniority Systems Outside the Collective
Bargaining Context
When confronted with seniority systems outside the collective
bargaining context, such as seniority systems unilaterally imple-
mented by employers, the federal circuit courts have not found com-
mon ground. Because no national policy explicitly favors seniority
systems outside the collective bargaining arena, and because the
NLRA would not be implicated, the EEOC's conflict provision would
not control. Thus, for the EEOC's conflict provision to spring into ef-
fect, the focus lies in whether a seniority system is the result of collec-
tive bargaining. Under this analytical approach, the enforcement of
seniority systems in the wake of a reassignment request under the
ADA would depend on whether the seniority system arises from a col-
lective bargaining agreement or an employer's unilateral policy. Un-
fortunately, focusing on this distinction is a myopic view of the ADA's
plain language. Instead of focusing on the genesis of the seniority sys-
tem, the initial focus should be on the word "vacant" in the ADA's re-
assignment mandate. The outcome of such an analysis with this
starting point would hardly focus on where and how the seniority sys-
tem was born.
In Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc.,6 93 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
sitting en banc, addressed a question of first impression for the cir-
cuit.6 94 Specifically, the court asked "whether reassignment is a rea-
sonable accommodation in the context of a seniority system" not
mandated by a collective bargaining agreement. 6 95 Robert Barnett in-
jured his back while working for U.S. Air.6 9 6 When he returned from
disability leave, Barnett was unable to perform his cargo job, so he
asserted his seniority rights to transfer to another position in the
mailroom. 6 9 7 Barnett later learned that two employees with greater
seniority rights sought to transfer to the mailroom, which would have
required him to transfer back to the cargo area. 698 Barnett sought a
reasonable accommodation under the ADA to allow him to remain in
the mailroom.69 9 Taking five months to respond to Barnett's request,
U.S. Air finally removed Barnett from the mailroom and placed him
on injury leave. 70 0 Barnett then requested U.S. Air accommodate him
693. 228 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
694. Id. at 1108.
695. Id.
696. Id.
697. Id.
698. Id. at 1108-09.
699. Id. at 1109.
700. Id.
97520051
CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW
by providing special lifting equipment for the cargo area or by restruc-
turing his cargo job so he would perform only office work. 70 1
In the interim, Barnett filed discrimination charges with the
EEOC. 70 2 U.S. Air then formally denied Barnett's requests for accom-
modations, informing him he could bid for jobs within his work restric-
tions.703 Barnett sued U.S. Air for disability discrimination in
violation of the ADA, and the district court granted U.S. Air's sum-
mary judgment motion. 70 4 Barnett then appealed to the Ninth Cir-
cuit, claiming U.S. Air violated the ADA when it failed to grant his
accommodation request for reassignment to the mailroom. 70 5 Barnett
argued U.S. Air should have made an exception to its seniority policy
by allowing him to remain in the mailroom. 70 6 The Ninth Circuit rec-
ognized "[t]he question of whether an employer's unilaterally imposed
seniority system trumps a disabled employee's right to reassignment
has not been answered directly by any other circuit."70 7
The court asserted the ADA's legislative history belies "any per se
rule barring reassignment in the context of seniority systems," even
though the ADA contains no legislative history outside of the collec-
tive bargaining context. 70 8 The court then recognized the ADA con-
tains legislative history suggesting a collective bargaining agreement
can be a factor in determining whether a reasonable accommodation
exists, but that no per se bar is referenced. 70 9 The court further recog-
nized Congressional reports foresaw future collective bargaining
agreements that would permit employers to take all actions necessary
to comply with the ADA. 7 10
The court also pointed out the EEOC rejected any per se rule al-
lowing collective bargaining agreements to trump reasonable accom-
modation rights. 71 1 The court posited that, according to the EEOC,
the ADA requires a fact-specific analysis when deciding accommoda-
tion issues, and the presence of a collective bargaining agreement is
just another factor in the undue hardship analysis. 7 12 The court then
displayed an extremely awkward and counterintuitive style of analy-
sis. The court concluded "[b]oth the legislative history and the EEOC
701. Id.
702. Id.
703. Id.
704. Id.
705. Id.
706. Id. at 1117.
707. Id. at 1118-19.
708. Id. at 1119.
709. Id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 63 (1990), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News at 345).
710. Id.
711. Id.
712. Id. (citing EEOC Compliance Manual at 5463).
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reject any per se rule barring reasonable accommodation even when
reassignment would conflict with a collective bargaining agree-
ment."71 3 Nonetheless, the court recognized that most courts have re-
jected such an interpretation, including the Ninth Circuit itself.7 14
Apparently, the court simply drove down the collective bargaining
path to switch lanes, pointing out this case does not involve bar-
gained-for rights.7 15 The court stated the ADA's goals would be frus-
trated if an employer with a seniority system were not required to
reassign employees with disabilities: "Any per se rule barring reas-
signment because of conflicts with a seniority system would sharply
limit the range of available accommodations without any required
showing of undue burden on the employer. In many cases this would
eliminate the most effective or the only effective reasonable
accommodation." 71 6
The court then asserted the ADA's basic premise is accommoda-
tions should be based on the individualized needs of the employee with
a disability and the specific burdens faced by an employer. 7 17 In the
court's collective mind, a seniority system would preclude an accom-
modation only when it constitutes an undue hardship. 7 18 Recognizing
reassignment may constitute an undue burden in some circumstances,
the court propounded that "courts cannot assume that which is the
employer's burden to prove."719
The court held "reassignment is a reasonable accommodation and
that a seniority system is not a per se bar to reassignment."720 How-
ever, the court allowed the existence of a seniority system to be a fac-
tor in the employer's undue hardship analysis, which would allow "[a]
case-by-case fact intensive analysis... to determine whether any par-
ticular assignment would constitute an undue hardship to the em-
ployer."72 1 The court concluded that, if an employer with a seniority
system cannot show that reassignment would cause an undue hard-
ship, an employee with a disability is entitled to the requested reas-
signment.7 22 Finally, the court held a triable fact issue existed as to
whether permanently reassigning Barnett to the mailroom, in viola-
713. Id.
714. Id. n.4.
715. Id.
716. Id. at 1120.
717. Id.
718. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)).
719. Id.
720. Id.
721. Id.
722. Id.
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tion of the seniority system, would force an undue hardship on U.S.
Air.7 23
The en banc court was not unanimous. The dissent argued the
court's decision put employers, employees and attorneys in a regretta-
ble position when dealing with important and costly decisions con-
cerning reassignment.7 2 4 The dissent contended the majority's
allotting the existence of seniority systems single-factor status pro-
vided no guidance at all.7 2 5 The dissent foresaw litigation every time
a seniority system blocks a reassignment request.7 26 The dissent as-
serted this issue-how to deal with seniority systems when a reas-
signment is requested-is a policy question left for Congress, and the
courts should not resolve the issue.727 The dissent then contended the
majority "left [us] with legislation by litigation, and we become a na-
tion not of laws, but of lawyers."7 28
As opposed to the majority, the dissent found little guidance in
the ADA's legislative history, noting Congress considered seniority
rights to be merely a factor-and not a dispositive one-for employers
and courts to consider when conducting a reasonable accommodation
analysis.7 29 However, the dissent recognized the House and Senate
Reports clearly state that bumping senior employees is not a required
accommodation.7 30 Faced with the ADA's ambiguous legislative his-
tory, the dissent agreed with other circuits "that the ADA does not
require an employer to give disabled employees preference over
nondisabled employees in hiring and reassignment decisions."7 3 1
The dissent pointed out U.S. Air's decades-old seniority system
covers 14,000 employees and controls assignments, shifts, transfers
and holidays.7 3 2 The dissent recognized many courts have held em-
ployers do not need to violate collective bargaining agreements con-
taining seniority systems by providing accommodations to employees
with disabilities. 7 33 The dissent rejected Barnett's argument, and the
majority's conclusion, that U.S. Air's seniority system is not covered
723. Id. at 1120-21.
724. Id. at 1125 (Trott, J., dissenting).
725. Id. (Trott, J., dissenting).
726. Id. (Trott, J., dissenting).
727. Id. (Trott, J., dissenting).
728. Id. (Trott, J., dissenting).
729. Id. (Trott, J., dissenting) (citing S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 32 (1989)).
730. Id. (Trott, J., dissenting) (citing S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 32 (1989), H.R. Rep. No.
101-485, pt. 2, at 63 (1990)).
731. Id. (Trott, J., dissenting).
732. Id. (Trott, J., dissenting).
733. Id. at 1125-26 (Trott, J., dissenting) (citing Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox, Co.,
117 F.3d 800, 810 (5th Cir. 1997); Cochrum v. Old Ben Coal Co., 102 F.3d 908, 912-13
(7th Cir. 1996); Eckles v. Consol. Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1051 (7th Cir. 1996); Benson
v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1114 (8th Cir. 1995)).
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by the collective bargaining agreement cases because U.S. Air's sys-
tem was unilaterally implemented. 734 The dissent concluded the ADA
only requires employers to treat equally employees with disabilities
and employees without disabilities when hiring and reassigning em-
ployees. 7 35 The dissent concluded U.S. Air's seniority system trumped
the ADA's reassignment requirement: "[b]ecause Barnett's proposed
accommodation would violate U.S. Air's legitimate seniority policy, I
find that the proposed accommodation is unreasonable under the
ADA."736
The Ninth Circuit was unable to convince any other circuit to fol-
low its lead. In EEOC v. Sara Lee Corp.,73 7 the Fourth Circuit dis-
agreed with the Ninth Circuit by holding "the ADA does not require
an employer to deviate from its nondiscriminatory seniority policy in
order to accommodate a worker."738 Vanessa Turpin had worked for
Sara Lee Corporation for eight years before she was confronted with
being bumped by a senior employee. 73 9 When another facility closed,
the displaced workers at the closed facility had the option of asserting
their seniority rights to displace workers at another Sara Lee facil-
ity.7 40 The seniority policy was part of Sara Lee's internal policy and
not part of a collective bargaining agreement. 74 1 An employee from
the closed facility, with twenty years more seniority than Turpin, as-
serted seniority rights in order to take Turpin's position on the first
shift.7 4 2 Turpin, who had epilepsy, requested Sara Lee allow her to
remain on the first shift.74 3 To support this request, Turpin provided
a doctor's letter stating that changing shifts would affect Turpin's
sleep patterns, making her epileptic seizures worse. 744 However, the
doctor also stated Turpin could work either the first, second or third
shift, as long her shifts did not rotate. 74 5 Sara Lee chose not to bypass
its seniority policy to accommodate Turpin, but offered to move Turpin
to the second or third shift, lay Turpin off with twelve months of recall
rights, or pay Turpin a severance package.74 6 After taking the sever-
734. Id. at 1126 (Trott, J., dissenting).
735. Id. (Trott, J., dissenting).
736. Id. (Trott, J., dissenting).
737. 237 F.3d 349 (4th Cir. 2001).
738. EEOC v. Sara Lee Corp., 237 F.3d 349, 350 (4th Cir. 2001); see also Smith v.
Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1176 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (holding employer
has no duty to reassign an employee to a position covered by a seniority system).
739. Id. at 350-51.
740. Id. at 351.
741. Id.
742. Id.
743. Id.
744. Id.
745. Id.
746. Id.
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ance package, Turpin filed a discrimination charge with the EEOC,
which then sued Sara Lee for disability discrimination in violation of
the ADA. 74 7
The district court determined Sara Lee did not violate its duty to
provide a reasonable accommodation by following its seniority pol-
icy.748 On appeal, the EEOC argued the ADA required Sara Lee to
violate its seniority policy to accommodate Turpin.7 4 9 Rejecting this
argument, the Fourth Circuit decided that, "[flor those who are dis-
abled under the statute, the ADA operates as a shield against discrim-
ination; the statute is not a sword used to punish non-disabled
workers."750 The court's fundamental rationale in rejecting the
EEOC's argument to disregard the seniority system was "the ADA's
reasonable accommodation standard does not require an employer to
abandon a legitimate and non-discriminatory company policy" to ac-
commodate the wishes of an employee with a disability.7 51 The court
believed this principle would allow employers to set general policies
without the fear of uncertainty and litigation over requests for excep-
tions to the general policy. 752 The court cited seniority systems as
prime examples of policies employers are entitled to respect. 7 53
Confronting the ADA's requirement that Sara Lee allow transfers
to vacant positions, the court determined this requirement provides no
statutory right to supersede a seniority system.7 54 Although this case
involved Turpin's wish to remain in the same position as opposed to a
transfer, the court classified this as a distinction without a differ-
ence. 75 5 The court refused to allow Turpin to vault over workers with
decades more experience by requiring Sara Lee to suspend its senior-
ity policy.75 6
The EEOC also attacked Sara Lee's seniority policy itself, claim-
ing it was not well-entrenched or uniform. 75 7 In response, the court
747. Id.
748. Id. at 353.
749. Id.
750. Id. at 356.
751. Id. at 353-54 (citing Burns v. Coca-Cola Enter., 222 F.3d 247, 257 (6th Cir.
2000); Cravens v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Kansas City, 214 F.3d 1011, 1020 (8th
Cir. 2000); Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1176 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc);
Dalton v. Subaru-Isuzu Auto., Inc., 141 F.3d 667, 678 (7th Cir. 1998); Aka v. Wash.
Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1305 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc); Duckett v. Dunlop Tire Corp.,
120 F.3d 1222, 1225 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam); Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d
695, 700 (5th Cir. 1995)). But see Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1120 (9th Cir.
2000) (en banc).
752. Id. at 353.
753. Id. at 354.
754. Id.
755. Id.
756. Id.
757. Id.
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recognized the seniority policy had existed for thirty years (fifteen in
its current form); company workers knew about the policy; the policy
applied to filling vacant positions, priorities for shift assignments, and
interplant transfers; and the policy determined layoff and recall
rights. 7 58 The court concluded this "neutral and non-arbitrary
method of resolving sensitive questions in the workplace... allows all
workers to know the rules of the game before [an employment] deci-
sion is made."7 59 The court refused to force an exemption to Sara
Lee's long-standing application of seniority rights to interplant trans-
fers, noting such an exception would disrupt long-time employees' le-
gitimate expectations and expose the company to lawsuits by those
who were denied their rights under the seniority policy. 7 60
The court noted the EEOC acknowledged Sara Lee would not
have been required to make an exception to the seniority system if it
had been part of a collective bargaining agreement. 76 1 The court
found no reason to create different rules for legitimate and non-dis-
criminatory workplace policies depending on whether they are part of
collective bargaining agreements: "[aill workers-not just those cov-
ered by collective bargaining agreements-rely upon established com-
pany policies. The ADA does not require employers to disrupt the
operation of a defensible and non-discriminatory company policy in or-
der to provide a reasonable accommodation." 76 2
Finally, the Fourth Circuit addressed how forcing an employer to
make exceptions to their seniority policies to accommodate workers
with disabilities would affect other workers.76 3 The court recognized
that "requiring an employer to break a legitimate and non-discrimina-
tory policy tramples on the rights of other employees."7 64 The court
readily rejected this requirement by deciding the "ADA does not re-
quire employers to penalize employees free from disability in order to
vindicate the rights of disabled workers."76 5 In doing so, the court ap-
propriately focused on Congress's use of the word "vacant": "Congress
recognized the importance of honoring the rights of non-disabled em-
ployees when it defined 'reasonable accommodation' to include 'reas-
signment' only when a position is 'vacant.'" 76 6 The court decided the
ADA simply does not mandate an employer bump other employees to
758. Id.
759. Id. at 354-55.
760. Id. at 355.
761. Id.
762. Id.
763. Id.
764. Id.
765. Id.
766. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B)).
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accommodate an employee with a disability.7 67 Instead, the Fourth
Circuit interpreted the ADA as allowing an employer to treat an em-
ployee with a disability as it would other employees under a legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory policy.768 The court observed a contrary
decision "would convert a nondiscrimination statute into a mandatory
preference statute, a.result which would be both inconsistent with the
nondiscriminatory aims of the ADA and an unreasonable imposition
on the employers and coworkers of disabled employees."76 9 Given the
circuit split over the impact seniority systems have on the ADA's rea-
sonable accommodation requirement, the Supreme Court was forced
to wade into the debate to resolve the circuit split.
D. A SPLINTERED SUPREME COURT ENTERS FRAY
In 2002, the Supreme Court entered the fray to decide an em-
ployer's duty to reassign an individual with a disability to a position
covered by a seniority system. Unfortunately, the Court focused on
the wrong issue at the wrong point in the analysis. Justice Stephen
Breyer, writing for the Court in U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, pro-
pounded that the issue before the Court was how the ADA "resolves a
potential conflict between: (1) the interests of a disabled worker who
seeks assignment to a particular position as a 'reasonable accommoda-
tion,' and (2) the interests of other workers with superior rights to bid
for the job under an employer's seniority system. In such a case, does
the accommodation demand trump the seniority system?"7 70 As will
be flushed out below, the initial focus of the issue should not be on
which policy trumps the other, but whether a seniority system fore-
closes a position from ever becoming vacant under the ADA. Justice
Antonin Scalia, who lodged a dissent with Justice Clarence Thomas,
correctly stated "[tihe question presented asks whether the 'reasona-
ble accommodation' mandate of the [ADA] requires reassignment of a
disabled employee to a position that 'another employee is entitled to
hold... under the employer's bona fide and established seniority sys-
tem.'" 77 1 When the issue is presented in this manner, the answer nat-
urally follows that reassignment is not reasonable because no vacant
position exists. Instead of focusing in the first instance on whether a
position is vacant when subject to a seniority system, the Court dove
headfirst into the apparent conflict between the ADA and seniority
systems.
767. Id. (citing Gile v. United Airlines, 95 F.3d 492, 499 (7th Cir. 1996)).
768. Id.
769. Id. (quoting Dalton, 141 F.3d at 679).
770. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 393-94 (2002).
771. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 411-12 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Before conducting an analysis of the issue, the Court announced
that a "seniority system will prevail in the run of cases," as a conflict
between a seniority system and a requested accommodation ordinarily
deems the accommodation unreasonable. 77 2 However, the Court de-
clared a plaintiff will always be allowed to show special circumstances
make the requested accommodation reasonable. 7 73
The Court then addressed the parties' arguments. 77 4 U.S. Air 7 7 5
argued that, when a requested accommodation violates a seniority
system, the accommodation is always unreasonable.7 76 Barnett's "po-
lar opposite view" was that violating a seniority system does not make
the requested accommodation unreasonable. 77 7 Instead, Barnett ar-
gued employers must show the requested accommodation constitutes
an undue hardship on a case-by-case basis.7 78 U.S. Air's core argu-
ment was the ADA does not require employers to give preferential
treatment to individuals with disabilities.7 79 Thus, U.S. Air argued it
was not required to provide a preference to Barnett, because such a
preference would violate a disability-neutral workplace rule.78 0 The
Court acknowledged U.S. Air's argument was "linguistically logical,"
but easily recognized the ADA sometimes allows preferences be given
to individuals with disabilities to achieve its goals. 7 8 ' Specifically, the
ADA requires preferences in the form of reasonable accommodations
to allow individuals with disabilities to have the same opportunities
as those without disabilities. 78 2
The Court made clear an employer's disability-neutral rule does
not insulate the employer's rule from the ADA's requirement to pro-
vide preferential treatment when reasonable accommodations are re-
quired.78 3 If that were the case, numerous accommodations would be
placed outside the ADA's reach. 78 4 For example, the Court noted neu-
tral office assignment rules would not allow an accommodation for an
individual with a disability to work on the ground floor, neutral work
772. Id. at 394.
773. Id.
774. Id. at 396-402.
775. The Supreme Court referred to the defendant as U.S. Airways, while the Ninth
Circuit used U.S. Air to refer to the defendant. Because the defendant in this case has
already been referred to as U.S. Air in the discussion above, this article will continue to
refer to the defendant as U.S. Air.
776. Id. at 396.
777. Id.
778. Id. at 396-97.
779. Id. at 397.
780. Id.
781. Id.
782. Id.
783. Id.
784. Id.
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break rules would not allow an individual who needs additional
breaks to receive them, and a neutral furniture budget would not al-
low accommodations such as different kinds of chairs or desks.785
Thus, the Court concluded that, because of the nature of reasonable
accommodations, the examples listed in the ADA, and the ADA's "si-
lence about the exempting of neutral rules together convince us that
the Act does not create an automatic exemption" from preferences. 78 6
U.S. Air also argued that, whenever an established seniority sys-
tem would automatically assign a position to another worker, no "va-
cant position" would ever arise.787 The Court decided Congress did
not intend to provide the word vacant any specialized meaning. 788
The Court noted seniority systems could allow employees to bid for the
vacant position.78 9 In this case, Barnett occupied the mailroom posi-
tion, even though the seniority system allowed the position to become
open. 790 Furthermore, U.S. Air reserved the right to unilaterally
change the seniority system at any time.79 1 Thus, the Court rejected
the argument that the position was not vacant or that the ADA would
deny an accommodation based on that argument.792
The Court then turned to Barnett's arguments.793 Barnett ar-
gued a reasonable accommodation simply means an effective accom-
modation, as any other meaning would make reasonable
accommodation and undue hardship "virtual mirror images."794 This
interpretation would create a burden of proof dilemma, Barnett urged,
because the employee must show reasonable accommodation, while
the employer must show undue hardship. 795 The Court rejected Bar-
nett's arguments. First, the Court noted ordinary English dictates the
terms reasonable and effective are not synonymous, because the term
accommodation conveys the need for effectiveness, not the term rea-
sonable. 796 Second, the Court concluded the ADA's primary purpose
does not require Barnett's interpretation. 797 The ADA seeks to elimi-
nate stereotypical behavior that hinders those with disabilities from
785. Id. at 397-98.
786. Id. at 398.
787. Id. at 399. As seen by the discussion below, this compelling argument should
prevail in most cases.
788. Id.
789. Id.
790. Id.
791. Id.
792. Id.
793. Id. at 399-402.
794. Id. at 399-400.
795. Id. at 400.
796. Id.
797. Id. at 401.
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participating fully in the workplace. 798 Although affirmative conduct
is required to meet this purpose, only reasonable behavior is re-
quired. 799 Third, the Court rejected the burden of proof dilemma, not-
ing lower courts had already successfully reconciled reasonable
accommodation and undue hardship.8 0 0 The Court noted the em-
ployee "need only show that an 'accommodation' seems reasonable on
its face, i.e., ordinarily or in the run of cases."8 0 ' If the employee
meets this burden, the "employer then must show special (typically
case-specific) circumstances that demonstrate undue hardship in the
particular circumstances.8 0 2 Thus, according to the Court, Barnett's
case focused "on the relationship between seniority systems and the
plaintiffs need to show that an 'accommodation' seems reasonable on
its face, i.e., ordinarily or in the run of cases."8 0 3
The Court assumed Barnett's request for reassignment to the
mailroom would ordinarily be reasonable, but stated this assumption
changes when the reassignment would violate the rules of a seniority
system.80 4 The Court asked whether that circumstance-the pres-
ence of a seniority system-would make the accommodation unrea-
sonable.8 0 The Court held the answer is ordinarily yes: "the statute
does not require proof on a case-by-case basis that a seniority system
should prevail[, because] it would not be reasonable in the run of cases
that the assignment in question trump the rules of a seniority system.
To the contrary, it will ordinarily be unreasonable for the assignment
to prevail."8 0 6
The Court focused on several factors to support its holding. The
Court highlighted "the importance of seniority to employee-manage-
ment relations."8 0 7 For support, the Court cited its decision in Trans
World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison,8 0 8 which held, in the Title VII con-
text, that an employer need not accommodate an employee's worship
needs when it would conflict with the seniority rights of other employ-
ees.8 0 9 The Court also recognized lower courts unanimously deter-
mined that "collectively bargained seniority trumps the need for
reasonable accommodation in the context of the linguistically similar
798. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a), (b)).
799. Id.
800. Id.
801. Id.
802. Id. at 402.
803. Id.
804. Id. at 402-03.
805. Id. at 403.
806. Id.
807. Id.
808. 432 U.S. 63, 79-80 (1977).
809. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 403.
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Rehabilitation Act."8 10 The Court refused to distinguish between col-
lectively bargained seniority rights and seniority rights unilaterally
imposed by management, because the advantages are the same, as are
the difficulties resulting from violations of either system.8 1 1 The
Court recognized seniority systems benefit employees by fulfilling ex-
pectations of fair and uniform treatment, job security, loyalty, and due
process in personnel decisions.8 12 The Court refused to require em-
ployers to show more than the existence of a seniority system, because
this would "substitute a complex case-specific 'accommodation' deci-
sion made by management for the more uniform, impersonal opera-
tion of seniority rules .... We can find nothing in the [ADA] that
suggests Congress intended to undermine seniority systems in this
way."8 13
The Court was not finished, explaining that an employee could
show "special circumstances [which] warrant a finding that, despite
the presence of a seniority system (which the ADA may not trump in
the run of cases), the requested 'accommodation' is 'reasonable' on the
particular facts."8 14 According to the Court, such an example might
be when an employer, which retains the right to change the seniority
system, changes the system frequently.8 15 This act would reduce em-
ployee expectations that the system will be followed, which may neces-
sitate a finding that another departure from the system would make
little difference.8 16 Another example, according to the Court, would
be where the seniority system already contains exceptions, such that
another exception would not matter.8 17 Thus, the Court declared,
"the plaintiff must bear the burden of showing special circumstances
that make an exception from the seniority system reasonable in the
particular case.8 18 To meet this burden, "the plaintiff must explain
why, in the particular case, an exception to the employer's seniority
policy can constitute a 'reasonable accommodation' even though in the
ordinary case it cannot."8 19
To sum up, the Court explained the ADA does not ordinarily re-
quire reassignments that would violate established seniority sys-
tems.8 20 Thus, summary judgment is usually warranted when a
810. Id. (citations omitted).
811. Id. at 404.
812. Id.
813. Id. at 404-05.
814. Id. at 405.
815. Id.
816. Id.
817. Id.
818. Id. at 405-06.
819. Id. at 406.
820. Id.
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showing is made that an assignment would violate a seniority system,
"unless there is more."8 2 1 The burden is on the plaintiff to provide
"more," which means "special circumstances surrounding the particu-
lar case that demonstrate the assignment is nonetheless reasona-
ble."8 2 2 Although five justices concurred in the Court's decision,
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, who cast a critical fifth vote, wrote a
convincing concurring opinion.
E. JUSTICE O'CONNOR CREATES MAJORITY, BUT COURT REJECTED
HER SHARP ANALYSIS
Justice O'Connor used precision analysis to focus on the critical
issue facing the Court without being detracted by an apparent-but
false- conflict.8 23 Justice O'Connor properly focused on whether a
vacant position exists. This focus controls the rest of the accommoda-
tion analysis. If a position is not vacant, then a requested reassign-
ment is not reasonable, on its face, under the ADA. A legally
enforceable seniority system will prevent a position from becoming va-
cant. Thus, in those circumstances, the employee would be required to
show special circumstances why the reassignment is still nonetheless
reasonable. When a position actually becomes vacant-with no indi-
vidual having a legal entitlement to that position-then the requested
accommodation will be per se reasonable under the ADA's plain mean-
ing. In those circumstances, the employer bears the burden to show
the reassignment would constitute an undue hardship.
Justice O'Connor recognized the ADA's plain language specifically
lists reassignment to a vacant position as a reasonable accommoda-
tion.s 24 Thus, when confronted with "deciding whether an otherwise
reasonable accommodation involving a reassignment is unreasonable
because it would require an exception to a seniority system," Justice
O'Connor declared, "the relevant issue is whether the seniority system
prevents the position in question from being vacant."8 2 5 As vacant
means "not filled or occupied by an incumbent [or] possessor,"8 26 Jus-
tice O'Connor concluded a vacant position, in the workplace context,
means "a position in which no employee currently works and to which
no individual has a legal entitlement."8 27 Thus, when an employee
occupying a position quits and that position is subject to a legally en-
821. Id.
822. Id.
823. Id. at 408-11 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
824. Id. at 408-09 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B)).
825. Id. at 409 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
826. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary
2527 (1976)).
827. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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forceable seniority system, the position never becomes vacant because
an employee entitled to the position under a seniority system is the
possessor of that position.8 28 However, when a seniority policy is un-
enforceable, an employee expecting the position under the unenforce-
able policy would not have a contractual right to the position and
would not be considered a possessor.8 2 9 Thus, with this understand-
ing, Justice O'Connor easily declared that, "[i]f a position is not vacant
[because a seniority system creates a legal entitlement to another
employee], then reassignment to it is not a reasonable
accommodation."8 30
Justice O'Connor recognized that the ADA's plain meaning8 31 is
supported by comments in the legislative history that the ADA was
not meant to bump other employees in order to provide an accommo-
dation.8 32 Because Justice O'Connor's eminently reasonable analysis
faithfully follows the ADA's clear and unmistakable language, her
analysis is unassailable and should have preceded the Court's
analysis.
Justice O'Connor accepted the Court's conclusion that the plain-
tiff must show the method of accommodation "is reasonable in the run
of cases."8 33 Justice O'Connor also agreed that, once this showing has
been made, the employer "must show special [ ] circumstances that
demonstrate undue hardship."8 34 Thus, Justice O'Connor agreed with
the analytical path to determine whether an employee has set forth a
reasonable accommodation request and whether the employer has
shown an undue hardship, "preventing the concepts from overlapping
by making reasonableness a general inquiry and undue hardship a
specific inquiry."8 3 5 However, Justice O'Connor took offense with the
Court's "blend[ing] the two inquiries by suggesting that the plaintiff
should have the opportunity to prove that there are special circum-
stances in the context of that particular seniority system that would
cause an exception to the system to be reasonable despite the fact that
such exceptions are unreasonable in the run of cases."8 3 6
828. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
829. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
830. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
831. Id. at 410 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) ("reas-
signment to a vacant position") (emphasis added)).
832. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, p. 63 (1990),
reprinted in, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 345 ("The Committee also wishes to make clear
that reassignment need only be to a vacant position-'bumping' another employee out of
a position to create a vacancy is not required"); S. Rep. No. 101-116, p. 32 (1989) (same)).
833. Id. at 410 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
834. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Barnett, 535 U.S. at 402).
835. Id. at 410-11 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
836. Id. at 411 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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Although troubled by the Court's reasoning, Justice O'Connor no-
bly concluded the Court's analysis would often lead to the correct out-
come had her reasoning been adopted. 37 Thus, in order to forge a
majority, Justice O'Connor concurred in the Court's opinion, providing
the crucial fifth vote to avoid stalemate and to establish a majority
rule in this case.8 3 8 In allowing a majority to be forged with her vote,
Justice O'Connor made the following concession: "in order that the
Court may adopt a rule, and because I believe the Court's rule will
often lead to the same outcome as the one I would have adopted, I join
the Court's opinion despite my concerns."8 39
Unfortunately, the Court failed to adopt Justice O'Connor's analy-
sis, which would have provided the same end-result with a better ra-
tionale. To be unduly dramatic, Sir Winston Churchill's admonition
about perseverance may have persuaded Justice O'Connor to hold
steadfast: "Never give in, never give in, never, never, never, never-in
nothing, great or small, large or petty-never give in except to convic-
tions of honor and good sense."8 40 Had Justice O'Connor's rationale
been adopted, the Court would have avoided the false conflict between
the ADA and national labor policy supporting seniority systems. In-
stead, the Court would have properly focused on the ADA's plain
language.
F. CORRECT APPLICATION OF BARNErr
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recently
confronted a post-Barnett case involving a reassignment request by an
individual with a disability subject to a seniority system. In Dilley v.
SuperValu, Inc.,841 Donald Dilley worked as a truck driver for
SuperValu for eighteen years before developing back problems, which
limited him to a sixty-pound lifting restriction.8 4 2 Dilley requested
SuperValu accommodate him by assigning him to truck routes that
did not require heavy lifting.8 43 SuperValu claimed such an accom-
modation was unreasonable because it would require SuperValu to vi-
olate a collective bargaining agreement to make such an
accommodation.8 4 4 SuperValu argued that, because the driving posi-
tions were subject to a collective bargaining agreement, Dilley could
837. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
838. Id. at 408, 411 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
839. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 655-56
(1998) (Stevens, J., concurring), and Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 607-08 (1999) (Ste-
vens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).
840. Sir Winston Spencer Churchill, Address at Harrow School (Oct. 29, 1941).
841. 296 F.3d 958 (10th Cir. 2002).
842. Dilley v. SuperValu, Inc., 296 F.3d 958, 961 (10th Cir. 2002).
843. Id.
844. Id. at 963.
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have been bumped from any position, and keeping him in the position
would violate the collective bargaining agreement.8 4 5 SuperValu re-
fused to accommodate Dilley; instead, it discharged him.8 46 Dilley
sued SuperValu under the ADA, and a jury found SuperValu had
failed to accommodate Dilley.8 4 7 SuperValu appealed.
The Tenth Circuit recognized the ADA "does not require an em-
ployer to provide an accommodation that would violate a bona fide se-
niority system under the terms of a collective bargaining
agreement."8 48 However, the court clarified this principle by noting
"it is the direct violation of a seniority system that has been held un-
reasonable under the governing case law."8 49 Applying this rule to
the facts, the court noted Dilley's requested accommodation presented
"only a potential violation of the seniority system."85 0 Specifically, the
court noted only four out of forty-two drivers had more seniority than
Dilley.8 5 1 In addition, SuperValu relied on the possibility that some-
one with greater seniority might, in the future, seek to bump Dil-
ley.8 52 Thus, the court allowed a jury to determine whether this was a
remote possibility: "[e]ven if a more senior driver did request Dilley's
new position, there is no reason why SuperValu would have to violate
the seniority system by refusing to remove Dilley from the bumped job
until other routes or positions would become available."8 5 3 Because
SuperValu's reason for not providing an accommodation to Dilley was
speculative, i.e., based on a "concern regarding potential violations of
the seniority system," the court held the jury was able to determine
Dilley's requested accommodation was reasonable.8 54
If the Supreme Court had adopted Justice O'Connor's rationale,
the Dilley case would have been vulnerable to a simple resolution,
and, quite possibly, would not have been appealed to the Tenth Cir-
cuit. Dilley sought reassignment to a position to which no one else
had a right to occupy under the collective bargaining agreement.
Thus, the position was vacant. Dilley's accommodation request was
per se reasonable under the ADA's plain language. Thus, SuperValu
had the burden to show reassigning Dilley would have worked an un-
845. Id.
846. Id. at 961.
847. Id. at 961-62.
848. Id. at 963.
849. Id. (citing U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002)).
850. Id.
851. Id.
852. Id.
853. Id. at 963-64.
854. Id. at 964; see also Morton v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 272 F.3d 1249, 1254 (9th
Cir. 2001) (pre-Barnett case recognizing reassignment can be reasonable under a collec-
tively bargained seniority system when reassignment does not conflict with the senior-
ity system).
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due hardship. Regardless of the proof issue confronting SuperValu's
undue hardship defense, Dilley's case would have followed a much
clearer analytical path to resolution had the Tenth Circuit been able
to follow Justice O'Connor's reasoning, which would have focused, in
the first instance, on whether the position Dilley sought was actually
vacant.
Focusing on whether the ADA's reasonable accommodation re-
quirement conflicts with national labor policy is misplaced. Similarly,
focusing on whether a seniority system is based on a collectively bar-
gained seniority system or one unilaterally imposed by an employer is
also misplaced. Finally, failing to focus on whether a position to which
an individual with a disability seeks reassignment is vacant clouds
the entire issue of whether the requested reassignment is reasonable.
An example will demonstrate why. On Wednesday, MJ, Inc. hires
Warren B. for a financial analyst position. The parties sign an em-
ployment agreement, which states Warren begins his new job as a fi-
nancial analyst the following Monday. On Friday, Wally, a current
MJ employee, seeks reassignment to the financial analyst position as
an accommodation for his disability. The financial analyst position is
not subject to a collective bargaining agreement and MJ does not have
a seniority system in place. Under the ADA's plain language, Wally's
accommodation request is unreasonable on its face because the posi-
tion is not vacant. Wally will need to show special circumstances why
reassignment to the filled analyst position would still constitute a rea-
sonable accommodation under the ADA. Thus, the proper focus is
whether the position is vacant. Whether this example occurs in an
employment environment controlled by a seniority system or not, the
results will be the same if courts, employers, employees and attorneys
were free to follow Justice O'Connor's sound analysis.
G. CONCLUSION
The ADA's reasonable accommodation requirement does not con-
flict with national labor policy supporting collective bargaining agree-
ments or seniority systems. When courts confront cases involving an
employee with a disability seeking reassignment to a position covered
by a seniority system, the Supreme Court in Barnett held the em-
ployee will be unable, in the run of the cases, to show the accommoda-
tion request is reasonable. Although this holding reaches the correct
result, the Court in Barnett appeared to get ahead of itself by failing to
focus, in the first instance, on the issue of whether a position is even
vacant. Justice O'Connor properly focused the inquiry, in the first in-
stance, on whether a position is vacant. Once a court asks whether
the position is vacant-and determines the position is not vacant-
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then the Court's analysis applies. If a position is vacant, then an em-
ployee's accommodation request is reasonable under the ADA. If the
position is vacant, an employer still has the undue hardship defense.
If the position is not vacant, then the employee's request is not reason-
able on its face. To gain an accommodation in those circumstances,
the employee would need to show special circumstances why the ac-
commodation is reasonable.
VI. ERADICATING THE DISABLING COMPLEXITY OF
AMERICA'S DISABILITY POLICY
It seems the law becomes excessively complicated with each pass-
ing year. As established by the list of federal labor and employment
statutes contained in footnote one above, the federal government ex-
tensively regulates the employment arena. Against an astounding
backdrop of complex federal legislation, the ADA joined other vital
federal labor and employment laws in 1990. In the fourteen years
since the ADA was enacted, the ADA's noble policies have interacted
with the policies of other federal labor and employment statutes.
Needless to say, an already complex ADA became even more complex
when analyzed alongside other federal labor and employment laws.
This article addressed some of the most noteworthy interactions
between the ADA and other federal laws. Whether the ADA's policies
confront the national policies announced by the FMLA, OSHA, Title
VII, the SSA or the NLRA, the result should be the same-a consist-
ently applied national policy toward individuals with disabilities. The
grand aspirations of the ADA-to mainstream individuals with disa-
bilities, to decrease their federal independence, to empower them, and
to guarantee their equal treatment-can be accomplished only if the
ADA's purposes stand on their own.8 5 5 Relegating the ADA to a sec-
855. An independent federal agency, the National Council on Disability ("NCD"),
contends judicial decisions have thwarted the ADA's purposes. Congress created the
NCD as an independent federal agency designed to "promote policies, programs, prac-
tices, and procedures that (A) guarantee equal opportunity for all individuals with disa-
bilities, regardless of the nature or severity of the disability; and (B) empower
individuals with disabilities to achieve economic self-sufficiency, independent living,
and inclusion and integration into all aspects of society." 29 U.S.C. § 780(a)(2)(A)-(B).
On December 1, 2004, the NCD published a 152-page document entitled Righting the
ADA, available at, http'//www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2004/pdf/righting-ada.
pdf. The paper argues recent Supreme Court decisions have negatively impacted the
ADA and relegated individuals with disabilities to "second-class citizen status." Id. at
11. The paper sets forth a legislative proposal entitled "The ADA Restoration Act of
2004," see id. at 12-27, "designed to get the ADA back on track." Id. at 11. The NCD
states its proposed legislation is "designed to reinstate the scope of protection the [ADA]
affords, to restore previously available remedies to successful ADA claimants, and to
repudiate or curtail inappropriate or harmful defenses that have been grafted onto the
carefully crafted standards of the ADA." Id. at 123. The NCD maintains the ADA Res-
toration Act is not intended "to proffer some new, different rendition of the ADA, but,
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ond-class employment statute is as bad as relegating individuals with
disabilities to second-class citizens, which occurred for far too long.
Hopefully, when courts, attorneys, employers and individuals with
disabilities fully recognize how the ADA interacts with other federal
employment laws, they will be well-equipped to assure the ADA is
consistently and compassionately interpreted to effectuate its goals.
When that happens, the ADA's dream will be fulfilled.
rather, to return the [ADA] to the track that Congress understood it would follow when
it enacted the statute in 1990." Id. Neither Congress nor the President has acted upon
the NCD's legislative proposal.
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